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What is education? This question demands that we not 
only describe the general nature of education, but also that 
we describe the qualities, problems and conflicts, which 
make up the present reality of education. The question is 
thus as philosophically pertinent as it is politically urgent 
— it demands reflection but not without imposing con-
frontation. To pose it is a way of questioning the answers 
that define and govern what education is and can be said 
to be today.
So what is said of education today? It might be hailed 
as a human right, thought of as a means against poverty 
and inequality; it might be considered an answer to 
market demands, a producer of workforce, consumers 
and citizens; or it might be defined simply in accordance 
with a quantifiable measure. Answers such as these are 
presented to us by governments and administrators of 
education. What they all have in common, however, is 
that they only value education in instrumental terms, as 
a practical means to an end. They do not judge education 
on its own terms — as an institution of insight, learning 
and knowledge — and thus they do not provide an answer 
to the question of education itself.
INTRODUCTION
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In these times where education is not merely a pastime of 
the privileged few, but a necessary means to ensure one’s 
livelihood, and where institutional autonomy too often 
only means becoming enslaved by commercial or private 
interests, the old dream of strong educational institutions 
unregulated by private or political influences is severely 
challenged. Thus perhaps, we face the same questions 
Plato and Socrates did when challenged by the Sophists of 
their time, and like them, we must ask ourselves: how can 
true insight be found? Can true knowledge be bought and 
institutionalized or, rather, must it be found in a commu-
nity of real friends, lovers and rivals of knowledge itself? 
If the answers to the question of education today 
similarly seem lost in the conflicts of the polis, it does not 
mean that we should allow our questioning to stagnate in 
the rigidity of the answers presented, or that we should 
disregard it altogether. As Hannah Arendt points out in 
her essay ”The Crisis in Education”, we must recognize “the 
opportunity provided by the very fact of crisis — that tears 
away facades and obliterates prejudices — to explore into 
whatever has been laid bare of the essence of the matter”. 
We should not deny the questions raised by the crisis nor 
the very meaning of krísis — a situation which requires 
a decision — that is, if we deny it becoming a moment of 
reflection and a possibility for action. As Arendt continues: 
“A crisis forces us back to the questions themselves and 
requires from us either new or old answers, but in any case 
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direct judgements.” And so we must Socratically confront 
those who claim to know, those who claim to have the right 
answers; just as those who know only too well what is not 
known will have to continue their questioning; for it is not 
our ability to formulate the right answers that will allow 
us to shed light on the nature of education, but rather, our 
ability to ask questions; to judge, reflect and think. The 
purpose of this anthology is to provide an opportunity to 
exercise these capabilities, to encourage thinking.
However, individual critical thinking will never be enough 
on its own; the educations of a society do not evolve by the 
progress of individuals, education needs a community to 
thrive. That is, a community that reflects on its own rela-
tion to the past and the future, as Immanuel Kant argued: 
”[Education] can advance only step by step, and a proper 
idea of the peculiar nature of education can arise only as 
one generation hands down its experience and wisdom 
to the one following, and this in turn, adding something, 
gives it over to its successor”. 
We need to take this lesson to heart while pursuing 
new ways of thinking, recalling the old meaning of the 
word university: universitas magistrorum et scholarium 
— it is a community of those who strive, masters as well 
as novices, in a common pursuit of knowledge (which, 
however, is not the same as saying that it is a democratic 
community of equals, see p. 236 in the present volume). 
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Any educational institution is an institution of commu-
nity, and it is the communities of the schools which must 
stand together against the onslaught of cutbacks and must 
insist on this character of community in opposition to 
all the ‘incentives’ directed at individuals, pitting them 
against each other. Teachers must stand by students who 
revolt, students must stand by teachers in pressure-filled 
working conditions. We must stop thinking of ‘student 
politics’ only - a remnant from ‘68, a different time to be 
sure - and instead think of an ’educational’ or ‘university’ 
politics which can stand together against our common 
challenges. And if all defensive measures fail, we must 
reinvent our community from the broken shards of our 
academies, universities and educational institutions, asking 
once again: What is an education worthy of the name?
✳
The contributions to this volume are, each in their own 
way, results of this urgent question. To a great extent, they 
reflect the understanding of the question not ‘merely’ as a 
matter of ontology, but indeed also as one of normativity. 
Regardless of the perspective from which one approaches 
the question “What is education?”, it seems clear that 
the answer will never be neutral, and furthermore that 
every answer proposed inevitably poses new questions. 
Education truly appears to be a question which requires 
us to think and rethink how we institutionalize thinking. 
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Each contributor faces this problem differently, but they 
all remain faithful to the problem of education.
The contributors themselves come from various back-
grounds such as educational studies, philosophy, psycho-
analysis, sociology and philology, yet certain recurring 
thoughts and themes can be found throughout the texts: 
the role of education within the public and private sphere, 
freedom or autonomy as both the end and precondition 
for education, the relation between teaching and research, 
the economical influence of privatization and financial-
ization, the effects and threats of instrumentalization. 
These themes addressed provoke new necessary questions: 
What happens to teaching when it is no longer research 
based and vice versa: what happens to research? What 
role should education have within the public and private 
sphere, and how should public and private interest be 
allowed to influence education? How should we conceive 
the university in a time where economical structures and 
incentives influence even the purpose of education itself? 
Can we, as students and teachers, reclaim the notion of 
vocation from the instrumental meaning it has taken on 
today, and restore it to its literary sense, that is, as a calling, 
as a passionate pursuit of knowledge?
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Henrik Jøker Bjerre
Associate Professor, Institute for learning and philosophy 
Aalborg University
Henrik Jøker Bjerre employs Kant’s concept of public 
and private use of reason to shed light on the discussions 
today regarding the future of the academy. He emphasizes 
the importance of the public use of reason, which is a 
matter of serving reason itself rather than some external 
authority. The very possibility of a public use of reason, 
he claims, is threatened today as a consequence of the 
increasing privatization of public space, not least the 
universities. Based on the idea that any space, as long as 
it is not serving private interests, can enable the use of 
public reason, he argues that a solution might be found 
outside the institutions.
Wendy Brown
Professor, Political Science, University of California, Berkeley 
Wendy Brown discusses the concept of vocation or Beruf 
as it is presented by Max Weber. Contrary to the original 
sense of the word, where it is conceived as a calling, to-
day it is, ironically, understood as job training - or artes 
mechanicae, as opposed to artes liberales. She argues that 
the increased role of financialization within education, by 
encouraging financially privileged or risk-willing students, 
influences the students’ choice of academic field, resulting 
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in the dominance of ‘rational’, in the sense of economically 
rewarding, subjects of study. What we risk, according to 
Brown, is a loss of freedom.
Elie During
Associate professor of philosophy, Paris Nanterre University, 
seminar lecturer at the École Nationale Supérieure des 
Beaux-Arts in Paris, and professor of philosophy at the 
European Graduate School.
In an interview, Elie During reflects on his own expe-
riences as a student and as a teacher of philosophy. He 
describes it as the privilege of teachers to be able to lead 
an indefinitely prolonged life as student. In this way, he 
points to the shared interests and problems of professors 
and students. In discussing the dynamics of education he 
designates “distraction” as one of the most grave challenges, 
but also as an opportunity for creative thought.
Christopher Fynsk
Professor and Dean of the Division of Philosophy, Art, 
and Critical Thought, European Graduate School in Saas-
Fee, Switzerland and Professor Emeritus at the University 
of Aberdeen.
Christopher Fynsk emphasizes the importance of inter-
disciplinarity, not merely as an attempt to further the 
functionality or technical skills suitable for a “knowledge 
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economy“, but for the sake of viewing education as a 
whole. By isolating each subject from one another, we risk 
falling into an abstract jargon which veils the connection 
between subjects. With regard to education as a quest 
for freedom, what is to be learnt is inherently a form of 
auto-didaxy and the “thing” that education, regarded as 
a whole, approaches is res publica, a commitment to ed-
ucation as inherently public, i.e. as accessible regardless 
of advanced preparation.
Siegfried Zielinski
Rector, Karlsruhe University of Arts and Design
Zielinski’s contribution is a draft for the faculties of an 
imaginary academy. Inspired by the Deleuzian thought 
of the Matinican writer Eduoard Glissant, Zielinski views 
the faculty not as a clearly delimited area of science, but 
rather as an energetic field that cultivates the connection 
between different territories of thought and art.
Steen Nepper Larsen
Associate professor, Danish School of Education
Steen Nepper Larsen constructs a small and colourful 
systematic ontology of education. He gives a description 
of three different approaches to the question of the essence 
of education. The first is the blind process of production 
of knowledge in contemporary capitalism. Next, two 
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diametrically opposed approaches to human nature and 
its capacity of education is discussed, the first is guided 
by the conviction that man is fundamentally defined by 
a lack, the other by the conviction that man is defined 
by creativity.
Kirsten Hyldgaard
Associate professor, Danish School of Education
Kirsten Hyldgaard sets out to analyse why research is 
regarded as more valuable than the task of teaching 
at the university. This leads her to question the role of 
education in society as such; why have institutions of 
teaching been a part of history for so long? Deploying 
theoretical psychoanalysis, she looks at education not as 
caused by some inner life force in man, but rather, as an 
anxious questioning originating in the frail individual’s 
confrontation with the weight of culture.
Mladen Dolar
Senior research fellow in the Department of Philosophy, 
University of Ljubljana
In his contribution, Slovene philosopher Mladen Dolar 
answers a series of question sent to him by university 
activists from Copenhagen. Dolar points toward the 
internal contradictions of the modern university: How 
knowledge has overtaken the role that the master inhabited 
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in traditional societies, how the idea of democracy and 
the idea of science might be at odds, how the university is 
split between, on the one hand educating students towards 
professions and on the other doing research that dares to 
be out of touch with the ideas of its contemporary society.
Steen Ebbesen
Professor emeritus in classic and medieval literature, 
Copenhagen university
In his text, originally delivered as his valedictory lecture 
after more than forty years of loyal service to the University, 
Steen Ebbesen presents the development and dissolution 
of the University as an institution, all the way from the 
Academy of Plato to the contemporary University of 
Copenhagen. In this way, he not only makes clear the 
history of the institution in all its glory and meticulous 
tragedy, but also the probable catastrophe of the pres-
ent-day situation.
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This anthology has been informed by a series of seminars 
held at Literaturhaus, Copenhagen, in which students, 
teachers and invited speakers discussed the situation of 
education today. 
Bypassing regular chains of distribution, the book will be 
distributed free of charge and made directly available to 
anyone: students, educators and educational institutions 
that wish to arrange seminars or debates on the question 
of education. 
The editors are all students at the University of Copenhagen 
or European Graduate School. The book has been con-
ceived on the basis of their experiences with university 
politics and activism and years of study at these two very 
different educational institutions. 
For more information:  
www.whatiseducation.net
The anthology is financed with means from DUF  
(Dansk ungdoms fællesråd) and Snabslanten. 
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PUBLIC USE OF REASON IN THE KITCHENS
Henrik Jøker Bjerre 
In Immanuel Kant’s distinction between the private and 
the public use of reason lies a key to some of the issues 
at stake in the contemporary debates on the future of the 
academy. In his essay on enlightenment from 1784, Kant 
defines the freedom to make public use of one’s reason as 
the only absolutely necessary prerequisite for the progress 
of society:
For this enlightenment, however, nothing is 
required but freedom, and indeed the least 
harmful of anything that could even be called 
freedom: namely, the freedom to make public 
use of one’s reason in all matters (Kant 1996: 18).
At first glance, the public use of reason appears only to 
concern the freedom of expression. If you have an opin-
ion about how things are run, in the public sphere or at 
your own work place, you should be allowed to state this 
opinion publicly because this is the only way we can make 
sure that mistakes, malpractices, and incoherent ideas are 
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being challenged and overcome. Kant emphasizes that 
any sovereign should gladly welcome the public use of 
reason, because it corroborates a well-functioning state 
through gradual reform rather than sudden, dramatic 
revolutionary acts.
The term “public use of reason,” however, does not simply 
equal ‘free speech’ in the sense of everyone being allowed 
to say whatever he or she pleases. There is not much 
progress for humanity in listening to someone’s bigotry 
or immediate emotional impressions. The limits of free 
speech, in this sense, is not really what is on Kant’s mind 
at all. Rather, he makes an important distinction between 
the public use of reason and what he calls the “private 
use of reason,” which does not mean that which one says 
or does at home, in private, as opposed to outside or to 
many people. By the private use of reason, Kant means a 
use of reason “which one may make of it in a certain civil 
post or office with which [one] is entrusted” (ibid.). The 
“privacy,” thus, concerns how one performs one’s own 
specific role, administrates the responsibility that one is 
entrusted, and, in general, does what one is supposed to 
do as a subject to maintain a decent life and function as 
a normal citizen. A policeman, for example, is entrusted 
with a certain mandate to regulate traffic or investigate a 
crime. This job has certain frames and regulations, which 
one must follow, and it is not up for grabs how you wish to 
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interpret these. You need good judgement and the ability 
to interpret situations and act on them appropriately, and 
your conduct must remain within the relevant laws and the 
order of command in the police force in question. Being 
a policeman, with all that it entails, is to make a private 
use of reason. You may serve the public in an important 
sense, but you are also doing as you are told and staying 
out of trouble, whilst receiving a salary and a certain kind 
of social status. You may disagree with your superiors and 
you may, at the right time and the right place, let them 
know that you disagree, but at the end of the day, you 
must follow orders. Kant is all for the private use of reason 
and maintains that it is an essential prerequisite for one 
to have a well-functioning society. If a (precisely) private 
soldier in the army starts arguing about the strategy in the 
middle of a battle, it immediately becomes dangerous. But 
the right of any soldier should nonetheless be maintained 
to publicly discuss the purpose and engagements of the 
military, when he or she is not directly on duty, and thus 
the right to (also) make a public use of reason. Sometimes, 
of course, the lines between the private and public use of 
reason can be difficult to draw, as e.g. in the cases of Chelsea 
Manning and Edward Snowden (should one reveal secrets 
that may be important for the public, but can endanger 
colleagues; how can one determine when the interest 
of the public overrides legally established duties to the 
state and its institutions; when is the right moment for a 
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disclosure, etc.), but it is crucial to Kant that the public 
use of reason is always defended and developed.
What distinguishes Kant’s concept of the public use of rea-
son from the many contemporary debates on the freedom 
of expression is that it is based on a distinction between 
the powers one serves when speaking: Does one serve 
an external authority (employer, superior, elder, group, 
community) or does one serve reason itself — i.e., by the 
scrutiny and discussion of laws, practices, ideas — for the 
“mere” sake of getting it right? So, the question is, in fact, 
not so much one of my individual right to say whatever I 
please, but rather, one of which use of reason I am making 
when I say whatever I please. As already indicated, the 
public use of reason does not entail that one speaks to a 
lot of people, for example, or even that it takes place out-
side of one’s home. One should just use one’s reasoning 
capacities to further what is reasonable. Writing a letter 
to the editor could be a public use of reason, even though 
one is at home, alone, in the armchair. I would even argue 
that talking to one’s friends or family could be a public 
use of reason, if what is at stake is the question of what 
is right and what is wrong. One might address someone 
in a bar as a member of “the entire public of the world of 
readers” (ibid.), as Kant puts it, and not as someone with 
a specific interest or inclination or power. 
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Kant’s distinction creates a number of difficult questions: 
Can a private company make a public use of reason? Is 
a politician, who represents her party in a debate on TV, 
speaking on behalf of reason or on behalf of the party? 
How can we distinguish these? And is the journalist 
mediating the debate doing so on behalf of the general 
interest of the public as a world of readers or on behalf of 
the media that has employed her? Sometimes, especially in 
a hypermediated world of consumerism, celebrity culture 
and anti-intellectualism, it can seem like a naïve, romantic 
idea to insist on a “pure” public use of reason, and it is 
in a way rather easy to put any supposed instance of it 
in doubt. (Why do people speak at conferences or write 
articles about the purpose of education, for example? Do 
we really believe that we might do something to improve 
education or at least save some of the essential values of 
the enlightenment, or are we already speaking and writing 
only to improve CVs and satisfy the increasing demands 
from employers and politicians to demonstrate “social 
impact”?) Nonetheless, I would claim, the imperative of 
a public use of reason remains a fundamental principle of 
democracy. Giving up on it, even as something one might 
aspire to do, would mean a complete surrender to market 
forces, political cynicism or brute power. Even if one could 
put in doubt the motivation behind every singular case of 
public debate, publication, discussion, artwork, etc., the 
28
mere belief in the public use of reason must be upheld in 
order to maintain belief in the very idea of a democracy.
We are, thus, approaching a problem very similar to the one 
of the categorical imperative itself: How can one be sure 
that a person (even oneself) is acting out of pure reverence 
to the moral law, and not out of some inclination secretly 
affecting one’s motivational system? You assist a friend 
with his exam paper or help him dealing with a personal 
problem, but how can you be sure you are doing this for 
moral reasons and not because you have a crush on him 
— or, why not, because you get some personal satisfaction 
from the act of helping itself? One can always postulate 
an ulterior motive, and Kant himself readily admitted that 
it is impossible to give an empirical example of a moral 
act beyond any possible scepticism. As Alenka Zupančič 
has shown, however, the implications of this problem are 
often misunderstood. What is essential about the moral 
law is not how we can purify ourselves enough from any 
pathological inclination to be said to act in strict accordance 
with it, but, on the contrary, how a pure, formal principle 
(act only in accordance with that maxim through which 
you can at the same time will that it become a universal 
law) can have actual, real, tangible, “pathological” effects 
in our lives. The categorical imperative, Kant claimed, is a 
Faktum der Vernunft, an indisputable fact, and as such it 
is real. We all know the demand reason puts on us to act 
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morally, and the curious thing is that this law makes us 
do things, invent things and want things. The scepticism 
towards a pure moral act is therefore a case of bad infinity 
or a superego logic that always demands more evidence 
and is never satisfied, and it is easy to conclude that no 
one can in fact ever act morally. But to Zupančič the sit-
uation is precisely the opposite: We have something real 
(even in a Lacanian sense), namely the moral law, which 
affects our lives and which can make us perform acts that 
we would not have otherwise done. 
The crucial question of Kantian ethics is thus 
not ’how can we eliminate all the pathological 
elements of will, so that only the pure form of 
duty remains?’ but, rather, ’how can the pure 
form of duty itself function as a pathological 
element, that is, as an element capable of assum-
ing the role of the driving force or incentive of 
our actions?’ (Zupančič 2000: 15-16).
Something similar can be said about the public use of 
reason. Although it can, of course, be an interesting and 
important exercise to investigate one’s own motives, as 
well as it is relevant to be aware of how different agents 
might be motivated by private motives in e.g. political 
or commercial contexts, it is much more important to 
invent, maintain, and experiment with forms of action 
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and institutions that create real effects out of the general 
ambition of a public use of reason. So, in the context of 
public discussion, other than a defence of the liberal prin-
ciple of the freedom of expression, is it possible to create 
interventions that change the parameters of exchanges 
such that the public use of reason may be re-invented? 
I think creativity in this field is in fact badly needed in 
contemporary society. When public debate is becoming 
dominated by social media, promotion of pundits and 
opinion leaders, professionalization of political parties that 
almost makes them resemble private companies, complete 
with CEOs and PR-managers, when news media are de-
pending more and more on advertising, or are controlled 
by narrow, political interests and restrictions — how can 
one re-create the voice of a public use of reason? How 
can one emancipate public discussion from the private 
interests of the participants?
In October 2010, the Danish artist Claus Beck-Nielsen 
made a radical attempt at emancipating himself from what 
one could broadly term the ideological state apparatuses, 
when he renounced his name and arranged his own funeral 
in absentia, such that his former identity and name could 
be buried. The project, entitled funus imaginarium, was 
supposed to investigate the conditions of escaping the 
identity, personal ID, etc. parcelled out to a person in the 
contemporary state, and possibly create a re-invigoration 
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of politics through a collective of subjects speaking only in 
their capacity of being human bodies.1 Although very much 
an aesthetic experiment, I think the continued resistance 
(of the person today known as “Madame Nielsen”) against 
being subjected to the normal-pathological conditions of 
being a subject of the contemporary state does encourage 
more thought and experimentation toward the possibil-
ities of creating a space for the public use of reason. The 
emancipation of the body formerly known as Claus Beck-
Nielsen was in a sense a creation of a new voice, one that 
speaks from beyond identity in most of the ways we are 
accustomed to think about it. Something similar could be 
said about the ambitions of another Danish experiment on 
the problematic of enunciation in public debate, the Centre 
for Wild Analysis (CWA), although it does take much less 
radical measures in terms of personal commitment and 
destruction. The CWA is an experiment in the creation of 
a collective subject that speaks and intervenes in public 
debate on the background of no one particular personal 
identity. It is a collective of five philosophers which writes 
books, newspaper columns and gives lectures. For a year, 
the centre also hosted its own national radio program, 
which consisted mainly in an experiment to create hour-
long conversations on philosophical topics. These were 
not exchanges of viewpoints, but rather investigations of 
themes, ideally spoken as if in one voice. One of the rules 
of the centre is that at least two of the members must be 
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present at the same time and place, in order for the centre 
to exist. Another, that the speakers cannot disagree. (If 
they do, they speak for themselves, and not for the centre). 
On its homepage, the centre writes:
Public debate does not need more “unique” 
individual voices with exciting personal per-
spectives. Much more, it needs collective inter-
ventions that can make society start thinking 
itself, instead of referring everything to personal 
interests and backgrounds.2
A third example is what one could call the struggle to 
reclaim public space itself. Nina Power, in a lecture given 
in Aarhus in 2015, addressed the increasing exhaustion of 
material, public space, and saw the various social move-
ments that have arisen over the past five years as attempts 
at a repossession of the very domain of the public. It is 
not enough to be able to “speak freely” and publish car-
toons of the prophet if the space for public discussions 
and decision-making is simultaneously being exhausted 
by privatization and commercialization. Walking around 
London today, for example, is, according to Power, very 
much a walk through various private spheres and interests. 
Therefore, the many forms of “occupy” movements: Occupy 
Wall Street, occupy the city council squares, occupy the 
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universities should really be seen as very literal attempts 
to reclaim a space for free intellectual or political debate 
and decision-making. Public space means space owned 
by the public — and space, where you can address others 
as members of the “world of readers”, rather than as con-
sumers or subjects of a state. So, one could say that while 
the psychological problematic of what and why one speaks, 
as one does, does remain, it is still possible to literally and 
materially create spaces where one is allowed and expected 
to speak on behalf of the public. Like in the case of the 
emancipated body of the artist formerly known as Claus 
Beck-Nielsen and the collective subject of the CWA, the 
question is one of inhabiting new forms of expression, 
by liberating territory, one could almost say: Declaring 
this body, this place, this structure, one for public use 
of reason. Again, the whole point is the inversion of the 
problematic from an epistemological to a practical one: 
When the cynic says that “oh, but everything is tainted, 
there is no pure interest of the common good”, the oc-
cupy movements respond by creating islands of public 
rationality, experimenting with forms of conversations, 
ways of showing approval, the human microphone, etc. 
When occupying the universities in 2014, for example, I 
think it was an extremely important and right move of 
the students in Aarhus and Copenhagen to have brought 
books with them to read and to have invited teachers to 
come to the blockade to talk on some topics, etc.
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We already know about the invention of forms of promo- 
tion of the public use of reason from a series of institu-
tionalized forms of the so-called arm’s length principle. 
In arts, for example, it is common to have a particular 
distance between donors of stipends or projects and the 
end recipients of the funds. How precisely this is supposed 
to work (and how, for example, one avoids new forms 
of nepotism and corruption within a branch) is up for 
continued debate and experimentation, but the principle 
itself contains precisely the ambition of promoting inde-
pendent forms of expression that are free to investigate, 
debate and criticise everything that the government or 
any other agent might do or opine. Institutionalizing and 
protecting free and experimenting voices that potentially 
speak against these very institutions themselves is a kind 
of (intelligent) self-reflective move of the state, very much 
in line with Kant’s ideals for an active encouragement of 
a public use of reason. To paraphrase Evelyn Beatrice 
Hall’s famous slogan (that is often attributed to Voltaire 
himself), “I disagree with you, but I will fight to death for 
your right to have your opinion”, the arm’s length principle 
says: “I disagree with you, but I will finance your right to 
disagree with me.”
In the academic world, finally, we find something similar. 
The very idea of free research is precisely to create a space 
that is unregulated by government (or other “private”) 
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interests (in Kant’s sense), where researchers investigate 
any question that they themselves find worthwhile. The 
concept of academic freedom is very different from the 
concept of the freedom of expression in precisely this 
sense. While freedom of expression regards the right to 
speak one’s opinion freely, academic freedom, to put it 
a bit bluntly, regards the right to corroborate, challenge, 
revise and improve one’s opinion, which, among other 
things, takes time and costs money. A researcher might 
believe, for example, that Hegel’s distinction between 
civil society and state throws some interesting light on 
current developments within welfare state institutions 
that encourage local engagement and volunteer com-
munity work; but if she does not have time and funding 
to investigate this hypothesis, it remains a rather limited 
contribution to public debate. Academic freedom is the 
freedom to (actually be able to) pursue the research that 
one finds important to pursue.
This emphasis on a broader understanding of the concept 
than what is implied by a “thin” concept of the absence of 
censorship is supported by another of Kant’s texts. In his 
The Conflict of the Faculties from 1798, Kant identifies the 
philosophical faculty as the one that should remain inde-
pendent from government interests, as opposed to the three 
“higher” faculties — medicine, law and theology — which 
are directly involved in the education of specialists and 
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officials who serve the interests of the state. There must be 
a fourth faculty, says Kant, that is guided by only scientific 
interest itself, i.e. by the search for truth, and where “reason 
is entitled to speak publicly.” For Kant, the public use of 
reason, I would claim, is most prominently taking place 
— or space — in the philosophical faculty. The absence 
of such a faculty would be damaging for the government 
itself, because truth would not come forward, says Kant. 
(Kant 1968: 282). It is in the government’s self-interest to 
maintain a philosophical faculty, but it is at arm’s length 
that the government must support this interest, in order 
for it to function optimally. Once again, the deciding fac-
tor for Kant is not the content or subject matter of what 
one is working with, but the interest on behalf of which 
one is working. The philosophical faculty, thus, relates 
to questions in both medicine, theology and law, and it 
comprises natural science, anthropology, logics, and other 
disciplines. It does not have its own field, but is a free 
investigation of the problems in and between any fields.
Wilhelm von Humboldt, 11 years after Kant’s essay on 
the conflicts of the faculties, emphasized that it is of 
paramount interest to a nation state to build and secure 
independent research and always treat science as “a not 
yet completed problem”. 
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As soon as one stops seeking the real science, or 
fancies that it does not have to be sought from 
the depth of the spirit, but that on the contrary 
it may be pieced together through quantitative 
measures of data collection, everything is irre-
vocably and forever lost; lost for science that, 
if this continues for a long time, will be dete-
riorated to such an extent that it leaves behind 
language as an empty shell; and furthermore 
lost for the state (Humboldt 1810: 2).
The state should never prescribe the right methods or 
objects of study to science, on pain of obfuscating its true 
purpose. Rather, the course of research should be decided 
from the inner necessity of research itself. If one should 
formulate a slogan for the classical, modern university in 
Kant’s and Humboldt’s outlook, it would be an expanded 
paraphrase of the famous slogan “l’art pour l’art”: “science 
for science’s sake — for society’s sake.” 
Without going too deep into university history, I think 
it is interesting to notice that Copenhagen University 
had the classical division of faculties described by Kant 
from its foundation in 1479 until fairly recently. Only in 
1850 were mathematics and natural science separated 
from the philosophical faculty, and it was as late as 1970 
that the philosophical faculty itself was renamed to the 
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faculty of the humanities. This does of course not mean 
that critical thinking was suddenly abolished, but maybe 
this event was in fact more consequential than we are used 
to thinking. Defining a field of knowledge as that of the 
“humanities” (as opposed to technology, medicine, divinity, 
biology, etc.) tends to limit the field of interest and maybe 
even the forms of inquiry. One starts investigating human 
cultures, communication, aesthetics, languages, ethics, 
etc. rather than questioning the fundamental assumptions 
within any field, as well as the relation between them, and 
it becomes important to define one’s own specific areas of 
research in contrast to those of other branches or faculties. 
Soon, therefore, one starts defending oneself against the 
colonisation of one’s field from other specializations, as 
when neuroscience starts to explain moral concepts or 
when evolutionary biology claims to have found the key 
to horror literature (we are afraid of bogeymen, because 
we used to live on the savannah for a very long time, 
where tigers with big teeth posed very real threats to 
our existence). Against such attacks, humanities tend to 
emphasize the unary traits of their professions; the dif-
ference between scientific explanation and hermeneutical 
understanding, etc., which might often be justified, but 
nonetheless remains a defensive and separatist move.
But, worse still, maybe the compartmentalisation of 
the humanities has also quietly and largely unnoticed 
39
prepared the “privatization” of them, to use Kant’s term, 
even against the original intentions of the “humanists” 
themselves. Ending up with its own particular fields of 
interest and modes of inquiry, the humanities have become 
vulnerable to the increasing emphasis on the utility of the 
knowledge that emerges from the universities, because the 
other fields produce more tangible outcomes. There is of 
course nothing wrong with knowledge being useful, but 
there is a certain irony to the fact that the remaining parts 
of the philosophical faculty of the classical university has 
ended up having to define its value in terms of the kinds 
of output that much more resembles the three “higher” 
faculties. To avoid the annihilation of the philosophical 
faculty, it has been transformed into a “higher” faculty, or 
to put it more brutally: a vocational school. When you look 
at the self-description of some of the humanistic faculties 
of Danish universities today, for example, the need for 
justification is rather evident. At Copenhagen University, 
the faculty itself defines the focal point of the humanist 
sciences as “the human dimension of development and 
innovation, social conditions and politics, language and 
communication, history and culture, arts and aesthetics, 
and modern media and technologies.”3 The object of study 
is the “human dimension”, and it seems obvious that one 
must therefore always include a humanist in research or 
business projects to understand the “human component”. 
Although such a description is maybe relatively innocent, 
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it is still interesting to notice how far away in fact it is from 
Kant’s idea of a philosophical faculty. At Arts at Aarhus 
University, the faculty staff investigates “the cultural and 
social forms of expression and practice of the human be-
ing”4, which again sounds plausible, but is also a form of 
compartmentalisation and privatization (in Kant’s sense); 
in this case it sounds rather like the study of something 
that could come in handy when the government wants 
to prevent the radicalization of young Muslims or design 
streets that are easy to patrol. 
Now, I am not saying that we should not educate people 
who are good at communication, understand particular 
cultures, and can analyse complicated texts and revise 
mission statements in municipal administrations. Far 
from it. I consider this a central contribution especially 
of philosophy educations in an era of mass universities, 
but I do maintain two things:
First of all, that one of the primary qualities of a solid 
university education is not the knowledge of the par-
ticular field that you are specializing in, but much more 
the ability to dig into a field of knowledge and “break 
the code” of its most fundamental assumptions. In this 
sense, when there is no longer any separate “philosophical 
faculty,” its purpose should be inscribed into the heart 
of any university education and research department. 
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Even if we want to educate “only” intelligent bureaucrats 
and competent workers in the information economy, we 
need to give them first of all a profoundly critical sense 
of their own field. Without this, they would not be able 
to contribute to innovation and critical reflection in any 
truly valuable sense. The crucial question of how to obtain 
a more genuine and solid foundation of one’s intellectual 
competences is what Ray Land has addressed in terms of 
what he calls “threshold concepts”: Concepts that open 
“a new and previously inaccessible way of thinking about 
something” (Land 2015: 18). Every discipline has one (in 
biology evolution; in literature deconstruction, etc.), and 
you only really get to know that field by embracing and 
understanding the ramifications of that concept. You get 
it, you have broken the code, when you understand the 
threshold concept, and after that you see the world differ-
ently in a fundamentally important sense. And maybe one 
could even go one step further: You only really understand 
a threshold concept (or maybe any concept), when you are 
also able to challenge it and potentially renew it. In any 
case: when students start losing the ability to grasp their 
threshold concepts, the meaning of higher education as 
such starts to evaporate. I think this concern could also be 
formulated in terms of the difference between knowledge 
and truth: You may acquire knowledge and communicate 
knowledge without being particularly concerned about or 
aware of the truth of that knowledge, but in order to “get 
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it”, to really understand the knowledge that you acquire, 
you have to see it in the light of truth. For example, you 
might know that in Russian a horse is called “loshad” 
and the president is called Putin (sometimes one gets 
the impression that “Putin” is in fact simply the Russian 
word for president), without being engaged in the critical 
examination of Russian culture, literature, traditions and 
politics. But only when you dive into the literature, music, 
politics, etc. will you be able to see the meaning of Putin in 
a genuinely interesting perspective. In this sense, university 
education has to be critical, which does not mean that 
you have to be “against” Putin. Criticism stems from the 
Greek verb “krinein”, which means to distinguish, separate 
or decide, and the critic (kritikos) is essentially simply the 
person who is “able to make judgments”. Therefore, even if 
universities are becoming more and more something like 
sophisticated forms of vocational colleges, their basic value 
and most essential characteristic remain the critical thinking 
of their staff and students. In times such as these, with cuts 
in funding and increased external pressure to accept the 
employability of the candidates as the only valid criterion 
for the relevance and success of education, it becomes even 
more important than ever to maintain and develop forms 
of teaching, supervision, examination and research projects 
that foster and nourish the critical dimension of whatever 
field one is working in. Or, put in terms of the distinction 
between the private and the public use of reason: Threshold 
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concepts can only be grasped by leaving behind the private 
use of reason. There is no “for what purpose” when one tries 
to understand the concept of deconstruction (especially the 
concept of deconstruction…).
Secondly, if humanist research concerns the “human com-
ponent” of research projects, it becomes critical in a rather 
different sense from the Kantian idea of a public use of rea-
son. In EU-projects, for example, we more and more see the 
role of the humanist researcher as the one that takes care of 
the “ethical issues” related to a specific problematic. You do 
research in a new method for gene manipulation of crops, 
for example, and you employ a small section of humanists 
to investigate the indigenous cultures on the farmland that 
is expected to be converted into GMO agriculture, or some 
of the concerns of the political consumer. But what you do 
not get is the integrated reflection of the very idea of gene 
manipulation as such, complete with detailed knowledge 
of biological processes, a philosophical approach to the 
relation between human and non-human actors, and a 
political and economic discussion of the implications and 
presuppositions involved (this is a hypothetical example 
and of course to some extent a caricature, but I think the 
concern is genuine). What we risk is something like the 
international agreements on the trade of e.g. fish quotas 
from African countries: You always have to allocate a small 
percentage for “local development projects” that ensure a 
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kind, ethical profile attached to the agreement — and then 
you are free to exploit their resources.
Additionally, I think there is a curious paradox related 
to the increasing external pressure on both teaching and 
research, namely that some, and often the most prestigious, 
of the research conducted is produced for a rather peculiar 
audience, which doesn’t quite fit Kant’s description of “a 
world of readers”. With the increased focus on the teach-
ing of a higher number of students at the lowest possible 
costs, simultaneous to an increase in the need for external 
funding for university research, we might be facing a di-
vision between those who teach students and those who 
do research (which goes straight against the intention 
of the ideal of research-based teaching in the Humboldt 
university), or maybe even between those who teach, those 
who engage with the public (companies, organisations, 
media, public lectures), and those who do research. In 
terms of what this means for research, my worry is not so 
much that some researchers do not “communicate their 
findings,” as it is sometimes insisted that they must. I think 
basic fundamental research aiming only and directly at 
the truth remains a completely honourable and vital task 
for academia, regardless of the communicative skills of 
the people involved in it. However, the separation of re-
search, teaching and communication might have another 
consequence that is not so innocent. To exaggerate a bit: 
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Teachers who do survey lectures and prepare students for 
problem solving in their future vocation; communicators 
who contribute by entertaining and giving expert advice; 
and researchers who publish their work in closed circles and 
journals inaccessible to the public in more than one sense. I 
move here into some more speculative remarks, but I do it 
nonetheless in seriousness. And there is a concept invented 
by German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk that I cannot resist 
employing here to highlight the principal problem.
Sloterdijk refers to the famous concept of the “implicit read-
er” which was described by literary scholar Wolfgang Iser. 
According to Iser, a text, and most prominently a literary 
text, always relies on a liaison between itself and the reader 
in order to function at all. Filling the “gaps” in the text, or 
even the move from one sentence to the next, requires an 
active participation on behalf of the reader. You imagine 
one of the many possible meanings the text might have 
and this interpretation is continuously revised throughout 
the reading. The process of imagination, interpretation 
and re-interpretation gives life to the text and without this 
it would not mean what it actually means (although this 
“actual meaning” thus varies from reader to reader, and 
even when the same reader reads the text again). The term 
“implied reader,” according to Iser, “incorporates both the 
pre-structuring of the potential meaning by the text, and 
the reader’s actualization of this potential meaning through 
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the reading process” (Iser 1974: xii). A reader is always 
implied in a novel (and other texts) and is part of the very 
composition of a text.
What Sloterdjik adds to this analysis is that today, he says, 
we must acknowledge that what most characterizes a very 
large quantity of academic texts, is the fact that they are 
never or scarcely ever read by anyone. This is Sloterdijk:
No academic will deny it. It is time to expand 
the theory of the implicit reader by the theory 
of the implicit non-reader. It seems to be a fair 
estimate that 98 to 99 percent of all academic 
text production is written with the justified or 
unjustified expectation of its partial or complete 
not-being-read [Nichtgelesenwerden]. It would 
be illusory to assume that this could take place 
without some retroactive effect on the ethics of 
the author.” (Sloterdijk 2011, my translation).
Sloterdijk’s point is related to the increasing problem of 
plagiarism in academic research (and he is referring to 
contemporary prominent scandals in German public and 
political life). If the expectations are that no one will ever 
really read what one writes, it seems a relatively small step 
to add a few paragraphs here and there that were borrowed 
from someone else. This is serious enough, if it is true 
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(in fact, there is a certain tragic irony to the fact that one 
of the more recent measures taken in the universities to 
combat plagiarism is — to have computers scan student 
papers for passages overlapping with other sources. 
The implicit reader of university papers thus becoming 
a robot…). 
However, I think there is another implication of Sloterdijk’s 
observation which may be a bit more elusive, but is none-
theless worth some consideration. If a text is being written 
with the expectation of its (largely) not-being-read, what 
does this imply for its relation to the distinction between 
the public and private use of reason? In fact, one very 
common attitude towards the publication of articles is 
that it is something one must do in order to improve one’s 
CV or fulfil the quota of one’s institute. Although it is of 
course somewhat cynical to adopt a purely instrumental 
approach to the publication of scientific work, it is also a 
very real and down-to-earth economic reality for heads 
of department around the world that a certain amount 
of points must be collected and especially for upcoming 
academics that they need to document a decent rate of 
publication. In other words, the private use of reason is 
a very obvious, I would even say objective, part of aca-
demic publishing today. Does this mean that such work 
is necessarily uncritical? It probably does not. But it does 
mean that the power that one is serving is to a significant 
degree something other than reason/truth/science itself. 
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Overall, there are several tendencies that create what I 
would call the “privatization of the universities,” which 
does not mean that they are being sold or run by private 
companies, but that their raison d’etre is increasingly 
moving toward what Kant defined as the private use of 
reason. These include the compartmentalization of the 
humanities, the new public management of the universi-
ties in terms of evaluation, quantification, and externally 
defined purposes for both research and teaching, and the 
increasing separation of research, teaching and commu-
nication of science.
So, what to do? Although it does probably seem a bit al-
tmodisch, I would first of all insist on a certain academic 
ethos to be maintained and promoted in the universities. 
Researchers and teachers must insist on the critical im-
petus of university education, promote the independent 
thinking of their students, and encourage them to think, 
rather than merely learn various forms of know-how and 
know-that. Obvious, as this may seem, this imperative 
forces us to constantly reflect on and rethink how we can 
accommodate it when demands for employability and 
instrumentalization of knowledge are constantly increased 
while the time for studying is being reduced.
Secondly, I think we might have to become more inventive 
in a more substantial sense as well. We may even have to 
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prepare for some rather rough conditions. The political 
climate does not show many signs of slowing down the 
attack on the public use of reason. There are certainly still 
traditional, old school academic spaces, but I am worried 
that such places are increasingly becoming more elitist 
educations and that the conditions for creating and prac-
ticing the public use of reason in the mass university will 
deteriorate even more. So, maybe we have to invent entirely 
new spaces. At the first conference in the Academy Group, 
held at Copenhagen University in 2013,5 some of us ended 
up discussing the necessity and possibility of establishing 
networks of what we called “kitchen philosophy”. We saw 
the need for new forms of academic work and exchange, 
and started to wonder whether these might have to be 
invented outside the university in the near future. Some 
initiatives followed from the conference but the idea has 
still not been fully developed. (Maybe the necessity has 
not yet become grave enough). The idea was that inde-
pendent thinking has come under such pressure that we 
might have to literally move out of the campuses to secure 
spaces for it. The image of such spaces that we came up 
with was that of the kitchen, because the kitchen played a 
central role in a place where the public use of reason had 
precisely suffered immensely: post-Stalin Soviet Union. 
Here, people started gathering in their kitchens to discuss 
politics, exchange jokes, play music, and thus a whole, 
separate culture emanated from these kitchens — complete 
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with kitchen recordings and kitchen publications. The so-
called samizdat were self-published books or documents 
circulated via the kitchens. And in the kitchens one would 
read and discuss the stories that were not allowed outside, 
in the public sphere. In the words of one Russian poet:
One of the reasons why kitchen culture devel-
oped in Russia is because there were no places 
to meet. You couldn’t have political discussions 
in public, at your workplace. You couldn’t go 
to cafes — they were state-owned. The kitchen 
became the place where Russian culture kept 
living, untouched by the regime.6
So, in the Soviet kitchens we have maybe the purest 
example of how the public use of reason can take place 
outside the view of public order or public space in the 
usual sense of that term. Does it mean that one should 
compare the Bologna process to the Soviet system and 
that I claim that we are only free to speak our mind in 
our own kitchens? No. Again, the point is the opposite: 
The case of the Soviet kitchens shows us how any space 
can be occupied and liberated for the public use of rea-
son. Repeating the invention of the Soviet kitchens does 
not necessarily mean repeating the precise arrangement 
of sitting in our kitchens, playing guitars and smoking 
cigarettes, nor does it imply that the way public use of 
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reason was suffering then can be compared directly to 
the way it is suffering now. It means repeating its gesture, 
its sense of urgency and its insistence on the practice of a 
public use of reason, even where it seems most unlikely. 
Maybe we just need to supplement our standard curricula 
in the universities for now: arrange voluntary reading 
sessions, choose unheard of topics for conferences, take 
academic thinking to the streets, occupy spaces, publish 
articles for free online, and so on. There are even ways to 
turn the obsession with quantifiable outputs against the 
administrative regime of New Public Management itself, 
as Timon Beyes has suggested. Its arrogant disregard 
for theory and academic content can in some cases be 
exploited by filling the lessons and textbooks with outra-
geously theoretical and independent contents, as long as 
the numbers are still officially adding up. But maybe, as 
such practices become more desperate and demand more 
and more unpaid labour by teachers and students, we 
should also use this inspiration to imagine new forms of 
networks and interactions, maybe even new institutions 
outside the frames of traditional academia.
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1 The event was analyzed and discussed in a sub-
sequent conference, the proceedings of which 
have been published in (Das Beckwerk 2011). 
2 www.centerforvildanalyse.dk  
3 www.hum.ku.dk/omfakultetet  
4 www.arts.au.dk 
5 ”How to facilitate the great academy?”, Copenhagen  
University, October 10-13, 2013.
6 www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2014/-05/27/3149 
61287/how-soviet-kitchens-became-hotbeds- 
of-dissent-and-culture
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I will be reflecting this evening on the vocation of the public 
university in the twenty-first century. The theoretical well-
spring for these reflections is Max Weber’s thinking about 
vocations developed in his well-known lectures, “Science 
as a Vocation” and “Politics as a Vocation.” Weber delivered 
the lectures just a little over a year apart — in November 
1917 and January 1919 — at the behest of a left-liberal 
student organization at the University of Munich. In them, 
he examines the conditions, motivations, purposes and 
ethics contouring lives dedicated to scholarly knowledge 
and to politics in his time. His examination centered 
on Beruf, translated into English as vocation but, in the 
original German, signifying both calling and profession.1 
Weber understood the distinctly Protestant notion of “call-
ing,” or Berufung, as something originally given by God 
and through which individuals serve divine purpose on 
earth.2 Transmuted into secular or even atheistic terms, as 
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it would have been for Weber, a calling retains the quality 
of emanating from the soul or at least somewhere deep 
within, of serving a cause greater than need satisfaction, 
and of appropriately hewing to an ethic distinctive to the 
realm in which it is practiced. Politics as a calling is in 
this way contrasted by Weber with politics as something 
one might do for a living but also with politics engaged in 
for sport, vanity, thrills or sheer love of power, and with 
politics pursued irresponsibly, without attunement to the 
particular qualities of political life — that is, power, vio-
lence and effects of action inevitably exceed its animating 
motives (Weber, Politics, 40, 76-92). Similarly, Wissenschaft, 
science in the German sense of scholarly inquiry and 
knowledge, is contrasted by Weber with polemicizing, 
preaching, advocacy or political organizing, and with 
research or teaching contoured by anything other than 
“plain intellectual integrity”—the pursuit of objective 
knowledge and sober consideration of the implications 
of various moral or political principles (Weber, Science, 
19-27, 31).
For Weber, having a genuine vocation for something 
means being compelled by and dedicated to the activity’s 
worldly value combined with a willingness to navigate 
and withstand often miserable conditions or rewards for 
pursuing it. Being animated by a calling is precisely the 
opposite of an egoistic or self-benefiting pursuit. Further, 
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Weber’s account of political leadership and scholarly 
inquiry involved bringing into relief how beset and even 
imperiled both endeavors were in his time, and how small 
the possibilities were for recognition or success in either 
domain. This led him to formulate the calling for politics 
and scholarship as requiring a capacity to simultaneously 
reckon with and resist these conditions — facing them 
squarely without submitting to them. The sobriety, matu-
rity and asceticism he established as comprising the ethic 
appropriate to each extends, then, even to their uptake; 
those seeking glory, glamour, wealth, certainty of success 
or simple gratification should look elsewhere. 
Weber also analyzes both vocations in the context of an 
increasingly ubiquitous instrumental rationality in moder-
nity, a form of reason and reasoning that he understood 
to gradually strip everything in the world — including 
knowledge and politics — of meaning and purpose 
as it converted human endeavor to ubiquitous instru-
mentalism without end or ends. (Weber, Science, 28-30; 
Politics, 54, 62, 66, 71, 75) And yet, with the very idea of 
vocation, Weber aims to move against this destruction 
of meaning and purpose… both in the world and in the 
specific fields of activity he is analyzing. More than merely 
withstanding difficult conditions, vocations are Weber’s 
bid to recover something of what the age, according to 
him, is vanquishing — ardent passion for inordinately 
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difficult and potentially world-changing endeavor and 
a deep sense of responsibility in following this passion 
(Weber, Politics 76-7; Science, 31). Vocations are also his 
bid to contest contingent developments within the fields 
he is analyzing — corruption, politicization and routin-
ization — as well as developments each field inherently 
generates — disenchantment of the world by science, and 
unprecedented machineries of domination (bureaucracy 
and capitalism) in politics. 
There is, then, both sober idealism and amor fati in Weber’s 
thinking about vocations, both a steely eyed confrontation 
with existing conditions and a forceful rejection of them 
as determinant. These are the coordinates I want to draw 
upon for thinking about the vocation of the university in 
the twenty-first century. Weber is uniquely attuned to the 
importance and the challenges of vocations in potentially 
rescuing noble fields of human endeavor from destructive 
tendencies imminent within the fields themselves and from 
toxic forces of the age. This makes him a vital intellectual 
companion in developing the calling and the attendant 
ethos of the public university today, particularly given its 
imperiled state.  
✳
We begin by marking the counter-intuitive meaning of 
vocation in the educational context today, where the term 
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has come to signify job training as opposed to other kinds 
of learning and human development. In both secondary 
and tertiary institutions, vocational education refers 
to what were classically termed mechanical arts (artes 
mechanicae, considered appropriate for unfree men), 
as opposed to the liberal arts (artes liberales, considered 
essential for free human beings to exercise their freedom). 
Even when the United States Morrill Act of 1862 struck 
a compromise between the vocational and liberal arts, as 
it founded scores of land grant colleges for the education 
of non-elites, the Act itself specified that concern with 
developing practical knowledge must not supplant but 
rather supplement “research and education in the liberal 
arts for the industrial classes.”3 The etymological irony 
we face today, as we will see, is that the contemporary 
vocation of the public university is precisely opposite to 
the new forms of vocational training it is being externally 
pressured to offer.
In addition to minding the etymological tensions, we 
need to mark the difficulties of shifting from an individual 
to an institutional register in considering Beruf. What 
does it mean to say an institution has a vocation in the 
Weberian sense? To imbue it with a secularized version 
of a divine calling? Far from contradictory, I will argue 
that discerning, articulating and culturing the vocation of 
universities has rarely been so important… or neglected. 
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More than a mission, and certainly the opposite of a brand, 
logo, motto or ranking, a careful and strongly iterated vo-
cation would fill every fiber of universities with dedication 
to worldly purposes. This is all that will prevent them from 
becoming complicit in a time and world increasingly voided 
of such purposes and voided too of thoughtful, educated 
democratic human beings. It is all that will prevent them 
from becoming handmaidens in replacing democracy with 
plutocracy, technocracy and autocracy, and in elevating 
capital appreciation — human, corporate or financial — as 
the value governing all entities large and small. If we turn 
back to Weber’s two lectures now, we will see how this goes. 
“Politics as a Vocation” and “Science as a Vocation” share 
an organizational and rhetorical arc. Both begin by map-
ping the abysmal contemporary conditions of each field 
and the meager chances for gratification offered to those 
endeavoring in them. Modern politics Weber describes 
as organized by machines, guilds, parties, as shot through 
with commercialization and corruption, and as dominated 
by the apparatuses of bureaucracy and capitalism. These 
features, combined with the requirement that contemporary 
leaders have mass demagogic appeal, mean that anyone 
with a talent for political leadership will find it difficult 
both to realize their aims and to maintain their integrity 
(Weber, Politics, 75-6). The pursuit of a scholarly vocation 
presents a different and more complex set of problems. 
61
First, its organization by patriarchal guilds in Germany 
prevents meritocracy and tends instead to reward slavish 
mediocrity (Weber, Science, 4-5). Second, science does not 
and cannot deliver meaning to a world increasingly voided 
of it; rather, the pursuit of objective knowledge desacralizes 
as it demystifies its objects of study, whether religion or 
biology, history or physics. Abetting this nihilism is the 
unbreachable requirement that scholars submit all values, 
convictions and principles to analytic scrutiny, treating 
them not as sacred or fundamental but as testable positions 
with implications and consequences. Finally, consequent 
to the progressive nature of knowledge formation, every 
knowledge discovery is destined to be eclipsed; there are 
no final or permanent truths in scientific paradigms of 
knowledge (Weber, Science, 11). Wissenschaft understood 
on a progressive and objectivist model thus paradoxically 
erases truth even as it presses toward truth. In sum, science 
necessarily evacuates the scientist from the work, the work 
itself is constantly overcome by and in time, and worldly 
meaning is eviscerated by the work. Commitment to 
Wissenschaft is a commitment to oblation — the emptying 
out of the world, truth and self.
For Weber, the combination of these existential and his-
torically specific contexts of the two vocations shapes the 
ethical bearing appropriate to each. Following his lengthy 
discussion of conditions, he articulates what he calls the 
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currency or “lifeblood” of each domain — power and 
violence for politics, truth for science. (It is significant 
for Weber that, pace Nietzsche, whom he read closely, 
power and truth are diametrically opposed and mutually 
contaminating. This establishes the ethical necessity of 
keeping the domains of science and politics radically 
separated: politics in the classroom is as unethical as are 
supervenient principles or totalitarian truths in politics.) 
Weber turns finally to the ethos and ethics of each voca-
tion, which are determined by both the conditions and 
the currency of the domain. His famous insistence on 
an “ethics of neutrality” for professors, and an “ethics of 
responsibility” for political actors, is born of each activity’s 
endemic features but honed by the specific challenges of 
the present (Weber, Science, 19-25; Politics, 79-92).
At the heart of both ethics is relentless responsibility for 
the effects, intended and inadvertent, of one’s conduct 
in the sea of powers contextualizing each endeavor. This 
responsibility is no abstract care for the world, but highly 
concrete. Attention to milieu, to chains of consequences, 
and to the vulnerability of innocents are all part of it: 
there is, for Weber, no room for “oops!” in politics and 
no room for Socratic tricks or charisma in the classroom. 
Responsibility in each domain is also stipulated by two 
very different chains of opposites: vanity, profiteering, 
corruption and power-mongering on the one hand; and 
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recklessness, illusion, idealism inappropriate to context, 
exploitation of the powerless and collateral damage on 
the other. The first comprises the sin of narcissism and 
self-indulgence, the second of failure to grasp the nature 
and currency of the domain. The ethic of responsibility 
Weber builds for each vocation simultaneously shapes 
commitment, animates conduct, and establishes restraint. 
Let us now gather up what we want to borrow from Weber 
as we think about the vocation of universities today. First, 
vocation itself is a calling featuring passion and sobriety 
vis a vis a particular field of endeavor and resting on an 
ethos specific to that field. Second, while having certain 
enduring, transhistorical qualities, vocation is always carved 
against historically specific conditions with which it must 
comport and yet which it also must resist: the task is to 
face and navigate these conditions without submitting to 
them, becoming a cog in their machineries. Third, almost 
everything in modern life threatens to derail or corrupt 
august human vocations. Articulating and protecting 
vocations matters because both the concept and the prac-
tice of vocations are so imperiled by the disappearance of 
substantive values in a world ordered by rationalization, 
bureaucracy and capitalism. Fourth, without animation by 
vocation, the activity at stake is worthless or worse. There 
is no reason to be in politics without a cause, without the 
yearning to have one’s hand “on the wheel of history,” 
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even as one may fail and even as one bears ceaseless re-
sponsibility for everything unleashed, intentional or not, 
in pursuit of this cause. There is no reason to be a scholar 
without passion for truth and understanding, even as 
this passion will neither yield meaning nor principles by 
which to live. Let us now see how we might draw from 
Weber’s appreciation of the importance of vocations, and 
his formulation of their requirements, to frame the pre-
dicaments and possibilities of the public university today. 
✳
Following Weber, we inaugurate our thinking about the 
vocation of the twenty-first century university by consid-
ering its current conditions. It is a commonplace that the 
last three decades have featured a steady submission of 
universities to business models, metrics and practices, a 
process that has all but eliminated the moat that for centu-
ries kept universities modestly apart from markets, if not 
from churches and royal courts. The familiar formulation 
here is that of neoliberal privatization: universities have 
undergone a sharp transformation from public goods sup-
ported by public funding to private investments supported 
by a combination of student tuition, philanthropic donors, 
corporate investors and public-private partnerships.4 This 
transformation has meant a number of things:
First, the principles of value governing almost every 
dimension of the privatized public university are now 
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capital appreciation and capacity to attract new investors.5 
The public model was dedicated to building a professional 
work force, to be sure, but also to educating citizens for 
democracies and conducting research in the public inter-
est. Privatization tends to drain the latter purposes from 
universities for the obvious reason that the new revenue 
streams carry private rather than public purposes. These 
purposes push everything about curriculums, programs, 
pedagogy, learning, and research toward return on privately 
made investments, a concern driven by students, investors, 
families, and institutional governance alike. Once they 
have become reliant on private rather than public monies, 
it is nearly impossible for privatized public universities to 
culture the purposes of a well-educated democracy or of 
research on public problems… though they may continue 
to brand themselves with these things in a competitive 
market where they no longer have enormous price ad-
vantage over private institutions. Thus, precisely when 
democracy is deeply imperiled from other sources, and 
requires knowledge and intellectual tools for fathoming 
the unprecedented complexities of the world, privatized 
higher education withdraws from this mission. 
Second, the skyrocketing tuition rates of privatized public 
universities generates new access models that re-stratify 
societies for which higher education was a mode of gen-
erating upward mobility through equality of opportunity 
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across class divides. Instead of a universal right that tem-
pers these divides, education becomes an intensifier of 
inequality as it becomes the private investment of those 
who either have means or are willing or able to gamble 
with debt. Debt becomes its own driving force, of course, 
bending both curricula and student conduct sharply toward 
income-generating concerns and thus further marketizing 
the subject, including the subject of learning.6 
Third, privatization breaks apart teaching and re-
search, decreasing the value of the former for scholars and 
graduate programs, which means outsourcing teaching to 
marginally paid, insecure, devalued adjuncts. Of course 
this shrinks academic job markets, which compresses 
graduate programs and makes them ever more dependent 
on outside donors, which in turn reduces their scholarly 
independence. Meanwhile, researchers and research 
programs are increasingly pressed to search out private 
funds, which means foregrounding commercial and ap-
plied inquiry. This in turn depreciates basic research and 
open-ended critical inquiry across all fields, and especially 
depresses the value of the arts and humanities. Campuses 
increasingly become publicly subsidized research plants 
for commercial undertakings, even as most in universities 
mistakenly believe the opposite, namely that private monies 
support university undertakings rather than drain them.7 
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There is much more to be said about the political economic 
transformations of public universities over the past three 
decades but in order to properly contextualize the question 
of vocation, we need to address a second feature of the 
age, namely financialization, which can be understood as 
an inadvertent outgrowth of neoliberalization though it is 
far from identical with it.8 While the original meaning of 
financialization was simply conversion of an asset into a 
financial instrument, e.g., the conversion of expected future 
earnings into a home mortgage, financialization now also 
designates the dramatic recent growth and importance 
of the financial sector — banking, asset management, 
insurance, venture capital and derivatives — relative to the 
economy as a whole. Like neoliberalism and privatization, 
however, the effects of financialization vastly exceed the 
economic sphere. The financialization of capitalist econ-
omies since the 1970s has radically transformed almost 
every feature of contemporary societies, including the 
nature of conduct, incentive and value for human beings, 
social institutions, states, business and labor. 
Most importantly, financialization generates economies 
and economic entities driven by shareholder value and 
not only by profit. It transforms what was, in an earlier 
iteration of neoliberalism, entrepreneurial and consumer 
conduct into investor and investee conduct, and it does 
this across every feature of organizations and human 
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existence.9 For investors, financialization shifts concern 
from profit and price to concern with the future value 
of the investment; for investees — the object of invest-
ment — it alters practices from concern with attracting 
customers at prices that exceed costs to concern with 
attracting investors who in turn increase the value of the 
stock and hence the firm. With these fundamental shifts, 
privatizing public universities in a financialized era entails 
more than replacing public with private funds and ratio-
nalizing higher education according to value for money. 
It entails more than importing business practices and 
metrics into every fiber of the university. Certainly these 
things have occurred and are consequential. However, with 
financialization, universities, like everything else, are less 
governed by return on investment or “the bottom line” 
than by their attractiveness to investors — students, faculty, 
donors, partners, creditors, even states. This attractiveness 
is registered by a plethora of rankings and ratings with 
which universities and every program and niche within 
them are therefore necessarily obsessed. 
Let me explain briefly. Shareholder value — the value of 
one’s investment in a particular entity based on the specu-
lative future of this value as determined by markets — is 
not equivalent to profit and is not determined by profit-
ability. This is clear enough from the frequent divergence 
between a company’s posted earnings and its stock price. 
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Amazon can post losses but see its stock jump. Uber can be 
“worth” 50 billion while only losing money — it is living 
off its investors, who are speculating about its future, and 
doing so in part by speculating about others’ speculations 
about its future. In the stock market — the theater of 
financialized publicly owned corporations — firms are 
valued according to a great range of tangibles and intan-
gibles including how the company is run; what it has just 
acquired or divested from; its perceived risk exposure; who 
is bidding to take it over; who its new competitors are or 
might be; how certain gambles with products and pricing 
are regarded by the industry; what future product lines it 
claims to be developing; what reputational advantage or 
damage it may be undergoing; what new market share it 
looks likely to acquire, and more. This great array of fac-
tors determining “value” makes clear that what matters is 
not a firm’s bottom line but calculated speculation about 
its capacity to enhance shareholder value in the future. 
What matters is the market’s assessment of a company’s 
future, an assessment that is based on speculators’ beliefs 
or guesses about that future. Above all, what determines 
share price in the present is would-be-investors’ beliefs 
about other would-be investors’ beliefs about the future 
of a particular stock.10
Shareholder value — so different from the kind of value 
Marx charted in Volume One of Capital — while emanating 
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from the stock market, has spilled into every dimension of 
contemporary existence. As any savvy college applicant, 
head of a start-up, or university development officer can 
tell you, what is crucial today is not their revenue/expenses 
ledger. Rather, what is decisive is their credible capacity to 
attract investors based on the market’s assessment of the 
predicted future value of what one is or might become. In 
a financialized world, this is equally true for educational 
institutions, research sites, apps, consulting firms, individ-
uals and large corporations. And it is why branding, repu-
tation, and above, all, ratings, have become so important to 
every entity and endeavor… from the local dry cleaner to 
the local newspaper, from an Airbnb host to Wells Fargo, 
from the city of Chicago to Boeing, from a law school 
to a nation teetering on the brink of economic collapse. 
 The great shift from corporate capitalism to financialized 
capitalism, from concern with profit margins to concern 
with shareholder value, has revolutionized universities 
which, as they have been neoliberalized and privatized, 
have adopted the governance practices, metrics, pre-
occupations and imperatives of financialization. As a 
financialized economy and culture generates ratings for 
investor calculations in everything (which is why every 
purchase you make, service you obtain, and experience 
you have is surveyed and ranked today), ratings have not 
merely proliferated in academic life but have come to 
71
govern each part of it.11 There are rankings of whole academic 
institutions, of course, as well as rankings of departments, 
institutes and scholars. There are rankings of graduate pro-
grams and rankings of subfields within them. There are job 
placement, publication, citation and post-graduate income 
ratings. There are ratings for “network advantage” — what 
students gain from rubbing shoulders with one group of 
fellow investors rather than another, say from Harvard rather 
than CUNY, Oxford rather than Birkbeck. There are bond 
ratings for public institutional borrowers, essential to every 
university’s capital building projects but now also driving 
their tuition increase schedules.12 For undergraduates, there 
are ratings for campus dining halls, housing, recreation 
facilities, cultural and social life, political values, student 
services and, of course, professors. 
 
The steadily growing importance of ratings in conditioning 
every decision, revision and allocation in university life 
means that shareholder capitalism transforms who and what 
governs the university, as well as what it is for. The result 
is profound mission confusion in both the research and 
educational arms of universities, and a radical de-linking 
of the two since they are governed by different investor 
groups. Indeed, the quaint faculty insistence that they 
are related refers to a university holism dis-integrated by 
shareholder capitalism and the “nexus of contracts” model 
of corporations by which financialization was ushered into 
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the corporate world. More than simply dividing teaching 
from research, and disorienting the aim or purpose of 
both, however, ratings and rankings increasingly shape 
every aspect of universities: student ethos and conduct; 
pedagogy; curriculum design and offerings; hiring and 
promotion of faculty; programs developed, nourished or 
abandoned; fields of study and lines of research developed 
or dropped; university partnerships and the programs they 
generate; and levels of regard (or disdain) for ourselves and 
our colleagues. 
Disciplines themselves are increasingly private niche 
industries with their own ratings and ratings agencies. In 
an increasing number of disciplines there are ratings of 
individual scholars; these are determined by “published 
research impact,” which is determined by citations in ranked 
journals, all of which is a reminder that this order of value is 
generated by expectations about others’ expectations about 
what is and will have value in the future. That is, the value 
of a scholar, indexed by citations, is linked to the value of 
publication venues, which is generated by an ensemble 
of ratings comprising journal “impact factor” (citations, 
library acquisitions, hits and downloads, etc.) which in 
turn is largely driven by the valuation of the journal by the 
leading (highly ranked) members of the profession, and has 
precisely nothing to do with anything we might quaintly 
call the actual value of the journal or the scholarship to 
the world.13
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Governance of disciplines, scholars and scholarship 
by rankings discourages research engaged with public 
problems or written for an educated public as opposed 
to research valued by the disciplines, its journals, and its 
rating agencies. Disciplinary rankings also deter creative 
interdisciplinarity, so essential for our times and its 
problem. For example, it is not possible to address the 
multiple crises besetting the European Union without 
linking approaches and insights from economics, politics, 
sociology, religion and geography. We cannot address 
the scandalous warehousing of humanity in urban and 
suburban shantytowns without drawing from economics, 
politics, sociology, geography, urban studies, anthropology 
and public health. The prospects for effective approaches to 
mitigating climate change require drawing from interna-
tional relations, climate science, social psychology, domestic 
political analysis, public policy and political economy. Yet 
scholars who work across several disciplines tend to be less 
read and cited within their disciplines, and hence to be 
highly ranked, than scholars who work inside disciplinary 
confines. This has a cascading effect: graduate students and 
young scholars are discouraged from such work, hence 
not trained to do it, and the prospects of breaking down 
disciplinary silos becomes ever more remote. 
 
Perhaps the most serious casualty of being governed by 
rankings, however, rests in undergraduate education. 
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Universities formerly devoted to developing worldly and 
educated human beings become sites for developing human 
capital, measured especially by post-graduate job placement 
and income levels. Being governed by these rankings is 
at odds with the cultivation of classrooms, curriculums 
and student orientation toward exploring meaning, the 
nature of knowledge, the condition of the world, human 
relations or the human spirit, or coordinates of existence 
different from those of the status quo. At the same time, 
in addition to return on investment, universities are mea-
sured by other rankings that lead to misbegotten priorities 
and often near-corrupt practices. These include rankings 
of competitiveness that lead institutions to try to boost 
applicant rates (so they can have a higher score for being 
competitive) and boost test scores, even as both practices 
are widely acknowledged as deleterious for students them-
selves. These also include rankings that drive the building 
of ever more elaborate recreational facilities, glamorous 
dorms, food courts and student services, while resourc-
es for education and research are steadily compressed. 
In short, if universities are no longer ‘cities on a hill’ due 
to privatization and financialization, they have not been 
pulled from their cloistered worlds into more public pur-
poses. To the contrary, as their every function becomes 
indexed and governed by a financialized order of value 
in which investor confidence and expectations dictate 
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survival or failure, they become steadily less oriented to 
research or teaching in the public interest, less able to 
set their own course, less organized by a clearly focused 
purpose and more bound to a set of drives that are often 
unjustifiable by any measure other than the rankings and, 
as is generally the case in financial markets, not even good 
indices of institutional health or productivity. The ratings 
by which they are governed generate neither priorities nor 
efficiencies that comport with rational institutional aims, 
let alone with that to which we now turn, the vocation of 
the public university in the twenty first century.  
✳
Let me compress the argument made to this point. 
Consequent to the particular time when public univer-
sities underwent their transformation by privatization, a 
time featuring ubiquitous financialization, universities 
are governed less by old fashioned utilitarian principles of 
cost/benefit (for internal allocations and for consumers) 
than by principles and metrics of shareholder value. The 
conversion of universities from public to private pur-
poses, in both research and education, has been shaped 
both by the demands that accompany private funding 
and by governance driven by the ratings accompanying 
financialization. The combination has not only drawn 
universities away from public purposes but has generated 
deep irrationalities in university organizing dynamics and 
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priorities. Neoliberal privatization along with financial-
ization constitutes the fundamental condition of public 
universities today. Following Weber, this condition is the 
context through which we should consider the vocation 
of the public university today. 
I believe this vocation has two basic features in the 
twenty-first century. The first is research and education 
oriented to worldly predicaments and challenges. Examples of 
such predicaments include the unprecedented transnatio- 
nal powers and forces — political, social, cultural, discur-
sive, economic — that have been humanly created but are 
not humanly controlled; global integration and the dan-
gerous interregnum that globalization generates between 
nation-states and their successor form; stratification and 
strife along economic, cultural, religious, racial, gendered 
and other lines… ever-increasing global inequalities and 
volatilities related to them; climate change, resource de-
pletion, species destruction, and unsustainably organized 
geographies and demographies that both perpetuate these 
problems and deter reckoning with them; human bodies 
that can be kept alive but without adequate conditions 
for their care or their thriving; diseases challenging the 
well-being or survival of entire populations and regions; 
widespread existential and political anxiety and fear, 
with its profound, social, psychological, political and 
theological effects; the difficulty of finding economic 
and political forms that both acknowledge a globally 
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connected world and provide the possibility of local 
self-determination and democracy. 
The list above is a bare beginning, far from com-
prehensive. The point of inaugurating it is to imagine a 
university oriented by worldly cries, perils and needs, 
and to imagine the research and education — basic and 
specialized, humanistic and technical, big picture and 
local — that would be responsive to these cries, perils and 
needs. This focus contrasts with research and education 
contoured by the aim of human capital appreciation (in 
students or faculty) and the shareholder value of depart-
ments, programs or whole institutions. It concentrates 
instead on the predicaments identified with planetary and 
species survival, with the disintegration or usurpation of 
democracies, with minimally decent and modestly egal-
itarian and free forms of human existence, and on the 
knowledges needed to fathom, historicize, probe, narrate, 
illustrate and address these things. 
This kind of education and research spans almost all 
the knowledges currently featured in research universities: 
technical, professional, scientific, social, humanistic and 
aesthetic. Far from being a mandate to focus universities 
on technical solutions to grave worldly problems, the claim 
here is the opposite. This aspect of the public university’s 
vocation comprises examination of the epistemological 
and ontological assumptions securing the existing orders of 
things as natural and inevitable; analysis of the grammars, 
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representations and methods that secure this givenness; 
inquiry into how different orders of knowledge are valorized 
or discredited, elevated or buried; study of diverse and 
contested formulations of religion, culture, gender, race, 
caste and sexuality; exploration of the foundations and 
content of various humanisms and posthumanisms, natural 
histories, ecologies, cosmologies and more. Thus, work 
on Aristotle, Darwin or Chakrabarty, on colonialism and 
sexual divisions of labor, on various iterations of markets 
and their alternatives, on history and reading practices, and 
on poetry and music, are as important as work on solar 
and wind energy technologies, sustainable cities, cancer 
cures, food sovereignty, or the precise mechanisms by 
which technocracy, autocracy and plutocracy are usurp-
ing democracy in this century. The particular disciplines, 
subjects and topics are not decisive in determining whether 
this aspect of the vocation of the university is activated and 
realized. What matters is the calling, purpose and ethos by 
which curricula and research are animated and organized. 
Put somewhat differently, if public universities are not only 
to survive but contribute to the public world — which they 
are bound to do by virtue of being public — university 
research and teaching cannot be subordinated to the kinds 
of knowledge needed by current economic and political 
regimes. This is not to say that all public university inquiry 
must be critical, only that it must be uncontracted, that 
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it must operate at a modest distance from the dominant 
interests of those regimes and also must aim at worldly 
problems rather than mainly at immediate commercial 
or state applications. Such uncontracted knowledge, until 
recently embodied in the relative autonomy of universities 
from markets and politics, is what privatization and finan-
cialization threaten in governing the conduct of students, 
faculty, donors and even taxpayers today and in their 
organization and governance of universities themselves. 
In fields ranging from forestry to physics, engineering to 
economics, literature to neurophysiology; and on issues 
ranging from climate change to the rise of nonstate terror, 
university research and teaching holds inordinate potential 
through its generation of publicly oriented research and 
its education of citizens. This generativity, however, is at 
odds with being held hostage to markets.
Developing and teaching publicly oriented knowledge 
is, then, one aspect of the vocation of public universities 
today. The second is bringing the outsiders in. Public 
universities must be consummately dedicated to educating 
and including in their research ranks those historically 
excluded by virtue of caste, class, religion, region, race, 
ethnicity, gender, and body. Why? Not only to redress 
historical hierarchies, dispossessions and prejudice. Not 
only to make the university a significant venue and ve-
hicle (again) for overcoming disparities in opportunities 
for those on the wrong side of social hierarchies and 
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exclusions. Not only to intellectually and socially integrate 
those who otherwise become candidates for hostility to 
stable, equitable societies. Not only to develop knowledges 
that challenge dominant perspectives with knowledge 
from dispossession or exclusion, knowledge focused on 
sites and scenes of existence often occluded by dominant 
perspectives or paradigms. This aspect of the public uni-
versity vocation is animated by all four of these: historical 
rectification and repair, equality of opportunity, social 
inclusion and incorporation, and democratic and diverse 
knowledge production. It is animated by equal opportunity 
combined with true (rather than rigged) meritocracy, yet 
is also an engine for egalitarianism. It challenges white 
and male standards for knowledge excellence at the same 
time as it affirms the value of educated intelligence for 
all people everywhere. It holds the promise of building 
worldly knowledge and addressing worldly predicaments 
in ways that repair, rather than reproduce, the hierarchies 
and exclusions that stratify populations, generate intense 
civil and political conflicts, and prevent the possibility of 
sustainable futures for humanity and the planet as a whole. 
It is impossible to overstate how severely privatization and 
financialization challenge this dimension of the vocation 
of the public university. Privatization limits access and 
funnels the historically excluded toward technical training 
rather than broad education in the sciences and letters.14 
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Financialization induces universities to prioritize faculty, 
students, programs and research areas that boost rankings; 
this means favoring those with the test scores, publications 
or rankings in the field that generate this boost. Put the 
other way around, institutions or programs that reach for 
non-traditional students or faculty, or struggle to feature 
and even center research and curriculums that attract and 
empower them, will suffer from lower ranking, resulting 
in diminished investment from states, private donors, 
and the very students and faculty they want to attract. In 
a university governed by the ratings, faculty and student 
“diversity,” along with public interest research, may be part 
of branding; however, these things cannot comprise the 
institutional core of the privatized publics without suicidal 
effects. Again, the issue is not primarily money but share-
holder value, measured by ratings of faculty, programs, 
and students and generated by applicant SATs, GREs, 
LSATs, post-graduate placement and income streams, and 
faculty prestige and productivity. Notwithstanding finan-
cialization’s ostensible reward of economic conduct that 
is disruptive and innovative, rankings produce profound 
conservatism in values and choices, reproducing existing 
social hierarchies, along with mainstream methods and 
criteria of excellence. 
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✳
I have argued that the vocation of the twenty-first century 
public university is the generation of publicly oriented 
knowledge and the broad incorporation of publics, both 
of which are undermined by privatization and financializa- 
tion. Of course, the university does other important things, 
such as developing skills and knowledges for particular 
professions, or developing research applications for both 
commercial and non-commercial purposes. However 
valuable, these cannot be said to rest at the heart of the 
vocation of the public university qua public university. In 
fact, they often do not require universities at all, and are 
increasingly taking place on non-university sites — insti-
tutes, corporate campuses, or virtual campuses — dedicated 
to technical training and research.15 
The two dimensions of the public university’s vo-
cation we have been considering, worldly knowledge 
and incorporating the excluded, are also fundamental 
to democracy — reviving it, renewing it, and rescuing it 
from the frightening alternatives on the contemporary 
horizon. To avoid despotism — whether by authoritarian 
anti-democratic forces or those of technocracy — citizens 
must have honed the intellectual capacities to minimally 
parse a complex world. Moreover, to avoid the devel-
opment of new neo-feudal race and caste-based orders, 
consecrated and secured by the ideas of the dominant 
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one, knowledge must be widespread and worldly, and the 
historically excluded must be among those both generating 
and gaining access to such knowledge.
Although it may sound, at times, nostalgic, I want to 
insist that this brief for the vocation of public universities 
in the twenty-first century is not a lament for a golden 
age. If twentieth century universities aspired to certain 
aspects of the calling I have outlined, these aspirations 
were severely cross-cut by their reproduction of white 
male hegemony, especially in the scholarly guild and the 
forms, methods and content of research prized by that 
guild. Public universities have never comported with a 
vocation to be fully of and for a democratic public. Purity 
is also inappropriate here. Universities will also always 
have other aims and interests specific to their time and 
cannot be held to a standard of purity. They will always 
be engaged in some compromises with their sources of 
survival and with the powers organizing them. What is 
certain, however, is that cultivating democratic access 
and worldly knowledge is wholly at odds with the neo-
liberalization and financialization of higher education. 
We are thus at risk of losing universities as sites for the 
generation of democracy in any meaningful sense of the 
word, and are also at risk of universities becoming voca-
tional in the familiar modern sense of job training. With 
this turn completed would come a loss of freedom itself, 
carried by the loss of learning appropriate to free people, 
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those capable of self-government. It would be a tragedy 
of monumental proportions — for knowledge, humanity 
and the future of the world — were universities to suffer 
this inversion at this moment in world history.
By way of concluding, let us make a brief return to Weber. 
In “Politics as a Vocation,” he distinguished between those 
who live “for” politics — those for whom politics is a vo-
cation — and those who live “from” politics — those for 
whom politics is a job, an income source (Weber, Politics, 
40). Weber understood that the two might converge 
in places, but argued that they must not be conflated 
lest the vocation for politics be lost as it is reduced to 
a means of individual survival. A calling ceases to be a 
calling when it becomes a means to some other end. 
Administrators of universities today risk instrumentalizing 
both the “public” and “education” for the survival of uni-
versities that would serve neither and in fact would have 
no distinct purpose at all. This is what the combination 
of privatization and financialization have generated, an 
ever-intensifying drive to entrepreneurialize and finan-
cialize both the form and substance of the university, to 
follow the money and the rankings regardless of the value 
to education or to the public of this pursuit. Without 
re-establishing the vocation of universities, and doggedly 
insuring that this vocation contours every important aspect 
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of their existence, public universities will increasingly live 
“from” the public and “from” education rather than for 
them. Hawking their brand and wares like every other 
commercial entity, and trading on speculative value like 
every other financialized one, what began as one of modern 
civilizations’ richest venues of human endeavor, and most 
important contributions to human freedom, may end as 
an expensive scam… one the public altogether ceases to 
support because nothing about it remains public. 
 
1 The focus on vocation was not Weber’s own choice. The public 
forum providing the auspice for his lecture was a series on “geistige 
Arbeit als Beruf”—intellectual or spiritual work as a calling. David 
Owen and Tracy Strong, drawing on Wolfgang Schluchter, also 
note that Weber’s lecture was prompted by an essay by Alexander 
Schwab which had argued for the incompatibility of a calling and 
scientific conduct. See Owen and Strong, Introduction, in Max 
Weber, The Vocation Lectures, eds. D. Owen and T. Strong (Hackett, 
2004), p. xiii. Hereafter, the lectures are cited in the text as “Weber, 
Politics” and “Weber, Science.”
2 See Weber’s Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.
3 From the Morrill Act: “without excluding other scientific and clas-
sical studies and including military tactics, to teach such branches 
of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts, 
in such manner as the legislatures of the States may respectively 
prescribe, in order to promote the liberal and practical education 
of the industrial classes in the several pursuits and professions in 
life” (United States Code Sec. 304).
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4 The critical literature on privatizing public education is now 
substantial and excellent. My own contributions include, among 
others, Brown, “Educating Human Capital,” Chapter Six of Undoing 
the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution (Zone, 2015) and 
Brown, “Neoliberalized Knowledge,” History of the Present 1.1 
(May 2011).
5 Michel Feher has theorized the fundamental change in value that 
accompanies the financialized phase of neoliberalism. See Feher, 
Rated Agencies (Zone, forthcoming). 
6 Ever more indebted educational institutions are themselves pushed 
toward policies that qualify them for borrowing and servicing 
their debts, in particular steady and predictable tuition increases. 
See Bob Meister, “They Pledged Your Tuition,” www.cucfa.org/
news/2009_oct11.php.
7 Christopher Newfield has been tracking and analyzing this phenom-
enon for some time. See his last two books, Christopher Newfield, 
Unmaking the Public University: The Forty-Year Assault on the Middle 
Class (Harvard University Press, 2011) and The Great Mistake: How 
We Wrecked Public Universities and How We Can Fix Them (Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2016). Out of the now enormous literature 
on the transformation of private universities in the past decade, 
Newfield’s work stands apart for its meticulous research, clear-minded 
analysis, and appreciation of the larger political and social forces — 
not only economic ones — generating public divestment from public 
universities. For recent work on privatization and higher education, 
see Andrew Leyshon and Nigel Thrift, “The Capitalization of Almost 
Everything: The Future of Finance and Capitalism,” Theory, Culture and 
Society 24.7–8 (2007); Bob Meister, “Debt and Taxes: Can the Financial 
Industry Save Public Universities?,” Representations 116.1 (Fall 2011); 
pp. 128–55; Susanne Soederberg, “Student Loans, Debtfare and 
the Commodification of Debt: The Politics and the Displacement 
of Risk,” Critical Sociology 40.5 (September 2014), pp. 689–709; 
Ivan Ascher and Will Roberts, “Critical Exchange: Education and 
scholarship in the twenty-first century marketplace” in Contem-
porary Political Theory (2015) 14, 409–433; Arunima Gopinath, 
“Who’s Afraid of Public Education?” in The Wire (March 3, 2017), 
www.thewire.in/113311/public-higher-education-privatisation/.  
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8 For analysis of how financialization has changed the governance 
and principles of value in organizations, see Randy Martin, Finan-
cialization of Daily Life (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
2002); Edward LiPuma and Benjamin Lee, Financial Derivatives 
and the Globalization of Risk (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
2004); Robin Blackburn, “Finance and the Fourth Dimension,” New 
Left Review 39 (May–June 2006); Gerald F. Davis, Managed by 
the Markets: How Finance Re-Shaped America (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009); Greta Krippner, Capitalizing on Crisis: 
The Political Origins of the Rise of Finance (Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press, 2011); Michael Hudson, Finance Capitalism 
and Its Discontents (ISLET, 2012); Dimitris P. Sotiropoulos, John 
Milios, and Spyros Lapatsioras, A Political Economy of Contem-
porary Capitalism and its Crisis: Demystifying Finance (London: 
Routledge, 2013); Joseph Vogl, The Specter of Capital, trans. Joa-
chim Redner and Robert Savage (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2014); Miranda Joseph, Debt to Society: Accounting for Life 
Under Capitalism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2014); Melinda Cooper and Martijn Konings, “Contingency and 
Foundation: Rethinking Money, Debt, and Finance after the 
Crisis,” South Atlantic Quarterly 114.2 (April 2015); Ivan Ascher, 
Portfolio Society: On the Capitalist Mode of Prediction (Zone, 
2016); Michel Feher: Rated Agencies (Zone, forthcoming); and a 
dissertation in progress by UC Berkeley Political Science graduate 
student, Brian Judge. 
9 See Feher, Rated Agencies (Zone, forthcoming).
10 See Ascher, Portfolio Society, especially chapters 3 and 4.
11 Articles on how to improve university rankings abound on  
the web. A sample: www.timeshighereducation.com/features 
/top-20-ways-to-improve-your-world-university-ranking/410392.
article#; www.qsdigitalsolutions.com/blog/7-ways-to-improve-
 university-rankings-in-the-eeca-region/. And on improving 
 personal rankings: www.elsevier.com/connect/get-found-optimize
 -your-research-articles-for-search-engines.
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12 UC’s bond rating was severely downgraded by Moody’s when an 
agreement between the California governor and the University of 
California President capped tuition in 2014. See “Rating Action: 
Moody’s downgrades University of California to Aa2 and assigns 
Aa2 to $950M of GRBs,” statement posted at www.moodys.com/
research/Moodys-downgrades-University-of-California-to-Aa2-
and-assigns-Aa2--PR_294817. 
13 There are also amalgamations and algorithms built from wildly 
skewed, partial and distorted data bases, such as Google Scholar. 
Yet this very rating agency has become increasingly important in 
institutional decisions about in the hiring, tenuring and promotion 
of scholars.  
14 While high fee aid programs are supposedly aimed at assuring 
access by the poor, these packages do not cover the whole cost, 
thus imposing jobs and loans on those in the middle and the 
bottom. Moreover, price tags alone is a mighty deterrent for poor 
families. The ever-growing private industry supporting college 
preparation and application also gives applicants from well-off 
families tremendous advantage in accessing prestige universities. 
15 Medical schools and those of the other health professions, for 
example, can be located in hospitals and other medical “cam-
puses,” as some already are. There are also many free-standing 
law schools. And the rise of phenomena like Apple University 
may bode a future in which corporations find it beneficial to 
contour what used to take place in generic business schools 
to their own corporate styles and products. See www.nytimes.
com/2014/08/11/technology/-inside-apples-internal-trai- 
ning-program-.html?_r=0 and www.businessinsider.com/heres- 
what-its-like-to-attend-apples-secret-university-2015-2.
 The contemporary obsession with investing in and enlarging so-
called STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) 
fields, especially as the breakthrough area for women and minori-
ties, is symptomatic of recasting universities as domains for the 
enhancement of human capital. Many have also mistakenly tried 
to defend liberal arts curriculums along these lines, trying to make 
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the case for the arts and humanities as building critical thinking, 
and analytic capacities sought by employers. We ought instead to 
be articulating their value in building an educated citizenry, ad-
dressing public problems, and saving the world from the barbarism 
of being ruled by finance, or simply from extinction altogether. 
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An Interview with Elie During
So what is education to me? I have no ready-made answer 
to this question and can only rely on my experience of 
researching and teaching philosophy. The most remarkable 
thing for me, in that respect, is that the educational setting 
presents itself as an opportunity to prolong my life as a 
student, a life which I have never quite left. I’m not saying 
this to indulge in a pedagogical mannerism — something 
like: “we are all students for each other…” — but merely 
stating a rather banal matter of fact which nevertheless 
turns out to be significant in actual practice.
I have been teaching philosophy for the past 15 years or 
so in various settings — philosophy departments as well 
as art schools — but I still consider myself as a student in 
a very real sense. Every time I have to teach something I 
have the feeling that I am actually confronted with new 
materials which force me to put back to work whatever 
background knowledge I may have accumulated over the 
years. This is rather uncomfortable, in the sense that I 
cannot rely on any previously designed format, although 
EDUCATION IN AN AGE OF DISTRACTION
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there are of course gimmicks or modules that can be re-
used. This situation of continuous self-education is perhaps 
specific to philosophy — or at least more apparent there 
than in any other discipline. Henri Bergson, a major figure 
in my personal Pantheon, considered himself a student 
until the very end. He was almost 63 years old when he 
confronted himself with the emerging theory of relativity: 
I have looked through the documentation he gathered 
for the task, and seen the several layers of multi-colored 
notes and annotations in his physics textbooks. It was 
both impressive and somewhat comforting to realize that 
he had stumbled upon something important in his late 
years, that he had encountered new problems, new ways 
of thinking that pushed him to develop his own ideas in 
directions he did not really foresee.
There is no time for retirement in philosophy. At 
some point, you may become a master student, but you 
never stop studying. You are never done learning, and it 
is important to cultivate that feeling and convey it to stu-
dents as you are teaching. Of course, this can only work 
if this experience undergoes a process of transformation, 
because students are not exactly in the position of doing 
research themselves. They are discovering and exploring a 
landscape that is already more or less familiar to the teacher. 
What is required, then, is a transfusion that converts the 
feeling of puzzlement experienced by the researcher into a 
sensibility for the extremely odd, and at times otherworldly 
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nature of the ideas and problems encountered in the study 
of the most classical figures in the canon. In other words, 
the perplexities of the researcher must infuse pedagogical 
dynamics in a way that heightens the capacity for aston-
ishment. Deleuze used to say that there is something eerie 
about any genuinely creative philosophical doctrine: it 
is part detective novel, part science-fiction… This is an 
intuition that both teacher and student can share, from 
different perspectives.
The crisis in culture and education that Hannah Arendt 
talks about can be interpreted in many ways,1 but the 
central issue revolves around our capacity to engage in the 
pedagogical relation in a way that allows the individual 
to develop not only a particular skill or acquire a specific 
body of knowledge, but also to flourish in a more general 
sense. The problem, as it is traditionally described, is to 
acquire the taste, you might say, or the ethos which will 
make you eager to learn and acquire new knowledge for 
the sake of it — that is, beyond the immediate practical 
benefits that one may expect from it. Now I am not sure I 
entirely share the humanist presupposition of this idea, but 
one thing is certain: in the case of philosophical knowledge 
— if there is such a thing — this ethos is directly linked 
with the feeling of bewilderment that makes you want 
to know more. In that sense, it is very close to aesthetic 
experience. Remember what Kant said about the aesthetic 
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Idea: it essentially gives you ‘more’ to think… Well, what 
happens when information is immediately available, 
‘underhand’, so it may seem that you don’t need to set up 
a particular educational or pedagogical relation to get it 
and assimilate it? You have more and more to learn and 
less and less to be excited about. Because if everything 
is virtually laid out and available, you are confronted 
with a continuum where the distinction between what is 
ordinary and remarkable is inevitably blurred. The logo-
sphere constituted by the worldwide web conjures up the 
image of a maximally dense Leibnizian universe where 
a continuous chain of variants connects any proposition 
with every other, including an innumerable number of 
unremarkable or frivolous propositions that are not worth 
one hour of our troubles.
Let me be clear about this. The problem is not that 
everything is flattened and packaged in readymade for-
mats. Quite the contrary. The institution of education, the 
classroom setting in schools and universities, has always 
run the risk of trivialization through standardization and 
leveling. There is nothing particularly new here. Good 
teachers have always been suspicious of textbooks. If 
anything, digital humanities and the internet offer ever 
more possibilities of direct exposure to genuine sources. 
For every Wikipedia entry, there are thousands of origi-
nal references in the form of digitalized documents that 
can be accessed in two or three clicks without having to 
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physically spend time in libraries. The problem is to avoid 
being submerged by all this material. And it is only natural 
to consider classroom education as a preparatory training 
for the great online navigation awaiting the researcher. 
The teacher would act as a super-browser, inculcating the 
“method” which will allow students to survive on their 
own in the deep forest of shared knowledge.
This is not exactly how I view things. Or better put, the 
real challenge, it seems to me, lies elsewhere. The gen-
eral disposition I have observed in myself as much as 
in my students is not exactly one of disorientation, but 
one of distraction, and that is a wholly different matter. 
Disorientation is easy to fix: you need a guide, and some 
reference frame. Teachers are trained to provide this. But 
what if they themselves suffer from distraction in the face 
of the abundance of “affordances” provided by the new 
digital aether of knowledge? What if they have a hard time 
focusing on one single track of reasoning or inquiry? We 
are all distracted. And by this I do not mean solicitations 
deflecting our attention towards non-academic tasks. I 
mean being distracted by the overwhelming abundance 
of resources accessible for academic work! In other words, 
it is the very matter that we are dealing with that becomes 
distracting. And this is not merely a matter of methods 
of navigation or “data-mining”. The problem is reflect-
ed in the concrete condition of classroom interaction. 
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Typically, during a seminar, students will take notes on 
their computers, while searching and looking up some of 
the names, texts and quotes that I am referring to. This is 
totally unprecedented.
Some may say that, as a result, the educator more and 
more resembles a switchboard operator, channeling and 
redistributing elements of knowledge that are already out 
there, acting as a constant source of distraction. There is 
some truth in this view: part of the task of the educator is 
to organize and articulate this distraction in a creative way. 
The teacher is more than an experienced student pointing 
out routes and shortcuts that will enable other students 
to save time as they are making their way. In reality, what 
he achieves is exactly the opposite. I believe that the main 
task of the educator is to find ways of losing time that may 
prove beneficial in the long run. It is a matter of prolong-
ing the journey itself by taking detours, by dilating time. 
Why? Well, precisely, in order to learn and organize the 
endemic distraction in a way that is productive and does 
not lead to wrecked attention and competence, and more 
importantly, that increases the students’ sensibility to the 
remarkable oddness of genuine theoretical innovations.
The important thing — which leads back to my first 
observation regarding teachers as belated students — is 
that the educator and the student share the same predic-
ament here. It would be easy if we were simply distracted 
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by extra-curricular activities such as going out, watching 
youtube videos and the like. I am not denying that such 
problems exist, but unfortunately there is no cure for them 
inside the classroom, unless we consider that it is the role 
of the teacher — as a more “mature” person — to correct 
bad habits through disciplinary methods. What I find 
more interesting is the fact that one may be distracted by 
knowledge itself, by the very thing that one is supposed 
to acquire. And it is important to realize that we all share 
the same problem here. There is obviously a functional 
asymmetry between teachers and students, but I think it 
is basically no more than a temporal difference: teachers 
started being students long before becoming the teachers 
of their students. And no one is preserved from the kind 
of distraction I have in mind.
What the situation suggests is a peculiar exercise in joint 
distraction. The educational relation is often described as an 
apprenticeship of freedom. Basically, what you must learn 
is to do without a teacher. But in the particular situation 
we are facing, things are somewhat reversed: the students 
must learn to do with a teacher whom they may feel they 
do not need anymore. In thinking this, they are wrong of 
course: they need the teacher as the necessary distraction 
from their own distraction. Yet it is equally important that 
the teacher also considers the possibility of drawing from the 
educational relation in order to organize his own distraction. 
98
Because he is himself struggling with different layers of 
knowledge that may appear completely heterogeneous. 
The basic skill that is required from the educational situa-
tion in the teacher’s perspective, whether in a seminar or 
a classroom setting, is to be able to sum up or condense 
some rather complex idea or theory in a few words or sen-
tences and connect them with very simple — and possibly 
silly — examples. But the fact that we are now immersed 
in an ocean of immediately accessible information calls 
for new methods for developing the critical capacity of 
navigating between different levels of contraction and 
dilation of thought on different planes. This is the only 
way to avoid the inherent “flatness” of the digital web 
of knowledge, and confer on it a new dimensionality or 
voluminosity. This is something I learned in art schools, 
confronted with an audience that had little resemblance 
to the one I was used to in more traditional academic 
settings. It is a matter of zooming in and zooming out, of 
collapsing a long chain of arguments into a one-liner, of 
branching in unexpected directions to connect things that 
were loosely coexisting in different regions of our mind-
map, of sustaining a simultaneous, distributed attention 
to two voices speaking at once, of reading a text or an 
image in transparency through another, and of alternating 
between phases of brutal acceleration and moments of 
suspension and dilation. Being involved in an argument, 
or absorbed in a text, may yield moments of genuine 
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diffuse, non-focused or “floating” attention after a time. 
We should value such moments, because they elicit what 
Ehrenzweig described as a “scanning” process enabling us 
to pick up singularities at the surface of our field of per-
ception and reveal previously unnoticed patterns on which 
to experiment further. This is good. So is the possibility 
of cruising at high speed between heterogeneous “strata” 
of the cultural landscape: Deleuze and Guattari aimed at 
something similar when they spoke of “pop-philosophy” 
as an antidote to the hermeneutical ethos which brings 
us to dig ever deeper while fundamentally remaining on 
the same discursive plane.
To sum up, the idea is to beat distraction on its own 
ground by replicating the sort of multi-media, multi-chan-
nel distribution of knowledge that has become our natural 
condition as intensive users of digital technologies. When 
I speak of contraction and dilation, what I have in mind is 
something like Bergson’s diagram of the memory cone in 
Matter and Memory. It is of course essential to make time 
for close reading, to get back to the sources and confront 
a material head-on, but we must also consider that an 
idea, a theory, is inherently non-local, that it tends to be 
distributed on a variety of planes according to different 
degrees of contraction or dilation, just as a memory — 
according to Bergson — is not a discrete unit but rather 
a radiating wave or dynamic schema virtually spanning 
across the entire psyche, with its multiple “planes of 
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consciousness”. At the highest degree of contraction, a 
theory can be encapsulated in a rallying cry or a simple 
image. At the lowest degree, it is like a mist or a perpetual 
movie projected in a dreamlike atmosphere, diffusing in the 
entire cultural spectrum, with innumerable relays in the 
digital aether. All these manifestations, taken together, and 
appropriately handled in the context of a class or seminar, 
can contribute to enhancing the inherent oddity which is 
the hallmark of genuinely creative thought.
1  [Ed.] Cf. Hannah Arendt’s essay: ‘The crisis in education’, 1954.
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Illustration of Henri Bergson's Memory Cone. Original  
appears in his book Matter and Memory
A
A” B” 
B
Aʼ Bʼ
P
S
102
103
AUTONOMY AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
Chris Fynsk
I will adapt, for my remarks, the framework of inquiry 
offered by the editors of this volume with their three ques-
tions regarding the value of “autonomy” as a traditional 
end of higher education.1 
I should acknowledge from the outset, however, that I 
will have to struggle with this term “autonomy” — it re-
mains deeply at odds with a thought of human finitude. 
“Freedom” speaks to me much more immediately, and 
if we are to win terms back from the tradition in full 
cognizance of their destiny in modern metaphysics (to 
which a near-century of European thought has directed 
its critical energies), I would prefer the latter word, given 
that it preserves the possibility of a relation to otherness 
that “autonomy” would seem to frustrate. “Functionality,” 
which “consumer satisfaction” only cloaks, perhaps names 
best the end of most education in the modern, developed 
world (this, sadly, is how we must answer the question: 
“What is education today?”). Resistance to this fate of 
the educated subject in the era of neo-liberalism and 
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Technik is difficult to think without reference to a notion 
of freedom (a value to which the term “liberal” — in the 
phrase “liberal arts” — must struggle more than ever to 
reach2). But a notion of autonomy can perhaps also be 
brought forth that serves this latter notion of resistance.
In any case, a notion of autonomy can be articulated that 
speaks to the highest ends envisioned in the speculative 
efforts of those who prepared the foundation of the 
University of Berlin, and while the philosophical assump-
tions and ambitions of these thinkers cannot be taken 
over without critical transformation, their understanding 
of academic freedom, and what thought at the university 
might be, marks an invaluable precedent. They set many 
of the terms of a struggle relating to education that might 
have seemed almost hopeless in Europe less than a year 
ago (though meaningful struggle without hope is still 
conceivable), and only more difficult today in the midst 
of convulsions that may bring new restrictions to projects 
of critical thinking and other manifestations of freedom. 
This is not the occasion for returning to the texts of these 
thinkers, but I want to retain their inspiring efforts (and a 
tradition of thinking that has proceeded from them) as a 
point of reference for measuring the ever-more essential 
character of the struggle against the educational processes 
that serve that grim term, “functionality.” 
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I. Teaching Autonomy
So, working with a loose sense of the term “autonomy,” 
let me ask how, in higher education, we can endeavour 
to free an autonomous exercise of thought, be this in any 
field of research or creative practice. And let me begin by 
speaking from my own site, which today is the European 
Graduate School — an effort to recover a meaning for the 
European university that remains modest in actual resourc-
es, but is nonetheless commensurate with the speculative 
endeavours of those who prepared its re-foundation over 
two centuries ago.
I speak from this special site because I believe that new 
educational practices serving the end I have defined 
must be won experimentally. I recall here the delightful 
thought-experiment undertaken by Gérard Granel in De 
l’université in 1982, and the playful fiction he proposed, 
despairing of any effort at reform in the socio-economic 
context of the time.3 I remain in agreement with him re-
garding the profoundly limiting scope of the horizons of 
possibility offered by our modern socio-economic order 
(even if I disagree with him about the futility of struggling 
from within), and I am inclined to think that these horizons 
have not significantly broadened with the extraordinary 
technical developments now on offer. Accordingly, I am 
not sure that a practical design for a new university exists 
that can satisfy the idea of the university toward which 
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I have gestured — a university where the possibility of a 
free thought of a worldly character can be practiced or 
prepared. Clearly, a new university must be invented. But 
I am a bit more accepting of our finite conditions than 
Granel, and a bit more open to the possibility of the event 
(in education). From this ground I remain devoted to a 
concrete form of experimentation guided by values such 
as academic freedom. 
I would also underscore that I accept Gérard Granel’s 
argument that the exercise of thought in any given dis-
cipline of study must engage the existence of those who 
practice the discipline, and must seek to draw forth the 
meaning of that practice for those practitioners and for 
a larger public at the level of their world. The latter term 
can only mark a question at this juncture, but one that 
remains unavoidable, for it is perfectly obvious (and has 
been so since the founding of the University of Berlin) that 
any question of profound social meaning requires some 
thought of the whole of social existence. We encounter 
this, for example, in the painful exigency of thinking 
today what a term such as “refugee” implies. Universities 
have increasingly surrendered to technocratic imperatives 
that reduce education to the preparation of expertise in 
a “knowledge economy“ that requires discrete forms of 
professional specialization or mere technical skills. But the 
resulting isolation of disciplines from one another (with the 
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eclipse of the question of the whole to which I am point-
ing) condemns all of them to some degree of abstraction. 
Therefore, it becomes imperative to keep alive in higher 
education not only the question of the foundations of any 
given discipline, but also its relation to all other fields of 
inquiry in a “university” worthy of this name. One must 
therefore seek, in and through every discipline, a question 
of the order of the one Maurice Blanchot posed for literary 
study: “What does it mean that something like literature 
should exist?” This is a question that leads to the imper-
ative of broad cross-disciplinary inquiry, even as it leads 
back to literary study by reason of the singular character 
of the literary event, forcing an acute form of disciplinary 
reflection. Without a questioning of this kind on its hori-
zon, once again, a discipline’s study is prey to formalism 
and the hold of abstract jargon, however “scientific” in 
its formulations; it can only produce further abstraction. 
I have sought, in The Claim of Language, to draw forth 
what this argument implies for the humanities inasmuch 
as they address and deploy distinctive usages of language, 
opening by this means to concrete questions bearing on 
all dimensions of human existence (including a relation 
to the world that obliges us to entertain, today, notions of 
the post- or in- human). I would argue that the individual 
who undertakes and undergoes such an engagement with 
language (taking this term in a broad sense) effectively 
opens to a free exercise of thought.4 
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But I wonder if one passage of this kind (from one dis-
ciplinary site), can ever suffice for a concrete form of 
“autonomy.” And is the opening not always threatened 
by a disciplinary closure where the relay called for in 
exposure to limits of any discipline (when it touches on 
questions of fundamental social meaning) is impeded, if 
not blocked? To rephrase what I have said thus far: every 
practice of thought calls for complementation of its efforts 
vis à vis the exigencies of that “thing” to which the phrase 
“res publica” points, the real that lies at the horizon of 
every search for social meaning in a particular discursive 
mode.5 Thought knows in the always singular paths of this 
search the lure of a whole; and what inspired researcher 
does not sense that they have touched upon this whole 
when they achieve in their writing or presentation an ex-
perience of concreteness? (Everyone will be familiar with 
the phenomenon wherein researchers believe that their 
work is echoed in many other forms of research going 
on around them — what is important about this slightly 
comical phenomenon is that there is some truth in the 
experience.) But the self-reflective researcher will also 
recognise in that same movement the inherently partial 
(or better, fragmentary) character of that concreteness, 
and hence the requirement of the relay to which I have 
referred. Every striving for reality in thought must go to 
the limits of the path chosen, and will inevitably disclose 
those limits. Is it not therefore imperative that a “higher” 
109
education reveal to the student multiple passages of a 
fundamental character? And in a time when mythic con-
structions of the whole are in resurgence, is this critical 
practice not all the more imperative?
 
With this principle in view, I believe it is possible to affirm 
philosophically the choice of the European Graduate 
School (in the Division devoted to Philosophy, Art, and 
Critical Thought) to construct a curriculum that is with-
out disciplinary bounds in the sense that it requires of its 
students work in a series of seminars that implicitly (or 
explicitly) entail a fundamental questioning of the fields 
taken up in them — there being no limit to the number 
of fields that might be broached within a course of study 
involving 12 seminars (for each of the advanced degrees: 
MA and PhD). Every student, whatever their special field 
of expertise or professional background (the EGS actively 
promotes diversity in this respect), must undertake this 
cross-disciplinary experience.
It should be noted immediately that a very particular form 
of teaching is required for this form of curriculum, one 
that is inherently public in its address insofar as it can-
not presuppose advanced preparation on the part of the 
students, and can only rely on a profound interest and a 
willingness to attempt the course of study. Professors must 
effectively translate their thought in terms that are accessible 
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to a diverse group, but in no way reductive with respect 
to the questioning undertaken. It is this challenge that 
seems to bring the distinguished faculty back to the EGS 
year after year, for their recasting of their thought in such 
exceptional circumstances is inevitably generative of new 
thinking, along with remarkable pedagogical encounters.
 
Of course, such a movement between disciplines implies 
that seminar training cannot be directed to the develop- 
ment of mastery in a particular area of research (a process 
that normally entails progression from introductory levels 
to more advanced ones). Mastery will come once a chosen 
field is defined and explored by the student in independent 
study, the supposition being that such learning does not 
require constant oversight if advanced students are initially 
given the means to address the fundamentals of any dis-
cipline. The latter means — habits of enquiry sharpened 
by extensive exposure to philosophically informed theory 
and sustained questioning with respect to contemporary 
topics — are provided in the seminar training of the EGS, 
where seminar directors are leading proponents of their 
fields, individuals who in many cases have shaped the 
very fields they address in their seminar. 
What is crucial in this model, I emphasize, is not acqui-
sition of a fund of knowledge, but repeated passages, in 
fundamental questioning, to the limits of what any given 
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discipline can offer with respect to some topic of inquiry. 
This course of study, when it is genuinely engaged, will 
foster a distinctive freedom in the students’ approach to 
their own chosen field of research — a singular capacity 
to construct a problematic requiring cross-disciplinary 
inquiry, and an ability to address that problematic with 
a special breadth and methodological sophistication. Let 
us call this a disciplinary reflexivity of a kind, though 
“reflexivity” does not quite capture, as I will try to show 
in addressing the second point raised by the editors, the 
form of freedom involved.
Disciplines are resistant formations; they will always 
reassert their hold in some measure as a student strives 
to define the question that organizes their study and 
to support their argument in a scholarly manner. The 
structures by which disciplines reproduce themselves 
are powerfully constraining — and this can be affirmed 
without consideration of the more coercive practices 
sometimes involved. Scholarly protocol in each field and 
in each national context is profoundly defining (both en-
abling and limiting) and the constraints involved are easily 
hidden by institutional practices involving a distribution 
of rewards.6 The EGS recognizes the necessity of those 
defining elements of discipline; it is wholly committed 
to academic standards. But it is also seeking to impart a 
free relation to disciplinary constructions and a capacity 
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for singular passages between them — not in a spirit of 
eclecticism, but for the purpose of addressing freely core 
dimensions of existence in the contemporary world. 
Exposure to theory, in itself, does not bring the critical 
freedom I have sought to describe. The explosion in theory 
of the last century has not brought a true explosion of 
disciplines simply because disciplines can easily contain 
the purchase and philosophical implications of theoret-
ical inquiry. The “free use” of philosophically informed 
theory of the kind we seek to advance at the EGS requires 
a constant passage beyond the limits of the disciplinary 
articulation of knowledge and institutional mechanisms 
serving the containment of thought. The effort can have 
only limited impact in relation to the stultifying structures 
that largely define what teaching is today. But freedom, 
when exercised, has a way of propagating itself.
II. Autonomy and Authority
The pedagogy leading to the free exercise of thought de-
scribed here would appear to require a form of mastery and 
an accompanying authority. And this is indeed the case in 
some measure, though only to a limited degree (as I will 
attempt to show). Teaching that pursues the fundamental 
ambition to which I have referred — teaching that is not 
simply research-led, but intrinsically a form of research — 
must go beyond a mere imparting of knowledge, be this 
an exposition of relevant theory or the work of leading 
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names in a field. (And this is why the EGS seeks to hire 
the leading names, not their commentators.7) However 
competent such exposition might be, it remains short of 
the form of thoughtful questioning to which students must 
be exposed if they are to learn what it is to think on their 
own — if they are to learn thinking (a highly problematic 
formulation that is at the heart of the question posed by 
the editors of this volume). Yes, in an EGS seminar, there 
will inevitably be the communication of insight into the 
discursive grounds (historical and philosophical) of the 
topic or problematic under consideration. The experience 
of the “master-teacher” is invaluable here, particularly if 
they are to address students who are not specialists in 
the field under consideration. This experience is also an 
important source of the authority the professor requires 
if they are to lead their students through a period in 
which many students must discover that they are not yet 
thinking with respect to the questioning undertaken in 
the seminar. But if the teacher is to lead into thinking, or 
stimulate it anew, they must be prepared to undertake a 
very intense form of reflective engagement with text, image, 
or schema, and develop this into a genuine questioning.8 
Again, a great deal of knowledge will be communicated 
in this process; there will also be imparted (mitgeteilt) 
habits of questioning and a form of exposure that is al-
ways communicated with a singular Stimmung (a certain 
disposition of energy conveyed in a tonality and posture 
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of questioning). Students — we will all recall this — first 
learn from their most influential teachers gestures of 
thought in a mimetic exercise. But they will also witness, 
if they are truly following (and this speaks to the teacher’s 
task), a ceding of mastery.
A surrender occurs when the professor explores the limits 
of their grasp of the thing that holds their attention. Jean-
François Lyotard described this surrender at numerous 
points in his work on the teaching relation by arguing 
that a philosophically informed questioning in any field 
will demand a form of re-beginning and a self-exposure 
that is more than reminiscent of infancy in that it rejoins 
a native capacity for openness (with all the suffering — 
“misère” — this can also bring).9 Lyotard was seeking a 
pedagogy that might prepare for what he termed “the 
event,” and I would argue that what I have called a “free 
use” of thought is “free,” in part, by reason of its capacity 
in this regard (a strange form of “capacity,” to be sure, but 
nonetheless something for which one strives).
The true master is therefore always, at some point, a little 
less than a master, and what they will teach is in fact the 
autodidaxy that they perform in their effort to approach 
that place where thought engages the thing of its concern 
(whatever the disciplinary site from which one starts). They 
will communicate their own searching act of thought, their 
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own effort to begin to think. Se former au retour, Lyotard 
writes, invoking a Bildung that involves a form of dispos-
session or exposure and thus the experience of the return 
of a form of infancy. The master “forms” by inviting to a 
repetition of self-discovery in a “philosophical” course of 
study that is of necessity an exposure to what one cannot 
master, namely the finitude of one’s understanding, and 
an exposure to the possibility of genuine engagement.
Projecting toward the ends of such teaching (that 
is, beyond the immediate end of preparing students for 
independent research in an academic thesis), we can say 
that it takes on a profoundly ethico-political character to 
the extent that it involves preparing the student for a form 
of thinking performance that is perhaps the prerequisite 
of genuine democracy (at least in the sense described by 
Jean-François Lyotard when he argues that a republic must 
teach its citizens what it is to bring something “other” 
to the public space than a repetition of the same).10 It is 
ethico-political in the sense offered to us by Emmanuel 
Levinas in his meditations on the teaching that occurs in 
the relation with the human other (autrui), and inevitably 
political in the sense that prompting the “self-formation” 
of a subject capable of conceiving a free relation to the 
“functionality” to which they are summoned, and always 
in some measure with the other (for what autonomy they 
have learned has come to them in relation), has political 
meaning, however undefined. Again, there is a form of 
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autonomy because this pedagogy requires of the stu-
dents an act of translation by which the singular path of 
thought undertaken by the professor is appropriated in a 
new act of “autodidaxy” wherein the student experiences 
otherness for themselves. A student will often mime the 
path undertaken by the professor for some time as they 
learn to translate the singular gesture of thought they 
have encountered; but the “pedagogy” I sketch here ulti-
mately requires a different form of repetition, a genuine 
re-beginning. And this requirement, I emphasize, will 
become all the more acute when a student undergoes a 
serial exposure to such an exercise of thought through a 
number of cross-disciplinary passages. “Autonomy” could 
perhaps name here the always singular search for the rule 
that will guide one’s thought, both in the response to a 
teaching, and in the effort to proceed independently in 
a research project. And yes, one undertakes this search 
in some measure alone, but always from the ground of a 
recalled exposure to the other (the teacher) and always in 
exposure to oneself, by way of the anamnesis that occurs 
with the return to infancy in re-learning what it means 
to speak meaningfully with respect to a given topic, text, 
or problematic.
III. The Autonomy of the Educator
I will speak again from a specific site for this last section, 
offering, this time, a brief account of an episode from 
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everyday academic life. My words will not bear directly 
on institutional autonomy, but rather to the effects on 
faculty (and specifically their intellectual freedom) when 
such autonomy begins to erode under the pressure of 
contemporary socio-economic and political agendas. 
The episode I will recount is not meant to be exemplary; 
it was simply the occasion for a form of discovery, and it 
happens to involve a project bearing on teaching.
The impact of neoliberalism on the contemporary acade-
my manifests itself in uneven ways, but one may observe 
in many academic systems a gradual supplanting of 
intellectual authority by administrative authority, and 
the concomitant phenomenon whereby those chosen to 
administer are those most successful in ‘administering’ 
their careers through grant development and other forms 
of rewarded service. (In the neoliberal academic order, 
such entrepreneurial self-administration presents itself as 
a form of autonomy.) Those most successful in securing 
grants are also generally those best able to conform to the 
standards enjoined by bureaucratic bodies such as research 
councils, whose criteria for selection are largely set with 
regard to state economic priorities. The offshoot in the UK, 
for example, is the imperative that all research demonstrates 
its “social impact.” The rhetorical acrobatics prompted 
by this criterion for evaluation can prove amusing, but 
the results are no laughing matter. Even PhD students 
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seeking financial support must be prepared to document 
at considerable length the social impact of their proposed 
projects; needless to say, the pressure of this requirement 
at such an early stage has a quite powerful effect on the 
character of the research produced.
In 2013 and 2014, I undertook with three colleagues 
(two of them from the School of Education at the University 
of Aberdeen, an important institution in Northeast 
Scotland), a project entitled “The Teacher in Public.”11 The 
project was devoted to transforming teacher training in 
Scotland and began with an effort to develop an MA pro-
gram that would offer teachers exposure to fields outside 
those of their specialty and whatever exposure they might 
gain to cross-disciplinary thinking from their program of 
training in pedagogy (which offers only the most basic 
psychological and sociological insights). 
I am sure I do not need to set forth the motives 
behind the effort to enhance teacher training.12 Let any 
parent in Scotland (or elsewhere) who knows something 
about academic preparation look closely at the training of 
those to whom they have entrusted their children’s earliest 
educational experience (they need not even open a psy-
chology textbook….), and they will grasp the imperative 
of reform. But this project was especially ambitious in that 
it sought a form of training that would prepare a teacher 
to grasp the broad meaning of their public role and what 
this could mean for their work in the classroom or in 
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situations requiring advocacy.13 For the latter purpose, the 
project envisioned an enhanced exposure to the critical 
thought and creative practices available in the fields of 
the humanities (as well as some social sciences). Here, the 
motives required some presentation, for not all humanists 
seemed to understand why they might have something to 
contribute to teacher training.
Because we were seeking support initially in the 
funding bodies serving the humanities, it fell to me (the 
senior academic in this area) to write the grant application 
to the AHRC. I will not attempt to assess my skill level 
in this area, or the quality of my work on this particular 
occasion. The project seemed only to require devotion 
and care. Could there be a project of higher social impact 
(particularly in that it had solid University backing and 
drew into association significant public figures in the field 
of education, governmental representatives, and leading 
academics)? And dare I say, could there be a more worthy 
investment from the side of the humanities, who struggle 
today to justify their work in the larger social context? But 
let me move past the possible grounds for the failure of 
this bid and focus on my experience, which is what I most 
want to communicate with this relatively banal story of 
one more unsuccessful grant application.
A year of preparation involving intensive meetings of 
inestimable value for the participants, then the creation of 
a national and international network of researchers, came 
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down to a quite lengthy exercise in filling numerous boxes 
with an appropriate number of characters. The characters 
(combined in words and sentences) had to conform to 
the vague expectations of largely nameless bodies — 
bureaucratic committees charged with vetting a flooded 
national system. Weeks, perhaps a month devoted solely 
to composing the application turned into what was in fact 
a revelatory experience — for I grasped concretely, for the 
first time in fact, what a career devoted to answering those 
vague expectations defined by governmental mandate in 
a conforming, always “safe,” rhetoric could do to a young 
academic, already saddled with onerous teaching loads.
In short, it became newly and painfully evident to me 
that this system imposed very significant constraints on 
academic freedom. There was a time, in the humanities, 
when one could “write off ” bureaucratic exercises such as 
grant-application as a necessary evil, accepting them as a 
delimitable percentage of the job’s requirements that could 
still leave a margin of freedom for research of a less directed 
kind. But what I had learned to appreciate on this occa- 
sion was the actual level of deadening constraint entailed 
in such exercises today — a constraint that cannot but have 
a debilitating effect on the overall work of an academic. 
The forms I was filling out, I understood, were forming 
me. Of course, academics in the sciences and social sci-
ences have been accustomed to such a regime for many 
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years (in almost all academic systems); for humanists, the 
imperative of grant-application is a relatively new devel-
opment. We may smile at the quaint, protected existence 
humanists have enjoyed, and their discomfort today. But 
should the shock they now experience not rather reflect 
back upon the working conditions of those in the sciences 
and social sciences? To what “formative” forces have they 
accommodated their work? The question is rhetorical, of 
course, because we know that a very significant number 
of researchers in the sciences have conformed, almost 
without question, to the dictates of agendas stemming 
from business and government.
My point is simple: We cannot afford to ignore the 
damage done to the spirit by the incessant demand for 
conformity to an ever-more technocratic and instru-
mentalized system. The greatest danger to education 
in the contemporary university may lie in the gradual 
destruction of the “autonomy” of the faculty, the ero-
sion of their capacity to perform freely and creatively 
(in teaching and in writing) from a deep and constantly 
nourished commitment to the meaning of their work. The 
becoming-functionary of the professoriat spells its ruin. 
The threat to academic freedom takes many forms, some 
quite a bit more harsh than the one I have tried to illus-
trate. One can only imagine what will unfold in the Trump 
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era in North America. But I remain convinced that the 
technocratic administration of the academy in the era 
of neo-liberalism, an administration that has very little 
“liberal” about it, is in fact quite harsh indeed. For this 
reason, it is imperative that a new autonomy be won for 
teachers — an autonomy that can perhaps free the kind of 
teaching relation I have sought to describe in the earlier 
parts of this statement. The latter relation requires a com-
pletely different organization of ends (served by a wholly 
new freedom to experiment in temporalities without strict 
accounting) from the one now strengthening its grip on 
the contemporary academy.
1 The questions, as communicated to me, are the following:  
1) A classical answer to the question ‘what is education?’, is often 
formulated in terms of its ideal purpose, namely that autonomy 
is the end that critical education strives towards. But this answer 
prompts us to ask: what does autonomy mean as an educational 
ideal?  2) The educational situation itself, insofar as it builds on 
a relation between students and an educational authority, raises 
questions towards the ideal of autonomy: How do autonomy 
and authority relate within education itself? And, how, by which 
processes, is the autonomy of the individual even made possible 
through the relation to an authority?  3) Autonomy is not only 
held as an internal ideal of education, classically the autonomy of 
the educational institutions have been held as a necessity in their 
external relations to society and politics. However, the nature 
of these relations poses recurring questions: how is education 
challenged by the contemporary demands of society and politics? 
Is it possible or sufficient still to maintain the idea of education 
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as autonomous? I will not try to adhere strictly to these three 
immense questions, though I will move through them as I would 
in response to a questionnaire. My hope is that the answers these 
questions have prompted will speak to the spirit of this collection. 
 
2 The notion of establishing a foundation for higher education in 
the liberal arts has been slow to reach Europe, and the values 
invested in the liberal arts in the post-war American universities 
are now more remote than ever as a horizon for grasping the 
meaning of higher education. For a recent, succinct account of 
the way neoliberalism is eroding these values and undermining 
the very conception of the way training in the liberal arts might 
sustain the project of democracy, see Wendy Brown’s Undoing 
the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution (New York: Zone 
Books, 2015), particularly Chapter 6, “Educating Human Capital,” 
175-200. The ideological constructions at work in many liberal arts 
curricula in American universities must of course be subjected 
to sustained scrutiny. But the principles animating a liberal arts 
education ultimately point in the direction of the goals that I will 
seek to articulate with respect to a profoundly cross-disciplinary 
training at advanced levels. The curricular experiment I will de-
scribe radicalizes the notion of Bildung and thus the understanding 
of “autonomy” that is normally proposed as the end of liberal 
arts education. But I consider defense of the ideals instituted in 
undergraduate liberal arts programs to be of critical importance. 
 
3 Gérard Granel, De l’université (Mauzevin:Trans-Europ Re-press, 
1982), p 75-96. 
4 The Claim of Language: A Case for the Humanities (Minneapolis: 
U. of Minnesota Press, 2004). This volume has recently been trans- 
lated into German by Katharina Martl and Johannes Kleinbeck: 
Der Anspruch der Sprache: Ein Plädoyer für die Humanities 
(Berlin: Turia + Kant, 2016). I draw the phrase “free use” from 
Friedrich Hölderlin, though I drop here his reference to a “proper” 
or “national.”
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5 I speak very allusively, here to be sure, and I would not help by 
saying that the evocation of a “real” forces us to look beyond the 
“public” relation to forms of exposure that exceed the political 
order. We touch here, of course, on a field of questions that are the 
purview of psychoanalysis, whose research is pertinent to all fields 
in the humanities, though no less in need of “complementation.” 
6 This is why the common argument that “cross-disciplinarity 
presupposes disciplinarity” inherently dooms a genuinely 
cross-disciplinary endeavour. In fact, the need for the historically 
tempered knowledge afforded by a discipline is something that 
should ultimately appear from the exigencies of cross-disciplinary 
thinking. Every thinker will discover that rigorous cross-disci-
plinary work on questions of crucial social import requires what 
“discipline” can provide, but it is cross-disciplinary questioning 
that defines most effectively and meaningfully what is required 
of a discipline. If the methodological order I describe is not 
pursued, the discipline will inevitably reproduce its hegemony. 
7 I seek to describe in this section an ideal pedagogical comportment. 
It goes without saying that not all professors at the EGS will incarnate 
this rare ideal, or do so on every occasion. I would add, in light of 
what I will go on to say in this section, that we have had masters who 
have remained incorrigibly so, and others who do not quite attain 
that stature. We have also had an impressive number of incredible 
successes. But my ambition here is merely to describe what it would 
take to realize the pedagogical ends of the experiment I am seeking 
to evoke, and what we strive constantly to achieve at the EGS. 
8 I describe a form of “introduction” here, but clearly I am not 
describing an “introductory” course in the standard sense of this 
term. In many contexts, the latter, standard form of introduction 
is all an advanced student will receive before they are abandoned 
to their “independent” research (which will almost of necessity 
take a narrow form as the student strives to meet expectations that 
have been poorly communicated — this too is how disciplines 
can repeat themselves). At the EGS, in contrast, students begin 
immediately with the “advanced” form of fundamental question-
ing I seek to evoke here. This pedagogy is entirely feasible if the 
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teaching takes on the “public” character to which I have referred. 
The EGS works from the assumption that anyone can learn the 
habits of questioning required for fundamental research in a 
given field and thereby undertake such research if they are willing 
to make the effort and given the proper instruction. And given 
that students will undertake twelve seminars for each advanced 
degree, for the MA, and for the PhD, it will be apparent that the 
EGS is offering a very intensive and substantial form of training. 
9 I refer here, principally, to Lyotard’s essay, “Address on the Subject 
of the Course of Philosophy,” in The Postmodern Explained 
(Minneapolis: U. of Minnesota Press, 1993), 99-108. I have devoted 
several essays to Lyotard’s thinking about pedagogy and infancy, 
including “Jean-François’s Infancy,” in Yale French Studies, No. 
99, 2001, 44-61, and “A Pedagogy on the Verge of Disaster,” in 
Pedagogies of Disaster, ed. Vincent W.J. van Gerven Oei, Adam Staley 
Groves, Nico Jenkins (New York: Punctum Books, 2013) 37-66.   
10 See Jean-François Lyotard, “The Other’s Rights,” trans. Chris 
Miller and Robert Smith in On Human Rights (New York: 
Basic Books, 1993), 136-147. I have taken up Jacques Rancières 
response to this text in “Police Actions in Aesthetics: Rancière 
Reading Deleuze and Lyotard on Art,” forthcoming in a special 
issue of Qui Parle (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017). 
11 The members of this group were Drs. Joan Forbes and Archie  
Graham, from the School of Education, and Edith Doron, from 
 the Centre for Modern Thought.
12 I do want to note that one motive I have for telling this story is that 
I believe it is imperative to answer the question, “What is teaching 
today?” with reference to all levels of the educational process.  
The general devaluation of teaching (as a social role) in Western 
societies is an astonishing and widely lamented fact. But no less 
astonishing is the way teaching holds such a low status in higher 
education — not just in the evaluation of performance (every 
academic knows that research counts first) or in the importance 
given to it in academic programs, but in the attention given to it 
in research. A precious few devoted researchers are undertaking 
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this work, which is worthy of the highest respect. Those who do it 
from Schools of Education are also acutely aware, in many cases, 
that they are the poor cousins of their more fortunate colleagues 
in other parts of the academy. There are many deleterious effects 
of this devaluation of research in teaching, one of them being that 
the academy is poorly equipped to respond to the highly financed 
efforts of those promoting online learning and various forms of 
technological assistance.
13 Advocacy for the contemporary teacher in Scotland takes many 
forms: within the school, in conference with parents and other 
interested parties, in collaboration with other forms of children’s 
service (medical care, for example — Scotland is seeking a broader 
coordination of such services, and teachers must be prepared 
to work closely with individuals from other fields), and in the 
broader professional or governmental contexts. In the UK, an 
older generation of leaders is followed by a strikingly thin cohort 
of successors.
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NEW FACULTIES
(Art)Universities as Surprise Generators
Siegfried Zielinski
I. 
Complete identification with the apparatus — aesthetically 
celebrated by Bertolt Brecht in 1928 as a premonition of 
a coming community of machines and humans in his 
interactive radio installation, “Ozeanflug” (‘Flight Over 
the Ocean’) — is now no longer an option, scarcely less 
than 90 years after the premiere. The great utopias are 
just as shattered and fragmented as the kakatopian con-
stellations from which they were generated. We now have 
the possibility to say everything to everyone and to do 
so without interruption and everywhere — mercilessly. 
Yet, who actually considers in depth what he or she has 
to say? In Chris Petit’s powerful cinematic statement 
Content (2010), one of the young female protagonists 
says, in front of a web camera in a so-called social media 
platform: “Just once, for one day in my life, I would like to 
feel that I and everyone speaking to me, were talking full 
sense.” A second girl responds from another planet within 
the same networked universe: “I would like to fall in love 
before it’s too late, don’t care who with.” A third replies in 
Translated from German by James Fontini
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an immediate collision with this statement: “I would like 
a feeling of assignation to life, not sitting here calculating 
how many fucks I have got left. The middle-ground is 
hardly there anymore.”
We are still living in the transition from the 20th to 21st 
century. I am convinced of this: the new century will 
become the age after media. We, but above all the next 
generation, for whom we as intellectuals are jointly re-
sponsible, should prepare ourselves for this.
We have learned to believe in machines and artifacts, and 
artificial entities learn more and more to believe in us. They 
trust us, like those artifacts from Naples I name “Belief 
Belief machine, photo: Mono Krom
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machines.” When you push a button on the keyboard, the 
electronic offering box lights a candle as a surrogate for 
our soul in the house of god, without first having inserted 
any money. The device assumes that we handle it correctly 
and we are not allowed to disappoint it. The more complex 
technical systems become, the more dramatic the relations 
between media-humans and media-machines behave at 
their intersection. The drama is nothing less than the 
insistence upon difference — from both sides.
I gain confidence in this drama by a similarly early 
insight: just as there is no political, aesthetic, or economic 
a priori, there is no technical a priori. Nietzsche did not 
claim that the typewriter could type thoughts on its own, 
as it were, from out of its steely heart and brain. This is 
something that our friend Friedrich Kittler would have 
misunderstood. Nietzsche said that the machine is co-writing 
our thoughts. That is a considerable difference of almost 
ontological relevance. In the first case art, knowledge, and 
design are mere effects. In the second case they are developed 
in a co-production of biofacts and artifacts. The second 
case, which for regular artistic research and the arts of 
knowledge most interests us, establishes a reciprocal relation 
between the instrumental [dem Apparativen] and the living, 
a non-trivial relationship between a set of regulations and 
the faculty of imagination. It is worthwhile to continue to 
work on this interdependency [Wechselwirkung] with the 
lofty aim of altering reality to its own benefit.
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I owe my confidence in a possible bond between poetic 
and technological thinking and practice to the foundation 
of a small Gallic village in the middle of a giant technical 
university (Technische Universität Berlin), a true hetero-
topic place, as Foucault would say, the Institut für Sprache 
im technischen Zeitalter — Spritz (Institute for Language 
in the technological Age — Spritz).
Walter Höllerer founded the institute in 1961 as a response, 
if nothing else, to the building of the wall and the renewed 
intensity with which the propagandic standards of language 
Original illustration, Siegfried Zielinski
Institut für Sprache im technischen Zeitalter - Spritz  
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were molded. And I owe the idea of the non-trivial rela-
tionship between humans and artifacts to a mechanical 
engineer, radio poet, and film semiotician, Friedrich Knilli, 
together with whom I was able to establish the first media 
studies program in a German university in the 1970s. At 
that time, research and critical instruction in media was 
frowned upon in German academies and universities. 
The establishment of corresponding faculties was held 
as completely wayward and superfluous.
It was only in the 1980s that Media — especially digital 
media — became the cornerstone of progress, revolutions 
without sweat and blood, immeasurable prosperity and 
esteem. By the beginning of the 1990s at the latest, the digital 
was an analogue for the alchemical formula for gold. In the 
course of that decade, a paradigm shift again asserted itself 
— from poetizing and thinking to the elegant and eloquent 
pragmatism of arranging and directing [Einrichtens und 
Lenkens], exemplified in network culture by the shift from 
the digital folklore of the first internet euphoria to the newly 
elaborated economy of mass media Web 2.0.
We still find ourselves, at bottom, in this closing phase 
of the 20th century. To be sure, one can no longer make 
revolutions with media. It has become part of our every-
day infrastructure, like the faucet one turns on to get the 
important things done (Günther Anders, Hannah Arendt’s 
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first husband, had already anticipated this in the 1950s). 
By focusing on what actually and originally interests us 
in media phenomena, namely the wild and restless re-
lationships between the arts, sciences, and technologies 
articulated in them, it is possible to begin anew.
As an an-archaeologist of the arts and media, I live in and 
with a time machine. Crafting future presences means, for 
me, to think through the sources of the fields of action 
for our knowledge, time and again anew, and to extract 
surprising variants from them. Presents both past and 
future are potential spaces, a beautiful concept from the 
Original illustration, Siegfried Zielinski
Surprise generator
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arsenal of the British psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott. 
They meet in the now of our being-active [Aktivseins]. 
This now, the opportune moment, can be conceived kai-
ros-poetically as an inextensible time-space [Zeitraum], 
out of which the present is allowed to develop in the form 
of a surprise generator.
II. 
The deeper I climb into my time machine of an archeology 
and variantology of the arts, the more strikingly clear it 
becomes to me that I myself must also move forcefully 
and horizontally into the heterogeneity of the cultures 
of knowledge and design [Gestaltung]. The territorial 
orientations suggested to us by continental-european 
philosophy are not sufficient for the coming centuries; 
they’ve run their course.
In the early 1990s the Haus der Kulturen der Welt (HKW) 
in Berlin came up with the idea to court, in a particular 
manner, the monster forming in the emergence of “infor-
mation society”. They invited the Martinique-born, Paris-
New York based poet-philosopher Édouard Glissant — the 
contemporary Empedocles of the Caribbean — to develop 
his idea of a “poetics of relation” for the discourse on the 
self-developing techno-political network-dispositif. I was 
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permitted to join Glissant at the podium for a discussion 
and, during the preparation for our dialogue, enjoyed a 
particular lesson that did more than just make clear that 
HKW’s plan at the time would not work out. Glissant’s 
lesson has remained for me an important reminder for 
another thinking of vast coherences.
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Glissant had written me a list of concepts whose mean-
ings and semantic neighborhoods he placed particular 
value on and which I returned for the discussion with 
my notations. At the center was his well-known concept 
of creolization, which he used to substantiate his idea of a 
poetics of relation. From this idea fields are derived, like 
those concerning the subtle, yet important distinction 
between mondialité (world coherence without a unifi-
cation paradigm) and mondialisation (globalization as 
universalization), followed by clarification as to why this 
understanding is so important.
The Mediterranean Sea [Mittelmeer], our (he addressed 
me as a European) geographical jewel, designated by 
Hegel as the center [Mittelpunkt] of world history, would 
at the same time be our great problem. Hegel’s designation 
does not indicate the function as mass grave assigned to 
the Mediterranean by centuries of various wars upon its 
waters and, in recent decades, by refugees from the poor 
and politically embattled regions of Africa.
Since time immemorial, all the longings of the con-
tinent, according to Glissant, were concentrated upon 
the once beautiful sparkling puddle in the middle of the 
African North, the Asian West, and the European South; 
and all universalisms, all political, ideological, economic, 
and religious ideas of unification were developed and 
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communicated on their coasts. E pluribus unum — out of 
many, one: what has been explicitly inscribed in the US 
Presidential crest refers back to the European source of the 
so-called new world emerging from the old. Its demand 
for universalization continued in the new world and es-
tablished itself in recent decades as a specific ideology of 
freedom which does not tolerate dissent.
“Unique, eternal omnipresent, unseen and inconceivable 
God…!” With these words of Moses begins the libretto 
for the first scene in act one of Arnold Schönberg’s mon-
umental opera, “Moses und Aron”; and the notion of the 
unique and all-powerful is immediately bound up with 
the ground upon which imagining moves. “...You stand 
upon holy ground”, calls the voice from the burning bush, 
“now proclaim!”.
In the Caribbean, on the other hand — according to 
Glissant — the mare externum, the ocean, unlike the mare 
internum, has no function of connection, but rather a 
function of separation.1 Therein lies a different conception 
of the world-sea than the one developed by Deleuze & 
Guattari in 1000 Plateaus. The mare externum is, in many 
respects, just as little a smooth space as the Mediterranean 
is a striated space. The territory in the region we call the 
Caribbean is shattered; the mighty water divides its scat-
tered parts. The only unity familiar to the inhabitants of 
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the Caribbean runs along the ocean floor between Africa 
and the islands of Meso-America. The imaginary unity of 
this deep ground is notched and furrowed by the chains of 
the slave trade. (Again the chain appears here, the nexus, 
which played such an important role in the representa-
tion of electricity with regard to the powerful cohesion 
of opposites throughout early modernity and, above all, 
in the theologi electrici of the 17th and 18th centuries; 
but this is another theme.2)Glissant terms creolization 
the tactic of linking different territorial constituents and 
particularities. With this he aims at “a mix, [...] that the 
unforeseeable produces.”3 Creole, as is well known, is an 
extremely “hybrid language which has emerged out of 
the contact between different, diametrically-opposed 
linguistic traditions and structures. The francophone 
Creole languages of the Caribbean were formed from 
contact between the Breton and Norman dialects of the 
17th century; one does not know the exact descent of its 
syntax, but one suspects it represents a kind of synthesis 
of languages that is essentially black African.” It is at 
once an imitation and a refraction that is ideally sung, 
similar to Black American in relation to the language of 
whites. (Just as James Joyce’s Finnegans’s Wake is primarily 
heard as something sung and not read.) His translator, 
Beate Thill, concretely outlines a few tactics of Glissant’s 
intervention: doubling of syllables, assonances, delayed 
metrics, deliberate rearrangement of vowels in particular 
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words…4 Such subversive tactics obviously do not permit 
the establishment of governing programs and adminis-
tration, but rather compose living songs and poems. The 
one and the other are not the same.
“The origin [Ursprung] always precedes the fall. It comes 
before the body, before the world and time…”5: The 
simple yet useful account of the paths of philosophical 
knowledge given by Elmar Holenstein — Swiss phi-
losopher based in Yokohama, Japan — allows one to 
distinctly recognize the dynamic development of the 
arts of knowledge [Wissenskünste] in the antique world 
in three local attractors, rather than one unique center: 
Alexandria, Athens, Milet. Al-Farabi — the great poly-
math of the Arabic-Islamic tradition before the turn of 
the first millennium, who also wrote a formidable, early 
encyclopedia of the sciences — constructed in the 10th 
century (of our calendar) a philosophy of world history 
which supplemented the dynamic triad with Baghdad; 
this allowed for a spiral-like construction of the represen-
tation of its development, which can be renewed all the 
way into modernity. It distinguishes itself fundamentally 
from the tiered, linear constructions favored by Hegel in 
his Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, which are 
erected upon dominance and which are entrusted to us 
by the European history of philosophy.
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III. 
For some time I have been making use of a trick in the form 
of a particular literary genre in order to briefly formulate 
what the change in the premises of thought means for 
work in universities, in which both knowledge of the arts 
and arts of knowledge have a home. I formulate — often 
times en route — short guidelines for the respective state 
of things and their possibilities of movement regarding 
the nervous relationships between the arts, technologies, 
and sciences. The items change constantly, necessarily so. 
The most recent variant consists in 31 points from which 
I have selected only a few for this textual intervention. 
They are meant to help me ground new faculties, a task I 
hold to be both necessary and desirable.
1.   Projects like universities and academies have a his-
torical beginning, development, and finite duration. 
Otherwise they would not be definable. The free will, also 
the artistic will, develops from the insight and feeling that 
the experienceable world, including that of a university, 
is constricting and full of fractures, irritations, inaccessi-
bilities, and dissonances. It is one of the privileges of art 
to be able to productively transform the suffering caused 
by the experienceable world through the process of de-
signing [Prozess des Gestaltens]. Artistic energy means the 
capability to transgress the finitude of our existence into 
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a more open pluriverse (a wayward [eigenwillig] dialogue 
with god). “Organizzar il trasumanar” — to organize the 
transgression of the limit — with this beautiful paradox, 
Pasolini paraphrases his activity as poet, painter, and 
filmmaker.
2.     The opposition between a defined framework — which 
one could also designate psychically as consciousness —
and the creative scope [Gestaltungsspielraum] of singular 
actors is not a matter of an irresolvable contradiction. It 
is much more about a tension-rich complementarity in 
contrasts. The one is not thinkable without the other. The 
freedom of the singular will not only agrees with the idea 
of a joined world [gefügte Welt], it lives in it. This should 
also be valid for the particularly pieced together world 
of a university.
3.    I understand the concept of freedom primarily as 
a quality of experience. The free will — particularly the 
will through which fantasy enters into aesthetic action — 
realizes itself only in that I become active, in that I think, 
judge, design, struggle, love. What the arts of design and 
knowledge essentially amount to in this perspective can 
be inscribed briefly and pointedly in one sentence: namely, 
the unconditional talent and ability to choose what my will 
actually [wirklich] wants. Expressed otherwise: The free 
will to alter reality [Wirklichkeit] to its own benefit is the 
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medium through which the sub-jected [das Unterworfene] 
(the subject) most intensely realizes itself as a pro-jector 
[Entwerfer]. Artists and designers are projectors. What they 
project are, in felicitous cases, projected worlds, and thus 
worlds that are different from the one in which we live.
7.     In cases of doubt and available choice, a decision for 
possibility, potentia, is more expedient than a pragmatic 
preference for reality. Spaces of possibility such as the 
Karlsruhe University of Art and Design are distinct in 
that we can think them, project them, and yet never reach 
their ideal; but also in that we can take risks because we 
favor them, wish for them, passionately want them. We 
work in factories and workshops that deal in illusions. I 
learned from Dietmar Kamper that the verb illudere does 
not only entail the production [erzeugen] of a beautiful 
image [Schein] but also entails taking a risk, venturing 
something in its most extreme form.
11.  Even when the shift we’re in a position to create is
only made up of nanoseconds, the most urgent task for 
artists of time-design is to give back to those who expe-
rience and enjoy our works something of the time that 
life has stolen away from them. This necessitates that we 
grant ourselves the time that art and thinking as exper-
iment require.
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12.  Outside of the thick of things: all revolutions and 
innovations have been generated from the outskirts [aus 
der Provinz]. Movements in the between-spaces and on 
the periphery have higher grades of freedom and enjoy-
ment and carry more surprises within themselves. They 
do not exclude occasional excursions through the center 
to other edges. Exactly the opposite: an existence on the 
periphery is only recommended when one knows the 
quality of the center.
14.    Machines and the imaginative faculty need not form 
irreconcilable contradictions. The homo artefactus of the 
21st century can use them as two distinct, complementary 
possibilities to understand the world, to disassemble it and 
reassemble it. One only penetrates the highest spheres of 
the programmed world through the forces of perception 
[Vorstellung] and imagination [Einbildung]. Conversely, 
fantasy [Phantasie] and imagination [Imagination] are 
well advised when they do not unnecessarily get rid of 
calculation and computation. Convenient approaches 
have lost nothing in the advanced arts.
19.   The most urgent and at the same time most difficult 
task to realize for all the arts is still to make or to hold 
sensitively for the other, for that which is not identical with 
us, and indeed with the particular means available to us, 
namely, the aesthetic. That will not change no matter which 
technologies and medias we express ourselves through.
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IV.
Along with Emmanuel Levinas, I understand the future 
as that which stubbornly refuses to show itself to us, as 
that which is principally inaccessible. But we can — to put 
it like thinkers like Bloch or Flusser — dream forwards. 
The dream is a vast time machine, perhaps the most 
powerful, over which we have no enduring command. 
This time machine withdraws from the grasp of cognition 
just as effectively as from the grasp of conscious action 
[bewussten Handelns].
From the fragmented considerations outlined above, an 
imaginary academy emerges on the horizon, one not unlike 
Italo Calvino’s imaginary cities, in that there would be nu-
merous factors which are not to be instituted because they 
escape installation; which are not to be understood from 
university chairs, because one cannot sit them out. They 
are too complex for that. They are rather fields of energy, 
motivation and irritation, faculties in the best sense of the 
word — in the indissoluble unity of poeisis and intuition 
[Anschauung], of “making”, [Machen] and theory. I would 
like to see to the formation of the following faculties:
DIGNITY
The most important faculty in general. (Also one of the 
oldest faculties in Europe indeed, founded in Glasgow 
in the 15th century.) To this faculty belongs, among other 
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things, an insistence upon speaking with one another, 
looking one another in the eyes in praise and in quarrel, 
and seeking the solution to confrontation in direct dia-
logue. We have nothing better. Dia-logos, the exchange of 
rational thoughts both within and outside of networks, 
is essential for survival. It presupposes the attention of 
the other. Trans- and interdisciplinarity have become, in 
general, mere compensatory concepts which manage a 
lack of dialogue with what is each time other.
UNUSUAL MEASURES
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, German artist Kurt Jotter 
founded an activist group in West Berlin that performed 
interventionist art under this concept. They referred to 
themselves as the Office for Unusual Measures [Büro 
für ungewöhnliche Maßnahmen]. Their most important 
sphere of activity was urban communications, particularly 
under the condition of self-asserted telematic relations. 
Throughout the 20th century there were always compa-
rable groups, from SPUR to the Situationists. They will 
always be needed to intervene into saturated relations and 
irritate comfortable harmonies. Under the conditions of 
the developing networks of communication and the in-
creasing technologization of our ways of life, such unusual 
measures can for example be articulated as a faculty, which 
we name along with artist-activists Julian Oliver, Daniil 
Vasiliev and Gordan Savicic
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CRITICAL ENGINEERING
By this we understand an activity which is as equally con-
structive in a critical, theoretical sense as it is in a practical 
sense, an activity which is a consequence of interventionary 
thinking and which is appropriate to elaborately net-
worked machines. It is thus able to take artifacts and the 
systems into which they are bound and reinterpret them 
or repurpose them in an unfamiliar way. This means to 
estrange them from their original purpose and to thereby 
organize contemporary dis-associations against and within 
immersive, consumer-oriented strategies. Such a faculty 
is tied closely to techno- and poeiticological work on
UNCENSORABLE SYSTEMS
which represents the greatest challenge for the arts and 
design of the next decade. For the occasion of our inter-
national conference “Potential Spaces” in February 2017, 
the Chinese media theorist, Gao Shiming, dean of the 
School of Intermedia Art (SIMA) at the Chinese Academy 
of Art, surprised us with the first draft of his “Hacking 
Media/Art Manifesto”, which can also be seen as defining 
his position on his future activities in Hangzhou. In this 
text he pleads for an artistic praxis he names “Neo Media/
Art”. This praxis would appropriate the same information 
technologies through which mechanisms of domination 
in advanced capitalism are realized in the politics and 
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control of data. According to Gao, it is only through a 
critical application of these technologies against their own 
surveillance and control mechanisms that such mecha- 
nisms can be laid bare: “Neo Media/Art has to make the 
media in our hand the most incisive and controversial 
content, thereby resisting against the new technologies 
of control and seduction.”
We should focus especially on the management of
CHAOS-PILOTS and KAIROS-POETS
When creativity becomes a fundamental social com-
petence under the banner of enhanced possibilities of 
media-humans and media-machines and the traditional 
model of the artist empties into art itself—but above all 
advances as a guiding model of social action—then it is 
at least prudent to work on supplementary identities. The 
life skills increasingly required of artists and intellectu-
als of the future are already graspable as tactical figures 
that do not let themselves be turned into strategies: 
Chaos-Pilots and Kairos-Poets are those who are in a 
position not only to deal with unforeseeable complexities 
[Unübersichtlichkeiten], but also to organize them, those 
who can snatch up opportune moments (in the movie 
theater, on the internet, on the stage, in the gallery, in the 
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concert hall, in the museum) and charge them energetically. 
Without an attitude towards complexity and an attitude 
towards time — both are linked inseparably — advanced 
thinking and aesthetic praxis are no longer imaginable.
Just as we artists, designers and thinkers are required to be 
in a position to intervene into these temporal structures 
that circumvent our perception in the slightest of ways 
(as in high-frequency trading), we thinkers and poets are 
required to overrun time-space-perceptions in the largest 
sense (as in astrophysics). I name this faculty
PALEOFUTURISM
This faculty would be exceptionally suited to investigating 
and developing the spaces of possibility of past and future 
presents and, from there, to generating surprises, essential 
to survival, in the relationships between media-humans 
and media-machines.
In the same manner, I advocate a re-start, a pata- 
physical project as an elaborated
CULTURA EXPERIMENTALIS
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In early modernity, alchemical theory and praxis served 
the self-understanding of a becoming, uncertain, floating 
subject, which wanted to set itself in a relation over and 
against the other, the not or not yet understood — includ-
ing nature and technology — which was both rational 
and exciting. The cosmos rustled and to listen to it was 
intoxicating. It projected itself acoustically over the things 
of nature and through the hearing organs into the souls 
of the adepts. They had decided to take part in the world 
rather than merely observe it. Alchemy understood as 
a new model for world-experience [Welterfahrung] and 
world-processing [Weltbearbeitung] did not point back 
to a magical past but rather forward to a possible future. 
My idea of a cultura experimentalis feels at home in this 
tradition as an exact (as possible) philology of precise (not 
perfect) things. Artifacts and their linkages are read not 
only as testimonies of a long-since past, that is, examined 
archaeologically, but also with view towards understanding 
the “play that begets the new” [Spiel der Hervorbringung von 
Neuem], which Rheinberger designates today as scientific 
experiment.6 Thus artifacts are read in anticipation. Our 
An-archeology is pro-spective.7
Alchemy was “a dream one could only eavesdrop upon 
and, to tell of it, one could only stammer. As humans were 
no longer in a position to dream of their kilns and listen 
in on matter itself, the dream of alchemy retreated into 
the night.”8 That experiment is worthwhile which activates 
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the dream of alchemy renewed at the present level of our 
knowledge of the world. This would correspond to those 
cultura experimentalis I have repeatedly sketched out for the 
arts. The cosmic, or whatever we want to call the general 
[das Allgemeine], which is indispensable for producing 
the identity of the singular, articulates itself manifoldly 
in things, in the ways in which they have been joined 
together, mixed, or formed. It is up to us to make speak, 
sing, hum, and stammer that which things themselves are 
not aware of. The things themselves will take care of the 
rest, namely for their inter-objective relationships.
WHENCE AND WHITHER BLOW THE WINDS?
If we take the challenge of a non-territorial orientation 
of our worldview seriously, we will not fail, in the long 
run, to place anew in the foreground of our anticipatory 
attentiveness [vorausschauenden Aufmerksamkeit] the 
capabilities of knowledge about winds and navigation. 
This faculty was already decisive in times when the 
relations of exchange between knowledges, goods, and 
cultural experiences were still essentially generated by 
ships and boats. They will now become essential com-
ponents of future knowledge. From a pacific or oceanic 
perspective, the issue [Sachverhalt] would be once again 
interpreted quite differently as a “relocation into the open” 
(Dietmar Kamper). The courage and techniques required 
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for navigation across great distances into the seemingly 
borderless and the definitively unmasterable are distinct 
from those needed in proximity and immediate struggle…
By no means should we ever cease to experiment with
PROJECTIONS OF ALTERNATIVE WORLDS
and to work together on the realization of a limitless
HOSPITALITY
as an essential component of an unconditional  
university in the Derridian sense. 
There are endless models available to us in art, in media 
and in thought, in which such faculties can operate effec-
tively. That we use them, how we use them, and in which 
connections we use them, depends on us.
Faced with digital-telematic relations, in the founda- 
tional years of the new universities between Cologne and 
Karlsruhe, with the French Les Fresnoy and the Japanese 
Ogaki-shi, in the beginning of the 1990s, we were eagerly 
engaged in making the impossible possible. Much of this 
has been achieved with regard to technologically based 
communication. Today the arts and design depend more 
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and more upon confronting what has everywhere and at 
every time become possible with its distinct impossibilities. 
This, for me, is artistic and theoretical practice after media.
A number of the old, venerable, and pillared academies 
have long since made way for light and easy education 
containers [Bildungscontainern], like those realized for 
large sums globally by master architects such as Bernard 
Tschumi or Daniel Libeskind. However, objectified knowl-
edge increasingly emigrates out from the solid architectures 
of libraries and archives; its mediation escapes into ubiq-
uitous, fluid, and networked constellations. Consequently 
the question arises as to whether or not future generations 
will still learn in universities or academies. Perhaps that 
passage in the lives of young people that one names 
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‘studies’ will be realized as something like the following: 
highly mobile, flexible, wandering, and knowledge hungry 
individuals searching for the fragments necessary for any 
individual knowledge or design blog from those floating 
freely together in art, science, and diverse technologies, 
docking occasionally at creative studios, ateliers, and 
thought spaces in order to load themselves with new 
energies, incessantly debating the attained interim results 
of the development of their projects with others online 
and eventually allowing them to be reviewed via pow-
erful imaginary knowledge depositories in order to see 
whether or not they have earned the credits necessary for 
a certificate entitling a nomadic existence to say: I have 
successfully studied.
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1  In a short paragraph regarding the sea in his Lectures on the 
Philosophy of World History, Hegel accentuates not only the sea’s 
fundamental limitlessness and its provocative character but also 
its ambivalent implications in the form of a pyschogeography: 
“The sea awakens his courage; it lures him on to conquest and 
piracy, but also to profit and acquisition.” G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures 
on the Philosophy of World History, trans.H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge, 
1975), p. 160.
 
2 I have treated the phenomenon of theologi electrici briefly in 
connection with Walter Benjamin and his relationship to Johann 
Wilhelm Ritter in: Bernd Witte, Mauro Ponzi (Ed.), Theologie 
und Politik. Walter Benjamin und ein Paradigma der Moderne, 
Berlin 2005.(An English translation is planned by Minnesota 
University Press)
3 Édouard Glissant, Kultur und Identität. Ansätze zu einer Poetik 
der Vielheit (Heidelberg, 2005), p. 81.
 
4 Ibid. (Kultur und Identität) p. 80.
 
5 Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” in The Foucault 
Reader, ed. Paul Rainbow (New York: Pantheon, 1984), p. 79.
 
6 Cited in the same, Experimentalsysteme und epistemische  
Dinge, p. 27.
 
7 [Trans. note: Its scope or vision is directed in front of itself.]
 
8 H. E. Fierz-David, Die Entwicklungsgeschichte der Chemie, p. 132.
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WHAT IS EDUCATION? — A CRITICAL ESSAY
Steen Nepper Larsen
Wer ein WARUM zum Leben hat, erträgt fast jedes WIE.
- Friedrich Nietzsche
§ 0. What is education? The answer to this basic and inevi-
table question must first be expressed through a homemade 
and multifaceted paraphrase of the intrusive, hegemonic 
and transnational consensus-enforcing machinery and 
boilerplate supranational narrative of education today. 
My intention is not only to voice a Danish educational 
perspective, but to dare to survey the broader educational 
landscape from on high. In a sense, this endeavour is 
tantamount to a critical infiltration, allowing a philoso-
phizing, sociologizing, and politicizing reflection to take 
shape through an anticipatory and almost self-unfolding 
counter-narrative.
The initial paraphrase will be faceless and without 
references; one could easily have laid forth mountains 
upon mountains of national and international policy pa-
pers, supplemented by an exposition on almost a century 
of mainstream educational ideas, beginning with Émile 
Durkheim’s Éducation et sociologie from 1922. Equally 
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relevant to our account would be to add a dollop of neo-
classical economic theory recounting society’s lucrative 
investments in human capital from the 1960’s and onwards 
in attempting to improve labor productivity. The omni-
present and all-conquering paradigms of economic theory 
which dominate current educational policy and planning 
— rational choice theory, principal-agent theory, allocative 
efficiency, benchmarks, and measures of aggregate lifetime 
earnings — will be left in the wings for now. But let’s cut to 
the chase and/or zur Sache selbst as you say in German(y).
An educational continuum has emerged, whereby 
children in daycare centres have been integrated within 
the educational system. This is all the more remarkable 
considering that daycare centres, or primary schools for 
that matter, were not considered educational institutions 
until the latter stages of the 20th century.1 In Denmark, 
the notion of education was to a far greater extent used in 
reference to the acquisition of a professional or vocational 
qualification. People were educated as craftsmen, dentists, 
or mechanical engineers. Education was primarily reserved 
for a specific stage in a young man’s life (and it was almost 
invariably a man) preparing him for adulthood — a rite 
of passage.
Today, education as a category has been inflated and 
subsumed under the truism that modern (wo)man will 
never be finished with his or her education once and for 
all. We are living in an educative discourse.2
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The principal purpose of the education system is to shape 
the competitive workforce of the future and to condition 
the individual for participation in society’s division of 
labor. Education is the production of subjects; typically 
in the form of a drawn-out process of institutionalized 
socialization. The norms and demands of society are to 
be instilled, while pupils and students learn to behave and 
govern themselves in an appropriate manner. Education 
is centered on the appropriation of knowledge, skills, and 
competences, but also on shaping the moral, social, and 
creative forces of the individual.
Education is — in principle, at least — a means to an 
end: to prepare the workforce for entry to the labor market 
and ensure the maximal number of years of work (ideally 
40-45 years), and the highest possible aggregate lifetime 
earnings. This perception of education is advocated by 
economists, politicians, educational administrators and 
managers, and leading educational researchers.
The educational system performs two tasks simul-
taneously. First, it nurtures national citizenship, whereby 
individuals learn to speak and write in a certain lingo — 
tied together by a series of more or less sanctioned stories 
upheld to assert the belief in a national territory and 
culture. Second, it schizophrenically tells these citizens to 
embrace a global outlook in order to stay competitive in the 
international marketplace of present-day global capitalism.
It has become our duty to learn and to keep learning 
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throughout our lives. Education can and must no longer 
be finite: we must learn to read, calculate, write, and speak 
in English, and to keep developing our competences until 
we are six feet under. The educational system shapes our 
will to lifelong learning, but also functions as a selective 
‘machine’, rewarding exceptional performance and talent. 
The educational system hereby serves as an ineluctable arena 
for both recognition and disapproval. Students’ abilities must 
be measurable and distinguishable; curiosity and interest 
are not enough to give the motivated student access to the 
education of her dreams. One’s papers must be in order 
and the gates are closed without a sufficiently high GPA.
Within capitalism, the purpose of the educational 
system is to increase the value of human capital.3 In the 
fierce competition of global markets, knowledge has become 
both a commodity and a productive force: education plays 
a pivotal role in the production of knowledge, meaning that 
the primary and secondary levels of schooling (preschool 
and K-12) are purported to build the foundation for the 
tertiary level (professional and academic degrees). Nation 
states around the world, not least of which those in Europe, 
participating in the global capitalist economy are competing 
to (re-)design and maintain the best and most effective 
educational systems.
National educational systems, educational institutions, 
and individuals all learn that any educational content 
consists of contingent phenomena in an ever-changing, 
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provisional, and adaptable world. Most educational 
programs have been subject to desubstantialization, 
and are now receiving facelifts in the form of the intro-
duction of new teaching modules centered on learning 
objectives tailored to the labor market. Underlying 
the current desubstantialization is an infringement on 
the foundational core of the academic disciplines, a 
splitting up of the academic substance into disparate 
modules, and a reduction of the allowed period of study. 
§ 1. Before we lose our wits completely — and to offer more 
than a reiteration of the many valiant attempts to condense 
and analyze the commanding narrative and almost ubiq-
uitous reality of education as presented in § 0 — we must 
think of education in a radically different manner.
We will begin by questioning the what-ness of edu-
cation, or more precisely its ontology; i.e., how education 
exists in the world. For the sake of clarity, we will exam-
ine the characteristics of two prevailing and conflicting 
strategies in the politics of knowledge4 that, each in their 
own way, strongly influence how education is perceived; 
an ontology of deficiency (in German: Mangelontologie) 
and an ontology of excess. The two strategies are initially 
represented by their ideal forms in § 2 and § 3, although 
they are unlikely to appear in such pure form in the murky 
and pragmatic reality of everyday life.
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At a later point in this missive (§ 7), I will inquire from 
an existential-ontological and phenomenological per-
spective into education’s role and how it is experienced 
by the individual, although the answers to such questions 
— bearing in mind the heterogeneity and indeterminate 
nature — are near unfathomable. The perpetual plurality 
of people (in pluralis) beseeches us to avoid conclusions 
based on singularity; the time for Robinsonades is over 
(or at least it ought to be).
In the intermediate paragraphs, I intend to make 
clear why the question what is education necessitates a 
discussion of purpose — rather than a retreat to the my-
opic newspeak of learning-targets and effective learning 
which seems to be the central concern of propagators of 
the education discourse outlined in § 0.
§ 2. By ontology of deficiency, I refer to a cosmology of 
being — a philosophical anthropology and sociology 
— that notoriously perceives human beings as a timid, 
unprotected species, lacking natural instincts, but never-
theless a unique species, equipped with a consciousness 
and the capacity for self-reflection and introspection. 
Education, then, is conceived as a form of compensation 
and as a dubious way of earning the love and recognition 
of others. In accordance with the ideas of the German 
sociologist Arnold Gehlen, were the human species fully 
developed at birth, we would have no use for the crutches 
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of socialization, pedagogical interventions, and educational 
institutions surrounding us from the day we are born. A 
self-reliant existence would have no need for teachers and 
educators (in Denmark one might talk about pedagogues); 
the autonomous I would, so to speak, be her own father 
and mother from the day she is born.
Education is not and can never be the real thing. 
Indeed, as expounded by Lars Henrik Schmidt, former 
dean of the Danish School of Education (1999-2007), the 
very existence of education is nothing less than a violation 
of the individual’s omnipotence — albeit he or she does not 
possess nor master this autonomous power and the tragic 
condition for human existence is that omnipotence is only 
accessible to the individual through the intermediacy of 
thought (see Diagnosis I-II-III, Copenhagen: DPI, 1999).
In the perspective of the ontology of deficiency, then, hu-
man beings undertake an education to gain comfort and 
security due to this existential angst. Born into the world 
without protective fur, strong predatory teeth or muscu-
lar super powers, and with no possibility of controlling 
the social sphere — or renouncing the battlefield of the 
subconscious that rests within us — we are doomed to 
be educated. Being educated is, as such, a plan B of onto-
logical purpose that we cannot relinquish. In this sense, 
within the horizon of ontological deficiency, the idea of 
human beings ‘undertaking’ an education is seductive, 
yet misleading; education, learning, and pedagogics are 
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inexorable destinies for the species in carentia (in Latin: 
cura), as delineated by Gehlen and Schmidt. We are, in 
other words, condemned to supplanted realities so long 
as we remain unable to stand on our own two feet and 
establish a path through life free from socialization.
The premise for asserting the ontology of deficiency is 
that this weakness is sustained by the educational system, 
allowing only its most fortunate, eloquent, and skillful 
participants to master the narrative and someday, perhaps, 
themselves become its authors.
§ 3. By ontology of excess, I once again refer to a cosmology 
of being, a philosophical anthropology and sociology, 
that construes the ‘incomplete’ nature of a human being 
— the plasticity of the human brain, the unknown future 
of the individual life, and the polyplural opportunities to 
be ‘spoiled’, indulged and inspired by other people in the 
slipstream of communicative systems — as a formidable 
and unique privilege of the species.
In the universe of the ontology of excess, educational 
systems are measured by their ability to supply human 
existence with as many opportunities as possible to practice 
in intelligent and phylogenetically advantageous ways. 
Here, the educational system serves the people and not vice 
versa. The individual is equipped with an impermanent 
and incomplete ‘first nature’, and each individual is given 
the possibility of revolting against the procedures that are 
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set in motion to discipline and control the second nature 
of pupils and students. Thus subjectified, the individual 
is enabled to disrupt the system.
It follows that the ontology of excess negates the 
perception of education and teaching as compensatory. 
Rather, the process of education plays a pivotal role in 
shaping human biology (in concrete terms: the quality 
of synaptic neural couplings, motor functions, percep-
tion, angst-free movement, etc.) and individual ‘style’ 
(including the possible scope for thought, argumentation, 
and action). In addition, of course, there are the equally 
important functions of constituting, maintaining, and 
transforming social ties between members of the species 
(including ethics, structures of expectation, implicit and 
explicit forms of acknowledgement, logical and rhetorical 
rules for argumentation, etc.).
As pointed out in the works of the German phi-
losopher and anthropologist of practice (in German: 
Übungsanthropologe), Peter Sloterdijk (e.g. Sphären 1. 
Blasen. Mikrosphärologie, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 
Verlag, 1988), among others, human beings are consigned 
to the help of others (starting with their parents). And 
indeed, this need to interact (breast in mouth, gruel, 
caresses, vicariousness, warm clothes, temperate baths, 
cave-like comforters, tranquility, and soft lighting) is an 
essential goad for developing the will and determination 
to engage in extra-familial socialization and education.
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From our travels through the micro-, meso-, and mac-
ro-spheres (to use a concrete example: the childhood 
home, the municipal high school, and the study program 
in a foreign country) flows a cornucopia of possibilities for 
existence in excessu; albeit this surplus-oriented position 
makes no pretention of denying that the varying condi-
tions of life matter a great deal in terms of determining 
the (unequally distributed) life opportunities of human 
beings across the globe.
The premise for asserting the ontology of excess is 
a fundamental normativity underlying the educational 
system’s raison d’être, implying that its qualities must 
above all be judged according to its ‘ability’ to contribute 
to life improvements (both on an individual and societal 
scale) and on the ability to provide each individual with 
the possibility of mastering his or her life in freedom. The 
educational system, in other words, must provide human 
beings with the opportunity to initiate praiseworthy prac-
tices, while at the same time opening pupils and students’ 
eyes to the destructive, deleterious, and threatening aspects 
of the process of civilization.
Several ontologies of excess have surfaced through-
out the history of ideas; from the prescientific postulates 
of humanists and enlightenment scientists to Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s writings in the late 19th century (Über die 
Zukunft unsere Bildungsanstalten, 1872), and the American 
anarchist Murray Bookchin’s Post-Scarcity Anarchism 
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(Ramparts Press, 1971). People opting for the ontologies 
of excess are notoriously post-scarcity thinkers and if they 
want to maintain their ‘position’ and utopian élan they have 
to keep up the counterfactual and uncontemporary spirit 
in harsh (testing) times in which they risk to be regarded 
as outmoded and obsolete.
§ 4. Proponents of both ontologies of deficiency and of 
excess are somewhat trying acquaintances: neither is 
well-suited to the current educational jargon of learning ob-
jectives, best practice, self-assessment, and evidence-based 
teaching.6 Both regard the incessantly propagated institu-
tional practices and techniques to be a fundamental abuse 
and subjugation of the freedom of pupils and students.
There are, however, more differences than similarities 
between the two ontologies.
Ontologists of deficiency can be remarkably petulant 
due to their incessant portrayal of what they see as the 
many negativa as an inexorable, profane condition for 
human existence. The a priori verdict is unrelenting and 
resounding: you are weak, you are scared, you cannot 
escape, you must go to school… Ontologies of deficiency 
are self-affirming constructions whose proponents even 
find solace in seeing their position ‘proven’ when empirical 
life, both their own and that of others, does not quite go 
to plan. “See, we told you so: we are a deficient species!” 
What is more, our journey through life’s institutions 
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(such as schools and universities) is pre-classified as 
merely symbolic and inauthentic.7 Hardcore proponents 
of an ontology of deficiency, who are, in fact, few and far 
between, simply forgo any ambition on others’ behalf, 
whether generational or among their peers. It is of no use 
when, fundamentally, they can neither teach nor counsel 
anyone out of deficiency. They are relegated to the role 
of a feeble educator who pupils and students have every 
right to reject. This doesn’t mean, however, that they are 
not offended if others fail to understand their views.
Being around or forced to listen to proponents of an 
ontology of excess, meanwhile, can be a quite agonizing 
experience. All too often, they come across as well-inten-
tioned preachers of the gospel of opportunity — making 
it difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish them from the 
contemporary wave of positive psychologists and apostles 
of self-realization that market themselves and their agenda 
by imploring their audience to think positively, say yes to 
life, enroll in various courses of self-realization, and apply 
an array of self-branding techniques. Furthermore, they 
seldom hesitate in presenting their asinine thoughts in 
the form of a book.
Ontologists of excess underline the necessity of 
reading major works in their entirety — preferably in 
three languages — without the incentive of instant grat-
ification in the form of higher grades or a better salary 
after completing one’s studies. These ontologists cannot 
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see what they cannot see — let alone what it is that enables 
them to see. As such, their grandiose ideals for each and 
every one of us to take on the role as an intellectual critic 
of society, seem an impossible and unrealizable dream 
among both the young pupils, who are heavy consumers 
of the attention-grabbing distractions of social media, 
and the students at ‘short-spirited’, module-structured 
mass universities.
§ 5. And so, we can assert the disparate, not to say antithet-
ical and prodigiously dipolar, natures of our two ontologies. 
However, it is also worth noting their similarities in that 
both are philosophically and sociologically narrated, and 
both have strong implications for our understanding and 
design of society’s educational institutions and appertain-
ing pedagogics.
‘Speculators’ from both ontologies — being spokesmen 
for either the ontology of deficiency or of the ontology of 
excess — would doubtless agree on the limits of the episte-
mological (i.e., scientific positions mapping out a subject’s 
knowledge about an object) and empirical-scientific, da-
ta-collected, and efficaciously-oriented approaches to the 
question of what education is and how education ought to 
be. In addition, both positions undauntedly champion a 
normative approach to the question of education and both 
are grounded in notions and thoughts of the historically 
and socially differing constituents of human nature.
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The speculations about human nature should not, however, 
be construed simply as old variations of the following two, 
more or less inescapable, questions: Are humans good 
or evil prior to socialization? Are humans born sinful or 
as blank slates? Nevertheless, it is striking how nature is 
simultaneously positioned as the argument and the premise 
for a series of thoughts and stipulations about the human 
condition and education’s why-ness.
§ 6. While the contemporary hegemonic educational 
narrative (see § 0) might coincidently brave its way into 
discussions of means and ends — as if the educational 
system were a pool table with legislators and school leaders 
as cues, teachers as balls, and students as pins — it would 
be an exceptionally rare occurrence if the purpose of edu-
cation were to be discussed in public. The question: “why 
education?” simply isn’t asked. Educational economists 
and politicians are generally content to demand greater 
effectivity and efficiency for their investments into the 
system. God forbid that we end up producing unemployed 
graduates, or that we have the gall to apply scientific and 
substantial (i.e. non-desubstantialized) arguments for the 
existence of academic disciplines and different forms of 
knowledge.
Consequentially, discussions of purpose are lost in 
the fog or relegated to the fallow corners of the mind. 
Not only has it been decided that we are all to play pool 
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— rather than, say, golf, basketball, or badminton — but 
also exactly which rules we are to follow and who is al-
lowed to participate.
For this author, it seems both impossible and incon-
gruous to reduce the purpose of offering and undertaking 
an education to means (technologies of control, com-
pulsion, enrollment procedures, economic incentives, 
scholarships etc.) and ends (to produce employable and 
competitive individuals) — not least due to the at once 
general and specific character of educational purpose: his-
torically created, constitutive, idea-generated, and guiding.
Critically investigating discussions of purpose elevates 
the phenomenon of education to a sphere in which it 
becomes possible to clarify why — but naturally also how, 
certain people have intended something with someone 
for centuries. And it becomes possible to determine how 
these intentions have been embellished with an array of 
arguments for their legitimacy.8
Of course, I have no pretension of presenting a com-
plete mapping of educational purpose within the frame 
of this essay; yet this should not prevent a tentative thesis 
from taking shape. Perhaps the purpose of education is 
an inherently incomplete project — something that takes 
place under the radar, something contrafactual…
Let me hasten to add an explanatory stage direction: 
the presentation of the ontology of deficiency in § 2, and 
the ontology of excess in § 3, in no way purports to imply 
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that these positions are as equally significant and powerful 
as the hegemonic master-narrative of education presented 
in § 0. Rather, they serve as invitations for the reader to 
ponder two fundamental questions that are seldom posed 
and even more seldom result in unexpected answers: what 
and why education?
Critical thinking and philosophy are many ‘things’, but 
not least — as Immanuel Kant phrased it in 1784 — the 
ability and courage to think and use one’s mind (intel-
lect, reasoning…) independently, without the direction 
of others.9 Moreover, critical thinking can contribute to 
and qualify public debates in society (res publica), and 
philosophy, with its courage to both create new concepts 
and reinvigorate outmoded ones by adding new layers of 
meaning, can serve to generating previously un(fore)seen 
analytical mappings.
§ 7. Unlike our English-speaking colleagues, as speakers 
of Germanic languages (Danish and German), we are 
privileged in our ability to distinguish between ‘uddan-
nelse’ and ‘dannelse’, between ‘Ausbildung’ and ‘Bildung’, 
as is distinctly possible in the ‘germanophile’ part of the 
world.10 It is a much more difficult task to advocate such 
a distinction in English, where ‘education’ is often linked 
to concepts such as ‘culture’ and ‘edification’, or French, 
where éducation is commonly used to denote the moral or 
practical aspects of child-raising (e.g. l’éducation morale as 
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the formation of character, as e.g. the English philosopher 
John Locke also wrote about back in 1693 in the classic 
Some Thoughts Concerning Education).
Bearing this distinction in mind, we are in a position to 
more clearly perceive what we otherwise risk losing sight of 
when education is embroiled in questions of functionalistic 
servility and efficacy to secure a productive workforce for 
the future of society (human capital). What is at risk are 
the ‘inner’ elements of education: the student’s distinctive 
ontology and the hermeneutic-interpretative horizon that 
always reaches beyond contemporary educational agen-
das.11 We must endeavor to retain these ‘inner’ elements; 
using the Germanic expressions, to protect ‘dannelse’ in 
‘uddannelse’, ‘Bildung’ in ‘Ausbildung’.
Despite what some may claim in their functional-
ist reductionism, undertaking an education is always 
a matter of experiencing. Educational life is first-hand 
phenomenology for those living it; education presents 
itself as something that shapes your working life, but also 
your self-image and imagination. You are introduced, so 
to speak, to new ways of perceiving yourself the moment 
you devote yourself to an education. In this sense, an 
educational life is — ideally, at least — at once a creative 
and unpredictable process which, to the dismay of the 
most tenacious and unbending among us, risks plunging 
the student into a highly challenging and even painful 
transformation (or complete rejection) of her existing 
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worldviews. It is inherently risky to expose oneself to radical 
transformational processes. Returning home afterwards to 
old friends, places, or family can, for example, be difficult 
and challenging, with an air charged of mutual alienation. 
All of a sudden, one has become unrecognizable and unable 
to communicate on the same wavelength.
If we view the student’s educational activity from a 
processual, existentialist-phenomenological perspective,12 it 
seems possible to step beyond and transcend the two anti-
thetical ontologies expounded in §§ 2-5. Laying all my cards 
on the table, however, it should be said that I have a greater 
fondness for the ontology of excess than that of deficiency.
From this existentialist-phenomenological and ex-
cess-ontological perspective, the student is no longer an 
empty vessel, waiting to be filled with a given curriculum, 
or a tabula rasa to be covered in scribbled learning objec-
tives and course requirements, despite the impression one 
might get through exposure to the rationales and enforced 
demands of educational policy as presented in § 0.
Ideally, at least, education can only occur through the 
self-transcending and self-realizing conquest of new areas 
of knowledge and through the acquisition of new ways to 
think, speak, learn, analyze, and write. Some of these words 
might even find their way into the occasional toast at casual 
get-togethers; much unlike the pragmatic appropriation of 
job-ready and applicable lingua productiva within the cur-
rent, dominant discourse in education policy and politics 
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(cf. § 0). The French philosopher Jacques Rancière would 
agree and proclaim: Whoever teaches without emancipating 
stultifies.13
The purpose of education is also, on an entirely different 
scale, to provide mankind with original ways of commu-
nicating with one another, with the voices of the past, and 
with the generations to come. Indeed, I would go so far 
as to argue that it is nothing less than our goddamn duty 
and wonderful obligation to acquire just some of the many 
traces and interpretations of human activity from different 
periods and other parts of the world. What we referred to 
earlier as Bildung — i.e. the edification and the eloquent 
formation of the individual’s character, wisdom, judgment, 
and fertile curiosity — is essentially a matter of training 
one’s attentiveness, developing the art of decentralization 
and focal reorientation. Successful educational processes 
teach you how to take a small step to the side and ask, 
bravely, insistently, and without hesitation: where do we 
come from? how have we become who we are? why do we 
think as we do? what would happen if we began thinking 
and living differently?
Well aware that not all students are engaged in the 
study of philosophy, the history of ideas, and/or critical 
humanities or social sciences, I maintain that, in an ideal 
scenario, any carpenter, chef, doctor, or dentist will also be 
challenged to think and use their imagination during the 
course of their education.14
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§ 8. In the 1960’s and 1970’s, many societies in the Western 
world experienced a previously unseen flourishing of novel 
ways to think, live, and study. The protests of 1968 spread, 
casting doubt on traditional authorities and throwing 
a spanner into the works of a number of institutions. 
Previously unseen and unheard of forms of culture and 
life revolutionized countries like Denmark. Along with 
the propagation of the newfound notion of learning by 
progressive theorists in direct opposition to the traditions 
of top-down instruction, many of society’s educational 
institutions were remodeled and equipped with what, 
back then, were exotic phrases and related practices, such 
as: project and group-based work; interdisciplinarity; and 
self-directed and problem-based study.
With the benefit of hindsight, one could argue that, 
paradoxically, the noble ambitions of yesteryear’s reformists 
came to function as battering rams for a project-orient-
ed, competitive capitalism with a strong predilection for 
self-directed employees and a ubiquitous drive for creativ-
ity, innovation, and ‘positivity’. The critique of capitalism 
and the related criticisms were integrated, smoothing the 
way for incessant institutional modernization and the 
development of politics of knowledge.15
Whereas the developments 40-50 years ago surfed 
on a wave of emerging bottom-up movements, it seems 
that, today, the tables have turned. The silence is deafen-
ing among both students and ground-level professionals 
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here in the second decade of the 21st century; overcome, 
perhaps, by the constant march of reforms from the hands 
of policymakers.
The question — What is education? — must once 
again be asked by teachers and students in 2017 and in 
the years to come. More than ever before, there is a need 
to conjure up and try out unpredictable alternatives to the 
hegemonic matrix outlined in § 0: a fervent and unrelenting 
apparatus of control which is imprinting itself globally. 
This time, the alternatives need to be formulated both 
locally and globally by concrete agents at the grassroots 
level and presented to an as yet non-existent cosmopolitan 
public sphere for transnational educational thought which 
must be able to not only match, but in the long run even 
transcend and transgress the dominant narrative with its 
more or less identical and streamlined policy papers and 
governance initiatives.
§ 9. It is always here and now. We are no longer in 1789 
or 1968, nor are we in 2097 or 2143. And yet the coming 
society16 is always already taking shape. Tomorrow has 
already begun, even though the past still has unfinished 
business. Whatever we initiate today has and will have 
consequences for the shape of tomorrow, both on an 
institutional (i.e. the material design and accompanying 
practices of education), ‘mental’ (i.e., the far from private 
lines of thought, distinctive characteristics, and personal 
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narratives of each individual), and communicative (i.e., 
what can be constituted socially through the exchange, 
sharing, and creation of speech acts) level.
The constitutive acts of the coming society are 
therefore accompanied by a powerful vision; reluctant to 
canonize some ahistorical answer to the question — what 
is education? — this vision bears a persistent process-on-
tological porousness and epistemological broadness in 
scope.17
The critical interpreter of contemporary educational 
policy is alert and ready to protest if and when this question 
is hastily brushed aside with unimaginative ‘answers’ and 
a series of familiar variations on the bewitching, and to a 
certain extent quality-indifferent, content of § 0.
§ 10. As if the poor reader had not already been bombarded 
with speculations, claims, and cascades of words, I will 
now venture into a lopsided, historical double exposition. 
While the year is 2017, and not 1945, I hope that it will 
serve as a both clarifying and thought-provoking finale.
The end of WWII and the collapse of Nazi Germany’s 
regime of horror mark a long-lasting Stunde Null for 
the regeneration of the German nation. Time stood still; 
entirely new ways to think, live, and practice politics were 
required. The German systems theorist Niklas Luhmann 
spoke of a Stunde Null for sociology as well.18 The social 
sciences needed to be reevaluated in their entirety, and it 
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is hardly a coincidence that the oeuvres of both Luhmann 
and his compatriot, the philosopher and sociologist Jürgen 
Habermas, took the form of grandiose and foundational 
theories of communication, innovating how society was 
to be both thought and spoken of. After all, the advent of 
radical, uncontrollable, and diversity-asserting theories 
of communication is easier in periods open to deep-lying 
and far-reaching transformation (e.g. Stunde Null) than 
under the rule of a totalitarian leader.
Yet here, as we near the end of our endeavor, self-crit-
ical misgivings are surfacing; indeed, it might come across 
as somewhat hyperbolic and extremely starry-eyed to 
suggest that the dominant educational discourse and 
policy finds itself in a crisis of legitimacy and governance 
comparable to a Stunde Null caused by the dominant 
educational discourse and policy (to paraphrase § 0). 
Unfortunate as it may be, we are not (yet) living in the 
ashes of an educational system that has fallen apart, and 
of which the state no longer has control.
In the pragmatic everyday reality of contemporary 
society, it is only natural that students want papers proving 
that they have learned something, that they are competitive, 
or that they dream of being employed in exciting jobs after 
graduating. It is only natural to have aspirations to earn 
a proper salary rather than performing unpaid work for 
architecture firms, journal editorial boards, radio stations, 
or government offices while hiding their fears that they 
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are on a direct path to joining the growing ranks of the 
precariat. Both study- and work-life have become risky 
places to find oneself in. It is not befitting, nor right, for 
any ontologist to ‘forget’ this reality.
We should, on the other hand, not forget Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s durable and at once ‘existence-ontological’, 
critical, and ever-relevant contention: one who knows 
why she or he lives can endure almost any how.
Today, both the existence and autonomous why-ness 
of educational life are threatened. The whys are paralyzed; 
trapped between the attempts to meet the demands of, 
and be able to honor, the hows. Our time is charged with 
oblivion and impatience. The entire education system 
ought to be rethought from the bottom up, by the pupils, 
teachers, students, and researchers. First then would we be 
truly capable of not only offering attempts to glimpse the 
future in answering the question: What is education? — 
but also the far more fundamental query: Why education?
Two tentative and anticipatory, but perhaps also 
slightly precipitous, answers to the why-question might 
be: (1) Education is its own justification;19 it is what it 
is by being what it is — which it is when it lives up to its 
name, without besmirching its own history or impeding its 
freedom to define itself; (2) education is education while 
all sorts of other things are all sorts of other things, such 
as the destruction and contortion of education through 
management by objectives, control, the shortening of the 
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time allowed to complete one’s studies and all the other 
kinds of attempts to besiege academia and the autonomy 
of educational institutions.
In a little more than 50 words, the final two words of 
this essay — followed by a ‘homeless’ but hopeful exclama-
tion mark — will echo valiantly in the dark night of winter. 
But it is no secret that any revolution requires agents of 
change and a widespread will for radical transformation. 
And unfortunately, neither currently seems to be on the 
horizon. Reclaim education!20
I am thankful to Associate Professors Ida Wentzel Winther 
and Kirsten Hyldgaard from the Danish School of Education 
(DPU), Aarhus University for their critical and constructive 
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WHAT CAUSES EDUCATION?
Anxiety and the Object a
Kirsten Hyldgaard
I have never met a star who didn’t come from the same kind 
of insecurity. It is the things that you are missing that make 
you a star. It is not the things that you have.
- George Michael on BBC Parkinson Show
Two questions will be addressed in the following:
(1) Why do universities not give priority to education? 
The article suggests a formal answer on the basis of Lacan’s 
four discourses. 
(2) Why education? Why do we learn? Is it caused by 
a natural curiosity or is it caused by anxiety? Is it at all 
possible to control the influence that we undoubtedly 
have on each other, not least when we teach? This will be 
discussed in the context of the psychoanalytical concept of 
transference as a condition for and an obstacle to teaching.
Due to budget reductions on public spending in general, 
at least in Denmark, universities have suffered severe 
cutbacks. It is not the cutbacks as such that I want to 
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discuss. Rather, I would like to begin with a question that 
has always puzzled me.
There are and have always been duties performed in 
exchange for receiving one’s salary as a professor; there is 
something we must deliver. This much is obvious. Both 
research and teaching is a must. A university professor’s 
duties are divided between research and teaching. We are 
obliged to publish peer reviewed articles every year. To 
ensure this management has introduced what is called 
‘research watch’ (‘forskningsvogtning’). 
However, management also provides ‘incentives’. 
These are motivating influences to how we might prioritize 
our duties. An incentive means that management does 
not stipulate what we must do, rather, it encourages us to 
channel our energy in a particular direction. This particular 
direction is not research in general; rather, management 
encourages us to compete for external funding. The in-
centive is an increase of salary and especially prestige, i.e. 
full professorships.
External funding is obtained by writing applications 
which is obviously time consuming. And why is that a 
problem? It is not uncommon that the success rate is under 
15%, i.e. more than 85% of the applications are rejected. 
Consequently, we are encouraged to attend courses where 
we can learn how to write successful research applications. 
Not only do researchers spend time on writing these 
applications; researchers, who could have done research 
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and taught students to become researchers, are spending 
time in committees assessing these applications.
This represents a considerable amount of time, hence 
money — even if we are not taking into consideration all 
the factors that cannot be measured such as the effect of 
disillusion, opportunism, and cynicism. 
So, why does management incite us to do this? For a 
very simple reason: Otherwise we would not do it. Granted, 
the official way of legitimizing this demand is that writing 
research applications clarifies one’s thinking and one’s 
ability to communicate the point and potential so-called 
impact of one’s work. However, the most common com-
plaint voiced concerns the time spent on writing research 
applications not having any positive effect on research. 
It is not just time consuming; it parasitises research and 
all other meaningful duties like teaching, attending staff 
meetings, presenting papers at conferences, and writing 
for or speaking to the general public.
So, to repeat, if this is the case, why does management 
incite us to do this? The answer is that universities are 
run like any other business. These days universities are 
at least semi-commercial. To be sure, universities are to a 
large degree sponsored by taxpayers’ money. And is it not 
entirely legitimate that taxpayers have some kind of control 
concerning what tax money is spent on? This rhetorical 
question, this seemingly legitimate, commonsensical de-
sire for control is also financed by the taxpayers’ money. 
190
There are at least two consequences. Firstly, if it has ever 
made sense to speak about freedom in connection with 
research, this has lost its meaning. Not even university 
management decides what kind of research is desirable; 
the decision has been handed over to external commit-
tees. Secondly, recognition, prestige is no longer granted 
to those who are supposed to be ‘first among equals’ but 
to those who are ‘first’ at writing research application, i.e. 
‘first’ at being successful at obtaining external funding.
This is all well-known and has been pointed out many times. 
What are the consequences for education and teaching?
Qualifications and dedication, as far as teaching is con-
cerned, have never granted anyone a full professorship. 
In other words, it is not prestigious to be a competent 
university teacher. In fact, if you spend more time than 
what is absolutely necessary to deliver just acceptable 
teaching quality you are not fulfilling the desire of the 
Other, i.e. management. More than 40% of the income of 
Danish universities comes from educational activities. To 
repeat, universities are run like any other business. The 
curious fact is that nothing incites university professors to 
deliver more than acceptable teaching quality.
Nevertheless, a considerable amount of time, hence 
taxpayers’ money, is spent on ‘evaluation’ of education, on 
‘quality assurance’ (‘kvalitetskontrol’), on ‘higher education 
accreditation’ and so on. But, to repeat, as a university 
teacher, you do not prioritize your work tasks properly 
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if evaluation of your teaching signifies more than just an 
average effort.
The time you spend on teaching and coaching students 
is measured down to twenty minutes (reading 15 pages 
equals an hour, reading 10 pages equals 40 minutes, reading 
5 pages equals 20 minutes). Whenever we are asked to do 
something, a conditioned reflex is the question of how many 
‘hours’ this particular task is worth. University professors 
are wage earners like any other wage earner and have always 
been. Arguably, we have finally caught up to wage earner 
behavior. A perhaps not so paradoxical consequence is 
that my colleagues and I have come to consider this time 
management a defense against becoming overworked, a 
defense against excessive exploitation. With reference to 
the meticulous time management, it is legitimate to decline 
a work task. It goes without saying that it is the taxpayers’ 
money that is spent on the administration of this practice.
Research-based education
Teaching at universities is supposed to be ‘research based’. 
It is far from clear what is meant by that. What is clear, 
however, is that we are not encouraged to discuss this. 
Teaching is referred to as taking time from research, 
hardly ever as something that could or should contribute 
to research.
This is a curious fact. How can you give one toast 
speech after the other about the importance of education 
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and spend resources on accreditation and evaluation of 
education when there is no prestige, no recognition of 
more than average teaching effort? To my knowledge, no 
one has ever achieved full professorship because he or she 
was ‘first’ as far as research based teaching is concerned. 
To my knowledge, no one has ever — at least not officially 
— been fired for not being up to his or her task as far as 
teaching is concerned.
I have been privileged with the opportunity to volun-
teer my opinion to management in the field of university 
education. Why do I hardly ever, if at all, hear anyone 
else voice this? There seems to be a tacit approval of the 
hierarchy between research and teaching and the lack of 
connection between the two. Why do university professors 
identify with the low status of teaching? 
There should be no doubt as to the fact that it is of 
no concern to students whether their teachers get their 
full professorship ambitions fulfilled. The problem is, 
however, that associate professors do what they are told. 
If teaching activities are not rewarded with money and 
recognition, we concentrate our efforts on guessing what 
kind of research will obtain external funding and develop 
our competences on the genre of research application 
writing — not teaching, not academic writing as such, 
but research application writing.
It has always been a bad idea to rely on individual 
morals when organizing a society. It would also be a bad 
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idea to rely on university teachers considering teaching a 
calling or as something that fulfills a desire for meaning in 
one’s work life, which teaching undoubtedly does do for 
many a university professor. But students should know 
that if we are in a hurry to get out the door after the lesson 
has finished, and if we are not always giving students our 
undivided attention, then we are just trying to satisfy the 
desire of the Other, i.e. we do what management wants 
us to do. We try to guess the desire of the Other; this is 
what subjects do, this is what human beings do. We desire 
recognition, the recognition of the Other.
To be sure, we sometimes jokingly speak about ‘edu-
cation based research’, i.e. when we talk about our efforts 
to make a closer connection between the subject matter 
of our research and our teaching, i.e. our effort to make 
our work life as meaningful as possible. By this we also 
recognize that it can in fact be productive for the research 
process having to prepare a presentation of a text for a 
lecture or a seminar and having to think a theoretical 
problem through in dialogue with the students. And 
sometimes, some of us can catch ourselves thinking that 
the dialogue with students struggling to understand the 
subject matter gives us a welcomed break from the tedious 
imaginary rivalry with colleagues for recognition, and 
that it gives us a no doubt also imaginary sense of nothing 
but the subject matter ruling the social relation. Then we 
wake up to reality. What could be the answer to the fact 
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that teaching is not recognized? A cynical answer could be 
that management knows very well that standing in front of 
students, seeing the expectation in their eyes, experiencing 
their loss of transference, their loss of respect, the loss of 
imaginary recognition when we are not up to the task is 
intolerable to most professors, i.e. those of us who are not 
completely lost to cynicism and disillusion. Management 
probably knows somehow that the immediate recognition 
of students — and lack thereof — is enough ‘incitement’ to 
make us do our job. Whereas we, to repeat, would never 
spend time on strategic research application writing if we 
were not ‘incited’ to do so.
To be precise, it is nothing new that teaching is not 
considered a contribution to research. It never has been. 
But why? The following will provide a formal, discursive 
argument relying on the psychoanalytic concept of trans-
ference and Lacan’s theory of the four discourses.
Transference
Teaching and learning imply social bonds. This is not just a 
triviality. Arguably, education is at play in any kind of social 
bond, but if we do not consider social bonds in general but 
rather the institutionalized social bonds called schools and 
universities — i.e. something different from what goes on 
in sports clubs, workplaces, and families — what are the 
formal conditions of teaching?
Education is a relation between a student and a teach-
er. This relation concerns a so-called subject matter. The 
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relation revolves around some ‘thing’. It is not always alto-
gether clear what this subject matter is and why the teacher 
is concerned with it, but teaching needs this reference to 
something outside the relationship between teacher and 
student in order to be called teaching. It is not enough to 
speak about ‘relational competences’ or ‘learning to learn’. 
Teaching is a relation because we teach a subject ‘matter’ 
and we learn because we learn some ‘thing’. To repeat, what 
the ‘matter’ is, and what the ‘thing’ is, is not entirely clear. 
I shall return to this. 
Now, students, qua students, are not supposed to know; 
they are supposed to be lectured. This is the fundamental 
reason why they sit in the lecture room. The teacher is 
supposed to know. The psychoanalytic concept of trans-
ference refers to this indispensable and quasi-automatic 
mechanism.
In Freud, transference refers to repetition of infantile 
relations, i.e. we repeat the emotional matrix — loving 
and hateful, tender and aggressive — and unconscious 
conflicts with parents and siblings to future relations. In 
the following quote, Freud describes transference between 
analysand/patient and the analyst/doctor: 
In so far as his transference bears a ‘plus’ sign, it 
clothes the doctor with authority and is transformed 
into belief in his communications and explana-
tions. In the absence of such a transference, or if 
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it is a negative one, the patient would never even 
give a hearing to the doctor and his arguments. 
In this his belief is repeating the story of its own 
development; it is a derivative of love and, to 
start with, needed no arguments. Only later did 
he allow them enough room to submit them to 
examination, provided they were brought forward 
by someone he loved. Without such supports ar-
guments carried no weight, and in most people’s 
lives they never do. Thus in general a man is only 
accessible from the intellectual side too, in so far 
as he is capable of a libidinal cathexis of objects; 
and we have good reason to recognize and to dread 
in the amount of his narcissism a barrier against 
the possibility of being influenced by even the best 
analytic technique. 
(Freud, S., 1968, pp. 445-446))
Transferred to the question of teaching, this implies that 
in order to learn you need to be able to love, to be ‘capable 
of a libidinal cathexis’. Not everybody is capable of loving. 
Narcissism, the investment of libido in the ego — the spec-
ular image of oneself, rather than an object — can keep 
you in ignorance, can prevent you from thinking. And vice 
versa: The students serve the purpose of preserving the 
narcissistic teacher’s imaginary, specular image of unity 
— wisdom, knowledge, the masterful grasp of the subject 
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matter. Seduction rather than teaching is at play. When this 
specular image of mastery is questioned, the reaction is 
often aggressive retribution: typically sarcasm, ridicule, and 
disregard or, in a milder version, endless speech that numbs 
listeners and covers up the fragile mirror image. 
Lacanian psychoanalysis distinguishes between drive 
and desire, which may clarify Freud’s concept of transference. 
When transference is both a question of the drive — libidinal 
cathexis — and of desire, the question of the Other’s object, 
is introduced. What am ‘I’, if anything, to the Other and, 
more importantly, what is the Other’s object. The question 
of the Other’s object is vital for teaching.
Furthermore, Lacan clarifies Freud’s concept of transfer-
ence by interpreting it as being basically a love of knowledge, 
the Other’s knowledge: The Other is ‘supposed’ to know, 
i.e. you do not actually know whether he or she knows; you 
only suppose it; you assume that he or she knows. This is 
the precondition for listening, for ‘paying’ attention. In the 
clinical psychoanalytic practice the analysand literally pays 
the analyst to listen. This is what analysts do. They listen. To 
be sure, analysts have to make a living too. However, there 
is also a less pragmatic reason for this exchange of money. 
If the relationship between analysand and analyst is not 
a professional one, something you pay for, the analysand 
cannot ‘pay attention’ to the effects of the unconscious, i.e. 
that the emotional ties and unconscious conflicts transferred 
to the analyst are in fact a repetition of infantile relations. 
198
The analysand will keep repeating instead of remembering.
Analysts listen. Teachers speak. Students listen. Students 
may discuss with the teachers, they may challenge, even 
fight the teacher provided they ‘suppose’ that he or she 
knows what he or she is talking about. Otherwise the 
teacher is simply irrelevant. Students’ suppositions may 
indeed prove to be wrong, but disappointment presupposes 
an initial supposition of knowledge. The analytic and the 
teaching relation is antinomic,1 but what teachers can learn 
from analysts is how vital it is how you ‘position’ yourself 
when being the object of transference. How do you not 
pose as an obstacle to the students working, thinking, and 
learning? In other words, how do you, as a teacher, check 
your narcissism? 
Not all students consider you relevant. When this is 
the case, you stand powerless. Often, this is not a major 
practical problem at universities; students stop turning 
up or are simply absentminded. For better and for worse, 
we no more control the effect we undoubtedly have on 
the other than we control our own unconscious. As far as 
‘relational competences’ are concerned, the unconscious 
formation called transference is an indispensable condition 
beyond one’s control. 
However, transference is not only love of knowledge. 
You may also hate. If you hate someone, according to Lacan, 
you ‘de-suppose’ him or her of possessing knowledge. He 
or she does not know the first thing about the subject 
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matter — as one’s exasperated exclamation typically goes. 
He or she does not ‘have it’. You do not respect the Other 
as Other when you hate or despise him or her. The teacher 
is a waste of time; he or she is likened to waste.
This could be one of the reasons why even seasoned 
teachers may enter the classroom or seminar room for 
the first session with slight anxiety. We do not often talk 
about it for obvious reasons: There is nothing to do about 
it. There are no guaranteed methods, no ‘tricks of the trade’ 
to ensure you the wished-for result because it concerns the 
fundamental vulnerability when confronted with the desire 
of the Other. Or to be more precise, it concerns the Other 
as subject, i.e. when students do not serve as backdrop for 
narcissistic speech. The concept of subject in Lacan does 
not signify foundation but what escapes being conceived 
of as an object of knowledge. The Other as subject is what 
potentially shatters the fragile narcissistic specular image 
of yourself as teacher.
Transference is indeed a semi-automatic mechanism, 
also in the sense that you cannot force it. There are typical 
strategies to protect oneself against this lack of control; ar-
rogance is one of the most common defense mechanisms. 
But love can also be an obstacle. Love (and its measured 
versions, respect and sympathy) is indeed a condition, but it 
can stand in the way of learning and thinking. This happens 
when focus is on the (imaginary) relation between teacher 
and student — the libidinal cathexis of the other — rather 
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than on the question of what the object of the Other is. In 
this case, the students cannot pay attention.
The four discourses2
Now, if this initial, yet precarious, condition is in place 
how do we, the teachers, speak in the seminar room? How 
do we form, uphold or disrupt the social bond between 
teacher and student?
Speech in the seminar room is submitted to and formed 
by what Lacanians call the discourse of the university, i.e. 
the discourse where you are an agent of knowledge, where 
you as a teacher must refer outside yourself to the Other, the 
socially accepted knowledge.3 To be an agent of knowledge 
means, among other things, that knowledge is not ‘yours’, 
Lacan's four discourses. Originally presented  
in Lacan's Seminar XXVII.
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knowledge is the knowledge of the Other, it is always 
‘according to …’. A teacher’s discourse does not allow for 
a sentence like: “Because I say so” — the quintessence of 
failure as far as pedagogics and education are concerned. 
It is an impossible sentence for the simple reason that you 
refer to yourself as the master who sets the rules of the game. 
Referring to oneself makes literally no sense. It is a master 
discourse. ‘Let there be light’ is the first master discourse 
ever, uttered by God himself, and it would make no sense 
to ask: ‘Why on earth should there be light?’. ‘Light’ is not 
just a condition but even the nonsensical precondition for 
everything, it is ‘pre’ any other condition. A master discourse 
makes no sense; you simply obey it or you spend the rest of 
your life trying to figure out what it might mean, thereby 
producing chains of signifiers, S2, ad infinitum.
As a teacher, you cannot bark an order; you have 
to make sense. And making sense means referring to 
something or someone besides or outside yourself, say-
ing “according to” Freud, Lacan, or this or that generally 
recognized authority on Freud and Lacan. Making sense 
means to refer one signifier to the other, S2, in an orderly 
fashion, ordered by ‘the symbolic order’. If teaching serves 
the purpose of referring to oneself, the result is not teaching 
but seduction. Narcissism kicks in. To repeat, narcissism 
does not only pose an obstacle to learning and thinking, 
it is an obstacle to teaching.
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A teacher does not produce new knowledge, he or she repro-
duces knowledge; a teacher transfers common knowledge, 
the knowledge of the Other. This might be one of the formal 
reasons for the low status of teaching, that teaching is not 
considered a contribution to research, teaching is only ‘based’ 
on research. In addition, this might be the reason why it 
is accepted, even expected of university professors that we 
deliver uninterrupted lectures that reproduce already given 
knowledge. University professors can even be the object of 
admiration when they do nothing but show their capacity 
for the encyclopedic memorizing of common knowledge; 
the professor as the epitome of a Mr. Know-It-All.
The discourse of the university does not produce new 
knowledge. This is presented in Lacan’s formalizations 
wherein the split subject,, rather than knowledge, is at the 
place of production. The discourse of the university pro-
duces divided, split subjects. A traditional way of describing 
teaching is as giving something and thereby filling up the 
other with your received wisdom. However, rather than 
installing knowledge into the student, you either control 
the other in order that no lack shall present itself, or you 
install a lack, i.e. you stir up desire. The latter is the basis 
for hysterical discourse, i.e. discourse that challenges the 
master signifier, the response from the student: But why? 
The ‘product’ of the discourse of the university is the split, 
lacking, desiring subject. In your effort to transmit common 
knowledge you, at best, stir up desire, lack of knowledge. 
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There is indeed something the students do not yet know 
and, what is more, it is something worth knowing. The 
student may exclaim: Yes, this is all very well, but it only 
raises the question … Or: Yes, but I still don’t understand 
… Why couldn’t the answer just be … And the teacher does 
his or her best to respond authoritatively to this challenge 
— without silencing the student with aggressive sarcasm 
or empty professorial speech, if he or she is worthy of the 
name teacher. 
You respond authoritatively, when you refer to the 
Other, and you compel authority when you, literally, do 
not need to compel or force the student to do anything. A 
teacher can thank the work of transference for this effect. 
This is also what analysts refer to as ‘work transference’.
The discourse of the hysteric is the only discourse that has 
knowledge at the place of production. It is only by chal-
lenging received wisdom, the master signifier, S1, that new 
knowledge is produced. You need to castrate the Other in 
order to produce new knowledge. You need to expose the 
lack in the Other, expose the holes and inconsistencies in 
knowledge, i.e. the holes in the chain of signifiers. A teacher 
should answer as best as he or she is capable of, i.e. author-
itatively, while accepting that he or she will never satisfy 
the student completely. There is always something left to 
be desired — for the student to think about, work on, and 
question. A teacher who is up to his or her task should be 
able to make room for this. Otherwise his or her practice 
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is literally a cover-up rather than teaching. Or to be more 
exact, it is violence. Protecting authority, not letting your 
lack be exposed, silences students — these endless, seem-
ingly consistent chains of signifiers, this empty professorial 
speech or, in the worst case, defensive sarcasm.
Because a teacher has to refer outside him or herself, 
teaching must necessarily be conservative or conservato-
ry. Teaching reproduces. You cannot intentionally teach 
students to be revolutionaries — even if this were a de-
sirable goal. Upbringing and education are, as Freud also 
stated, conservative practices. You necessarily reproduce 
the ruling ideology, the accepted, common knowledge of 
what is ‘reality’. But your effect on the students, provided 
your position makes room for the unsatisfied hysterical 
desire, might make room for thinking, and thus a result 
that cannot be controlled.
What are you teaching and what do students learn? 
You teach something, literally some thing, some matter. 
And students, by questioning what is the matter, i.e. what is 
your object of desire, may learn something. It is not entirely 
sure what the ‘subject matter’ of teaching is. The notation 
of the object of desire in Lacan is the object a. This is the 
notation that refers to the cause of desire, the question of 
what the object of the Other’s desire is. Neither the teacher 
nor the students are the cause of learning, the object a is, 
the undecidable question of what the Other’s object is. The 
trouble with narcissism is that it blocks and protects against 
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this cause. To put it another way, what exactly the students 
learn is beyond one’s control, no matter how much ‘goal 
oriented learning’ one’s method might contain. So, teaching 
is not just a question of social relations; it presupposes an 
object, something that the social bond is about, the object 
a. If teaching is not about, literally, some ‘thing’, the object 
becomes the teacher him- or herself. This is not teaching, 
this is seduction; teachers and students lost in imaginary 
love. The disciples hang on the celebrated master thinker’s 
every word. The disciples await his interpretations instead 
of being put to work. Rather than seduction the teacher’s 
work is that of suggestion. We suggest that something other 
than the relation to ourselves is worth the while; we should 
divert attention away from our sorry narcissistic selves and 
suggest the object instead. The trusted teacher, apparently, 
considers something other than him or herself important, 
and what it is and why…
This is also the reason why a teacher cannot teach 
on the background of his or her own texts, because in 
that case the teacher cannot question what (in the present 
case) K. Hyldgaard’s dubious points and perspective are. 
Self-reference is at play.
Anxiety as the cause of education?
So, what makes us think and what are the conditions for 
thinking in the seminar room? Why do we learn? The 
questioning, lacking, ‘missing’, and desiring subject is 
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the foundation of thought and other human excesses. 
It is not uncommon to hear philosophers of education 
claim that the desire to learn is founded in some kind of 
natural curiosity; we are born with a natural instinct or 
capacity to learn. The present author considers this an 
all too easy, even sentimental assumption. References to 
‘the natural’ usually serve as a blockade against further 
thinking. According to Freud, we think and work because 
of Lebensnot (the ‘life-essential’); we only think and work 
when forced to do so. This is founded on the basic point 
that the psychoanalytical concept of drive does not equal 
a natural instinct. Drives are not inborn. They come into 
being in connection with Anlehnung, that is, the satisfaction 
of biological needs. When hunger is satiated and thirst 
quenched by the Other, there is always something left to 
be desired, and the drive is this leftover, this insatiable, 
restless pulse seeking satisfaction by whatever means may 
be at hand. The assumption is that the reason why human 
beings desire to learn and the reason for human beings’ 
excessive achievements in this respect — our constructive 
and destructive excesses in general — are both the insatiable 
pulse of the drive confronted with the equally insatiable 
desire for recognition and the fundamental anxiety of loss 
of the Other’s love and recognition. What we ‘miss’ drives 
and haunts us.
So, what is the difference between teaching and 
education on the one hand and learning on the other? 
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In distinction from the concept of learning, education 
and teaching imply a social relation, a relation between a 
teacher and a student, a teacher who has an agenda, the 
gerundive, some ‘thing’ that should be learned. Education 
means etymologically, ‘to be lead’. The pedagogue in an-
cient Greece was the slave who accompanied the child to 
school. Teachers are not masters; teachers do not possess 
knowledge. Teachers are and have always been slaves 
to the Other. This suggests the low status of teaching in 
comparison with research.
1  For further reading, see Millot 1997.
2 Lacan, J. L'envers de la psychoanalyse. Livre XVII.  
(Paris: Seuil), p. 79
3  For further reading, see Salecl 1994.
Literature
Freud, S. (1968). Transference. The Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud,Volume XVI.  
Lacan, J. (1991). L’envers de la psychanalyse.  
Livre XVII. Paris: Seuil 
Salecl, R. (1994). Deference to the Great Other: The 
Discourse of Education. Lacanian Theory of Discourse.  
Subject, Structure, and Society. New York & London:  
New York University Press 
Millot, C. (1997). Freud antipédagogue. Paris: Flammarion
208
209
7 QUESTIONS FOR THE PROFESSOR
Mladen Dolar
Slovene philosopher Mladen Dolar answers a series of 
question sent to him by a group of university activists from 
Copenhagen — known as ’Et andet universitet’/’Another 
university’. During their blocade of the rectorate of the 
University of Copenhagen, the activists from ’Et andet 
universitet’ arranged study circles in which they read and 
discussed Mladen Dolar’s text ’The Master and the Professor 
are Dead, and I am not Feeling Well Myself.’1 The questions 
presented here have been formulated in their subsequent 
discussions.
1) Wherein lies the truth of the Humboldtian 
model of higher education (Das Humboldtische 
Bildungsideal)?
Humboldt University was the first major modern university, 
i. e. a university which was not based on the medieval tra-
dition that shaped the bulk of the then existing universities, 
most of them venerable institutions of long standing. It 
was established anew in 1809, after the devastation of the 
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Napoleonic victory in Prussia, and was thus virtually the 
first university after the French revolution (along with 
the École normale supériure established by Napoleon at 
roughly the same time in Paris, but with different goals).2 
It was based on very laudable principles: the unity of 
teaching and research, the transmission of knowledge 
going hand in hand with the production of new knowledge; 
the community of professors and students in the common 
pursuit of knowledge; pursuit of knowledge for the sake 
of knowledge alone, not in view of training for profes-
sions and not complying with the needs of the state and 
economy; complete freedom of research, liberated from 
the pressures of religion, prejudice and state ideology; 
and last but not least, Bildungsideal, i. e. the idea that the 
pursuit of knowledge at the same time entails the forma-
tion of autonomous subjectivity, fostering independent 
judgment, combining erudition and responsibility. This 
was the blueprint that most of the modern universities 
were to follow. The proclamations sound great, the reality 
was different. Above all, the Humboldt model implicitly 
fostered the spirit of the elite; despite its universal aims, it 
was meant to be carried out for the enlightened minority, 
the privileged few, who were supposed to take the leading 
positions in society. The massive demands for the democ-
ratization of the university, to make its education accessible 
and available for all strata of society, put the Humboldt 
model into jeopardy. It displayed some hidden assumptions 
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of domination under the guise of praiseworthy pursuit 
of pure knowledge. Furthermore, its elitist enclosure 
came under siege from the growing demands of social 
utility and efficacy, combined with funding. Indeed, the 
model involved the very real danger that the knowledge 
produced in such an academic enclosure was cut off 
from the accelerating progress of economic and social 
realities. Its great advantage—knowledge purely for the 
sake of knowledge—was also its weakest point: academic 
knowledge out of touch with the social, not responsive to 
the needs of the exponentially growing economy and blind 
to the drastic changes in the social structure.
 
2) Wherein lies the truth of the student revolts of ‘68 
and their ideals? 
I guess there is no single truth of ’68, there are multiple 
and disparate messages. First of all, the fact that these 
were student revolts is very telling in itself. The biggest 
anti-capitalist revolt in prosperous western societies after 
the Second World War was instigated not by workers or 
oppressed minorities, but by students, belonging to a 
relatively privileged part of society. The university was 
the locus of a social symptom, and Lacan, who coined the 
term ‘university discourse’ in the immediate aftermath of 
’68, certainly pointed his finger at this symptom, turning 
it into a diagnosis, claiming that ‘university discourse’, 
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after the demise of the authority of the Master, was the 
paradigmatic social tie of modernity. Pure knowledge as 
the agent of this discourse, promoting the key role of the 
colossal development of modern science, turned out to 
implement new forms of domination under the cloak of 
most commendable declarations. Student revolt demand-
ed the democratization of universities, making them 
accessible to everyone; it was turned against the merely 
academic production and transmission of knowledge 
and it pointed at the far-reaching political dimension 
of knowledge production and transmission. It therefore 
demanded the inclusion of ‘subversive knowledge’ such 
as Marxism and psychoanalysis and it put into question 
the academic hierarchies and investiture rituals. The 
trouble with the student demands then is that they were 
largely justified but also far more recuperable than one 
could imagine. The demand for democratization turned 
into the massification of universities, with the lowering 
of academic standards and implementation of testing. 
The demand for knowledge to address social concerns 
turned into the submission of knowledge to the demands 
of production and the market. This ‘subversive knowledge’ 
turned out to be easily tamed, as it could positively flourish 
in universities as its playground without having any seri-
ous consequences. The critique of hierarchies and feuds 
developed into the demise of the venerable figure of the 
Professor and into modernization of ancient institutions, 
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i. e. their functionalization. To sum up: what promised to 
be a radical revolt against the rule of the university dis-
course turned out, in its effects, to be rather an extension 
and reinforcement of its rule by new and more pervasive 
means. Yet, this gloomy outcome doesn’t at all exhaust the 
student revolts and their political legacy. It is a lesson to 
be learned and can serve as inspiration for present fights.
 
3) Who should have the last word concerning the 
university and its purpose: the institution of the uni-
versity itself or the surrounding society? 
The slogan of the autonomy of the university is a dou-
ble-edged weapon. Of course one should defend the 
autonomy of the university against the growing pressures 
of economic demands and efficacy; the pressures to 
mass-produce marketable knowledge; and the pressures 
to demote knowledge to information, testing and imme-
diate practical use. But the plausible claims against such 
pressures often disguise less plausible agendas: the defense 
of acquired positions along with the established power 
structure and distribution within the universities. Anyone 
who has worked in academia for some time will know that 
universities are not just places of enlightenment, erudition, 
rational argument and progress of knowledge; moreover, 
whoever thinks that people with doctorates and high 
professorial positions are endowed with a higher grade of 
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rationality has never had to actually deal with them on a 
daily basis. Intellectual capacities and human decency seem 
to be equally and democratically distributed among them 
as anywhere else, with the aggravating circumstance that 
high grades and sheltered positions tend to bolster the fatal 
propensity for arrogance, conceit and prestige fights—all 
the more cut-throat for being conducted under the cloak 
of the high scientific ideals. Should the university or the 
ambient society have the upper hand, in other words, 
the ultimate say to determine the university agenda? The 
trouble is that both are split in themselves, in a variety of 
ways, so that the proper fronts are to be established not 
simply between the one and the other, but within both 
and across both. A very hard thing to achieve.
 
4) In this regard, is there a conflict between the ideas 
of Erziehung (the process of being trained for a pro-
fession and meeting political demands) and Bildung 
(the process of being introduced into the autono-
mous sphere of universality)? 
No doubt there is a far-reaching conflict between the 
two, but also a ‘discordant concord, concordant discord’, 
concordia discors, discordia concors, as Kant put it in The 
contest of faculties (in a somewhat different context, but 
not unrelated). The university has to aim at two contra-
dictory goals: first, it has to be attuned to social demands 
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and utterly sensitive for social changes. This doesn’t simply 
mean it should train students for professions that society 
needs, but that it should constantly critically reflect on 
what the social demands are in the first place, for the 
social demands don’t coincide with the rashly imposed 
and fluctuating market expectations. It should provide 
knowledge that is socially needed and useful, while also 
examining its utility. Second, it should dare to be utterly 
out-of-tune with the ambient society, ‘anti-social’, as it were, 
it should dare to produce knowledge that has no immediate 
utility, a knowledge that stands in opposition to the spirit 
of the times, an untimely knowledge, to use Nietzsche’s 
great word, unzeitgemäss, beyond the framework of social 
pressures and expectations. This is what thought is — and 
maybe one should draw an opposition between knowledge 
and thought in this respect — namely, any true thought 
reaches beyond the limits of what seemed to be hitherto 
possible. It raises the claim to the impossible, beyond 
what is socially needed and acceptable. How to reconcile 
the two aims which are completely at odds? There is no 
way to reconcile them, but one has to work with the two 
threads at the same time.
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5) What organizational form is fitting for the univer-
sity: a democracy of students, professors and staff or 
the idea of an aristocracy of reason? 
It looks like the assumption of your question is that 
democracy is a good thing and aristocracy is to be dis-
carded, for who would want to make oneself ridiculous 
by defending the aristocracy of reason. But let me say: 
there is no democracy in philosophy. Look at its history: 
it can be summed up by a dozen names, or two dozen (ok, 
make it three dozen to appear more democratic). There is 
a paradox: philosophy’s claim to abstraction, universality, 
conceptuality, theory, ideality can be pinned down to a 
dozen (or so) singular names. There is no majority that can 
decide about this — so are they to be taken as ‘aristocrats 
of reason’? The idea of democracy is that every opinion 
counts, and since they are at odds one has to eventually 
count them. The idea of philosophy is that no opinion 
counts, as long as it is an opinion and cannot establish 
itself as proper knowledge. The divide between doxa and 
episteme is the foundational divide of philosophy. Having 
an opinion doesn’t entitle anyone to anything in science. 
I am speaking of philosophy since I am a philosopher, 
but I believe that the argument can be made, mutatis mu-
tandis, for science as such. Of course there is a pragmatic 
assumption of democracy in science, the idea that the basis 
of scientific knowledge is ultimately the consensus of the 
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scientific community. Science is what peer-reviewers say 
that science is. Thus it would be ultimately based on vote, 
but the vote of those who have proven their credentials to 
be entitled to vote. Yet, if this mechanism pragmatically 
works and if we accept it as a rule of thumb to simplify 
our scientific lives, one has to be fully aware that this is 
emphatically not what science amounts to. There is no 
vote about truth, and ultimately no big Other of consensus 
to sustain it. In Lacan’s theory of the four discourses, the 
discourse of the university is one of the four basic types 
of discourse as a social tie, but there is no discourse of 
science on that list — there is something in the discourse 
of science that is irreducible to a social tie, that is, to its 
social function, transmission and utility.
Yet again one has to work with two contradictory 
threads in hand: of course, on the one hand, the community 
of students, professors and staff—based on democratic 
deliberation—every voice has the right to be heard, every 
suggestion examined, every interest taken into account; 
but, on the other hand, all this is in pursuit of something 
that goes beyond any democratic consensus and dialogue, 
beyond particular interests and opinions, also beyond 
authorities and guarantees. It is like a utopian community 
which is democratically organized in view of something 
that reaches beyond democracy and cannot be construed 
in a democratic framework.
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Let me add a skeptical remark on democracy in the class-
room — the alleged democracy of professors and students, 
sitting around the table, freely discussing any possible 
concerns and grievances, the professor there as one among 
equals, everyone on the first name basis, buddy like, etc. I 
rather think that this is an insidious version of the figure 
of a postmodern master, the one who pretends to be your 
buddy. The professorial authority is not superseded by 
such a seemingly democratic arrangement, but enhanced 
by it and made more intractable.
 
6) What is the role of love in the university (φιλοσοφία)? 
Given my background in psychoanalysis, I can only in-
voke the specter of transference. No knowledge without 
transference. Transference is at its core an affair of love (as 
opposed to a love affair). Freud famously wrote a paper 
on transferential love, Übertragungsliebe, and pointed 
to the ways that transference works in what he called 
the three impossible professions: governance, education 
and psychoanalysis. These professions are impossible 
precisely because they involve transference, and for that 
reason, as Freud said, one can also always be certain of 
an unsatisfactory outcome. It is like squaring a circle. 
Socrates, whose mission was to pull people out of their 
embeddedness in doxa, in the received opinion, and push 
them on the way to knowledge, episteme; Socrates was an 
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emblematic figure of transference. His constant claim, as to 
his authority and knowledge, was famously that the only 
thing he knew was that he knew nothing, yet, in a famous 
moment in Symposium he claimed that “… the only thing 
I understand is the art of love …” (177e). The man who 
doesn’t know anything, except about love: the pure instance 
of transference divorced from any particular knowledge, 
but functioning as a pure injunction to knowledge. 
No knowledge without transference, but transference 
is not an affair of knowledge. This is why Lacan based his 
seminar on transference (1960/61) precisely on the figure 
of Socrates. With Socrates, this link is spectacularly osten-
sible, but I believe that there is a moment of transference 
involved in every production of knowledge. Or, if one 
wants to sidestep the psychoanalytic vein, one can say no 
knowledge without passion. In Helvetius’ De l’esprit, On 
spirit (1758) there are two sections with delightful titles: 
“On superiority of passionate people over reasonable 
people” and “One becomes stupid when one stops being 
passionate”. It is not that passion is something that would 
lead reason astray so that one would have to be purified 
of it in order to pursue the high goals of rationality, it is 
rather that unless one is driven by a passion one would 
never seriously use one’s reason. Psychoanalysis scrutinizes 
this point, love and passion being at the core of knowledge 
and rationality, which is not to say that one should debunk 
‘irrational’ impulses behind the façade of knowledge and 
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rationality and reduce them to that core, but that the two 
intertwine in ways far more complex than imagined from 
the one side or the other.
7) Is the university of reason the best way to achieve 
communism?
The prospect of communism can only be conceived beyond 
the university, if by university we mean something that can 
ultimately be reduced to what Lacan called the university 
discourse. And this is what we spontaneously assume when 
speaking of the university, even if very critically, so that 
most of the proposed reforms of the university run out 
into implementing the social tie of the university discourse 
even better, to universalize it. The point of the prospect of 
communism would be precisely to invent another kind 
of social tie, another kind of discourse that would be able 
to counteract the framework of university as the modern 
site of production of knowledge. There is no blueprint for 
what that new social tie may be, but we must try to engage 
immediately in various kinds of activities that counteract 
the pervasive rule of the university discourse.
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1 Published in On the Facilitation of the Academy, Edited by: 
Westergaard, Elias,Wiewiura, Joachim S, (Springer Publishing, 
2015).
2  For the sake of accuracy one should add that École normale was 
established in 1794, in the midst of revolutionary turmoil, it was 
supposed to be the first revolutionary university, but it lasted a 
very short time: January-May, 1795. Napoleon relaunched it, but 
it got its present shape only under the Restoration, in 1826 and 
finally in 1845. The École normale model never concealed its elite 
nature (as did Humboldt), but flaunted it proudly and boasted 
about it up to the present day. Les normaliens function somewhat 
like freemasonry, and indeed freemasonry was an Enlightenment 
phenomenon, an enlightened select exclusive group, destined to 
rule the society, making its coming out after being a hidden sect.
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FROM THE ACADEMY TO KUA
 A Brief History of Learned Institutions or Madhouses
Steen Ebbesen
The author is a former professor of Greek and Latin in the 
University of Copenhagen, who became an emeritus in 2016. 
The following is a somewhat edited English version of his 
Danish-language valedictory lecture, delivered on November 
18, 2016, in KUA, i.e. the building complex housing the 
Faculty of Humanities of the University of Copenhagen. He 
wishes to thank his former pupil, professor David Bloch, for 
critical comments on a first draft of this English version.
It is today fifty-two years and two and a half months since 
I started working in the University of Copenhagen. I was 
eighteen, and had been enrolled as a student of classical 
philology and Russian. Classics was a full education, but 
in those days, nothing prevented one from studying and 
taking a degree in as many extra subjects as one could 
manage.1
In the students’ manual issued by the faculty of 
philosophy,2 classical philology occupied 24 small pages 
(size A5) in all. Five of these contained a list of recom-
mended books, most of the rest detailed the examination 
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requirements for the six different degrees joined under 
the umbrella of classical philology. Less than two pages 
were spent on advice about how to conduct one’s studies. 
The first paragraph is memorable:3
The study is free, and the decisive factor 
is and remains the continuous reading of 
texts, translations and secondary literature. 
Students are, however, especially during their 
first terms, advised to attend those university 
lessons that follow a rotating schedule.
Notice the initial proclamation: The study is free. And so 
it was. You could spend as much or as little time as you 
pleased on it, and you could follow whichever lessons 
you fancied; even the few rotating courses were not 
obligatory. If you wanted to obtain a degree, you would 
have to know your stuff on the day of judgement, but 
nobody was going to ask you how you learned it or how 
much time you had spent on learning it. There were three 
sets of examinations in all: (1) a minor exam in general 
philosophy, usually taken after the first year, and required 
for admission to (2) one oral and two written tests, usually 
absolved one or two years later. (2) gave no academic title 
but had to be passed before (3) the degree examination, 
usually taken about four years after (2), and consisting 
of a thesis, three written and three oral exams. After (3) 
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you could walk away with the title of cand. mag. (in full: 
candidatus magisterii), roughly equivalent to M.A. If one 
wanted to qualify in further disciplines outside classics, 
degrees roughly corresponding to a B.A. were available.
For me, entering the university felt like being a small child 
let loose in a candy shop. In my first semester, I followed 
lectures and other sorts of lessons on general phonetics, 
Russian, archaic Greek art, the Homeric Hymns, Euripides’ 
Hippolytus, Greek religion, Greek prose composition, 
Terence’s Phormio, Virgil, Ovid, late Latin, the develop-
ment from Latin to the Romance languages, and medieval 
Latin poetry. Later I reduced the number of hours spent 
in classrooms from twenty-four to something like six 
or eight a week. Of the recommended rotating courses, 
I only attended one semester of Latin and one of Greek 
prose composition.
In 1966, I went to Thessaloniki in Greece for a year 
of study there. No formalities were needed to be allowed 
to be away from my home university for a year, nor did I 
have to bother about a transfer of ECTS points after my 
return. But I did get something for having learned proper 
Modern Greek: my classics professor, Johnny Christensen, 
asked me if I would be so kind as to take a minor degree 
in Modern Greek because he had just instituted such a 
degree and would like someone to use the opportunity. 
I obliged, and in 1968 I obtained the degree of cand. art. 
in Modern Greek, but then decided to drop my initial 
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idea of also graduating in Russian. Incidentally, my new 
title served me well, for it allowed me to serve as a Greek 
interpreter to the Danish police and law courts, and the 
income from that activity helped keep me economically 
afloat during my remaining student years. Tuition was 
free, but we had to find the means to pay for food, books, 
clothing and lodging ourselves.
Not all my teachers were equally inspiring, but a 
sufficient amount of them were guided by the same spirit 
as Hans Brøchner, a 19th-century Danish professor of phi-
losophy, who in 1860 had finished his inaugural lecture 
with these words to the students:4
I hope I shall succeed, as we jointly engage in 
the quest for truth, to win and deserve your 
trust. At the present moment, when we are 
still strangers to each other, I can only demand 
one thing of you: that you trust science, trust 
thought, trust yourselves.
Brøchner, of course, used science in the old broad sense of 
scientia, not in the modern English sense which excludes 
the humanities from science.
To the most inspiring among my teachers I got 
a relationship so close that to this very day I proudly 
proclaim everywhere in the world that I am a pupil of 
Johnny Christensen and Jan Pinborg. Traditionally, the 
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teacher-pupil relationship in higher education has been 
close. Already in ancient times, biographers would clas-
sify philosophers in a sort of genealogical tree, with the 
relation “having heard”, i.e. being the pupil of, replacing 
“being the son of ” in genuine genealogy. The mass uni-
versity has made it difficult to maintain the close contact 
between teacher and pupil, but top scholars still ask each 
other: “With whom did you study?” and “Whose pupil is 
that remarkable young person?”.
In my youth, we usually referred to the University 
of Copenhagen simply as The University. Later it became 
fashionable to call it Uni (a loan from German, I believe), 
and still later to use the initials KU or KUA, abbreviating 
Københavns Universitet (University of Copenhagen) and 
Københavns Universitet Amager (Copenhagen University, 
Amager campus), respectively. In recent years those 
designations have received ever increasing competition 
from The Madhouse.
The history of higher institutions of learning and their 
names is closely linked to the notion of philosophy, which 
arose in the Greek culture about 500 BC. Pythagoras is 
the alleged inventor of the term philosopher or “lover of 
wisdom”. Cicero reports an anecdote about a visit paid 
by Pythagoras to the prince of a miniature state called 
Phliunt in northern Peloponnese:5
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The prince asks him:
—What is your craft?
—I have none. I am a philosopher.
—What is such a one supposed to be?
—Well, you see, the life of man is like the 
Olympic games. Some participate in order to 
win prizes, others to sell or buy merchandise, 
and finally there are those who just come to 
watch and see what the athletes do, and how they 
do it. Life is like that: some strive for honour, 
others for money, and a few try to figure out 
how things are structured.
The anecdote about Pythagoras pinpoints something cen-
tral about higher institutions of learning. Their purpose is 
to make people think and strive to understand what they 
see in the world. The ancients called that sort of activity 
philosophy, now the common name is research.
Research has always been closely linked to teaching. It 
takes a perverse researcher not to wish to hand his insights 
on to others. How Pythagoras did so, we do not know, 
although it seems indubitable that he gathered a group 
of adherents around himself. The vast majority of later 
philosophers have run a school, at least in the sense that 
they would give lectures and participate in discussions in 
definite locales.
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Plato makes a point of portraying his hero, Socrates, in 
a way that no smell of the school-room attaches to him. 
The dialogues almost always result from a chance meet-
ing at some undetermined place out-of-doors, though 
occasionally in a private house, and on three occasions in 
a room in a sports facility.6 But a totally different picture 
is painted by Aristophanes in his comedy The Clouds. 
There, Socrates and his acolytes inhabit a “little house”, 
which is their thinkery. Interestingly, it is suggested that 
it is adjacent to a sports facility.7
As Plato remarks in one place,8 ordinary people will 
easily get the impression that researchers are crazy, and 
Aristophanes accordingly depicts Socrates’ thinkery as a 
madhouse, where the inmates practice wildly speculative 
cosmology, try to figure out how many flea-feet a flea 
can jump, and learn how to turn black into white in an 
argumentation. If we strip away the caricature, we are 
left with a school in which both cosmology, zoology and 
dialectic are among the subjects cultivated.9
As is well known, Socrates was condemned to death 
for two crimes: lack of respect for the gods of Athens and 
corruption of the city’s youth. I strongly suspect he plied 
his corruptive trade near or in one of the city’s sports 
facilities, for nowhere else would he have so easy access 
to the sons of the upper echelons of Athenian society and 
thus, perhaps, be able to make them reflect a little upon 
their beliefs and prejudices.
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Both Plato and Aristotle used public sports facilities for 
their philosophical activities. Such gymnasia had porticos 
(stoai or peripatoi) with back rooms (as one can see in the 
restored Stoa of Attalus in the ancient centre of Athens), 
and it must be such back rooms that the two philosophers 
(and later ones, like Zeno, the father of Stoicism) borrowed 
or rented from the city.
Plato established himself in a gymnasion called 
Akadēmeia. Diogenes, the father of cynicism, reportedly 
nicknamed Plato’s institution, “Plato’s destitution”, thereby 
suggesting that attending it would bring one nothing of 
value.10 Yet, the “destitution” was to have powerful effects 
on European culture for more than two millennia.
Plato gathered a circle of dedicated adherents around 
him. He may not himself have lectured to the general 
public,11 but it is rather clear that public discussions 
between his pupils, and probably also with participation 
from non-school members, played an important role in 
the life of his Academy.12 Devoted pupils participated in 
reading groups where Plato’s works, and possibly other 
philosophical literature, were studied and discussed.13 
Plato had his opinions about how to pursue philo-
sophical research. You have to discuss the matter under 
consideration thoroughly and take the time that it takes. 
So, you must have scholē — i.e. leisure, spare time —, 
and indeed, plenty of it, at your disposal. It is no use to 
declare a problem solved at 11 A.M. just because you 
231
need to finish by then. That sort of slavish submission to 
the clock is found in law courts, so no wonder advocates 
are the way they are, Plato says. Research is a matter for 
free people who will not cease discussing until they have 
rehearsed all relevant arguments and are satisfied they 
have reached the truth.14
The word denoting leisure devoted to intellectual 
activities soon acquired new uses. A teacher’s audience 
could be called his scholē, and soon one could talk about a 
teacher running a scholē. In Latin, that became schola, and 
now all European languages use adaptations of the Latin 
word to characterize teaching institutions. But schools 
typically have fixed timetables, and often have sinned so 
greatly against Plato’s ideas that their pupils have called 
them treadmills.
Aristotle was Plato’s star pupil. The very first sentence 
in his Metaphysics is “All humans have an urge to know.” 
And he was right: curiosity is a fundamental human trait. 
Most of us end up with a curiosity limited to certain aspects 
of the world, but a few keep a healthy and well-stimulated 
child’s all-embracing curiosity. Why doesn’t a moo-cow have 
wings? And why does it say ‘moo’ instead of ‘bow-wow’? as an 
inquisitive boy asks in a Danish childrens’ tale.15 Aristotle 
remained a curious child at heart and tried to learn about 
everything from cosmology to insects and logic, just like 
the caricatured Socrates in Aristophanes’ play.
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Aristotle, in his Posterior Analytics, formulated a num-
ber of conditions for when a piece of knowledge can be 
considered scientific. Crucially, it is required that one not 
only knows that something is in a certain way, but also 
why, and is able to give a generalizable explanation of the 
phenomenon, not just an ad hoc one. This conception of 
science is still the driving force of basic research in the 
natural sciences, even though Aristotelian causal necessity 
is now generally replaced with statistical probability. And, 
properly modified, the same conception also underlies 
good research in the humanities.
Both research and transmission of insights require 
critical discussion and although Aristotle had already as 
a young man created a somewhat more rigid framework 
for the discussions in the Academy than was to the taste 
of Father Plato, he remained true to the Socratic heritage 
in the sense that he always saw discussion as the natural 
setting of scientific activity.
Aristotle was a fellow of the Academy for twenty years. 
Talk about scholē! Later, he started his own learned insti-
tution in a gymnasion named the Lykeion (Latin Lyceum) 
— in imitation of French and Italian usage (lycée, liceo); 
the name is used in Modern Greek to mean “high school”. 
Aristotle’s pupils were called Peripatetics after a portico 
or ambulatory (peripatos) in the sports facility, which 
probably means that he used a back room in the portico 
for his lectures. Like Plato, Aristotle did not charge money 
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for his teaching, it seems,16 but otherwise the Lyceum 
shared several important traits with later research and 
teaching institutions. A large part of Aristotle’s preserved 
works must be, or have started their existence as, lecture 
manuscripts, and they generally presuppose an audience 
who were already well acquainted with his way of think-
ing and speaking. The inner circle of his students must 
have organized reading groups in which they studied the 
master’s and other great thinkers’ works. But according 
to ancient tradition, Aristotle also gave a daily lecture for 
the general public.17
The students must have assisted the master in gath-
ering extensive collections of empirical data, such as 
descriptions of the constitutions of no less than 158 city 
states, which Aristotle needed as background material for 
developing his political philosophy. Also, with or without 
interference from the master, the students would have 
organized dialectical training sessions and participated 
in public debates. To all appearances, Athens had a lively 
debating culture, where philosophers competed about 
primacy and their acolytes sharpened their claws in debates 
with students of their master’s competitors, and did so in 
front of an audience, whose approval or disapproval in 
practice decided who was the winner and who the loser 
in the competition of wits.18
It cannot have been boring to belong to the environ-
ment around Aristotle, and, as one might expect, several 
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of his pupils later made considerable contributions to a 
wide array of disciplines.
Plato’s Academy and Aristotle’s Lyceum survived as 
institutions for some 250 years after the death of their 
founders. Apparently, the death blow was dealt when the 
Roman general Sulla’s soldiers sacked Athens in 86 B.C., after 
which Athens ceased to be the dominating seat of learning 
in the ancient world. In late antiquity, even philosophers 
belonging to the Platonist and Aristotelian traditions were 
not above taking money for their teaching, whether directly 
from their pupils or in the form of public salaries, but, more 
worryingly, the way they transmitted their own and their 
predecessors’ thoughts became increasingly standardized to 
the detriment of the culture of discussion by which genuine 
philosophical research lives. Occasionally, though, a good, 
heated discussion could flare up, particularly when educated 
Christians and pagans engaged in battle over such issues as 
whether the world is temporally finite or not.19
The victory of Christianity brought with it a widely 
held suspicious attitude toward worldly learning. Human 
curiosity could not be suppressed, but for a long time it had 
to work within rather narrow borders. In the twelfth century, 
people began to break out from those borders, and Paris in 
particular developed a research and teaching environment 
as vibrantly dynamic as that of Aristotle’s Athens.
Top intellectuals set up shop, selling higher education, 
and students flocked to Paris from all over Western Europe, 
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arriving even from such far-away countries as Denmark 
in order to learn logic, linguistics, cosmology and various 
other philosophical disciplines. Works by Aristotle and 
other ancient authors were used as basic textbooks, but 
although the exegesis of those fundamental books formed 
the core of the teaching, teachers would also initiate their 
students into theories the ancients had never imagined, 
and they would train their students to submit the doctrines 
of the ancients to critical scrutiny.
It is one of the really strange aspects of Western 
culture that, at least in higher education, we pursue two 
goals that may appear contradictory. On the one hand, 
we try to transmit our own generation’s knowledge to our 
young students, while we on the other hand train them 
to have a critical attitude towards traditionally accepted 
knowledge. 35 years ago, a young Japanese guest scholar 
worked in the research institute to which I belonged at 
the time. He discovered that in 12th-century logic there 
is a whole genre of writings about the art of finding an 
objection against just about anything.20 Several European 
scholars, myself included, had seen some of those texts, 
but had not realized how peculiar they were; to us, being 
critical was the natural thing. Not so for our Japanese 
guest, who decided to investigate this weird phenomenon 
further, and thus discovered a logical sub-genre.
In 12th-century Paris, it mattered which master’s 
school you attended. The leading masters each had their 
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own philosophical theses, and their pupils could then join 
battle with each other, each participant in a disputation de-
fending the idea of his master. Like in antiquity, important 
masters sometimes had their school continued by pupils 
after they themselves had retired from teaching or died. 
By the end of the 12th century, the Parisian masters 
got organized in guilds. There were four such guilds, 
called facultates, i.e. disciplines: artes, i.e. the liberal arts, 
(in practice almost identical with philosophy), medicine, 
law and theology. The four guilds were united in an um-
brella organisation called Studium or Universitas. Modern 
pop-ular accounts of the history of universities sometimes 
make a point of claiming that the designation Universitas 
magistrorum et scolarium, “Association of masters and 
students”, indicates that two groups of teachers and pu-
pils were somehow on the same level, as opposed to the 
situation in normal schools where an abyss separated the 
pupils from the teacher. This is a piece of romanticism. The 
corporation was basically a super-guild for the masters of 
all four faculties, but their journeymen (bachelarii) and 
apprentices (pueri) automatically came under the jurisdic-
tion of the guild, and it was important for the masters to 
stress that this was so, hence the inclusion of the scolares 
in the title of the organization.
The early university was a private institution and it 
was democratic: all teachers could vote and all could be 
elected officers of their faculty. To counterbalance the 
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influence of the so-called “higher” faculties — law, medicine 
and theology — whose teachers were both older, richer 
and generally had much better connections to powerful 
people than the far more numerous arts teachers, it was 
established that the official head of the university, the 
rector, should always be elected by and from among the 
artistae. The formation of a class of career administrators 
was made difficult by the fact that officers were elected for 
very short periods, typically only a few months.
The early university owned no real estate, but man-
aged nevertheless to be economically independent of 
both secular and religious powers. With time, a tradition 
evolved in which the pope provided financial support to 
select teachers, but the dependence on the distant pope 
was rarely oppressive. Usually, he was actually an ally, as, 
for example, when local ecclesiastical authorities tried to 
exact money for issuing licences to teach.
The students enjoyed considerable freedom. To obtain 
an academic degree (as bachelor or master/doctor), certain 
conditions had to be met: one had to be above a certain 
age, one had to have attended lectures on certain central 
texts, and one had to have taken part in disputations — 
however, nobody bothered to update the list of required 
courses when a much larger selection of Aristotelian texts 
began to be regularly taught in the second half of the 
13th century, so in practice the students must have had a 
considerable freedom in their choice of lessons to follow. 
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And then it was not all that necessary to take a degree. 
Sure, it conferred dignity on its holder, but only one job 
actually required a university degree, and that was the 
job of university teacher. Nowadays, “dropping out” is 
considered rather shameful, and in countries with state-
paid education, drop-outs are often seen as people who 
have wasted public money. In the middle ages, there was 
no shame attached to leaving university without a degree, 
you had probably learned something anyway.
The faculty of arts became thoroughly Aristotelianized 
in the 13th century, and this in a very positive sense. 
People studied the writings of the old authority, but the 
goal was understanding, not parroting, and a lively cul-
ture of discussion prevented parroting from dominating 
the studies. What did the students learn? Of course, the 
current (more or less Aristotelian) theories in disciplines 
like logic, physics, ethics, biology etc., but primarily how 
to think and how to approach a theoretical problem. 
Evidently, many teachers and many pupils did not live 
up to the ideal, but for a considerable number of them it 
was a reality. Several authors quoted from the period, give 
the following beautiful characterization of knowledge: 21
Knowledge is a possession to be held by 
noble spirits only: when spread, it grows, 
and it scornfully rejects a miserly owner, for 
unless it is made public and is multiplied, it 
will disappear.
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There is a deep satisfaction in acquiring theoretical insight, 
and acquiring it is an important component in realizing 
one’s human potential. As the Danish-born Parisian phi-
losopher Boethius de Dacia says ca. 1270:22
The highest good attainable by humans con-
sists in knowing what is true, doing what is 
good, and enjoying both.
A study of the liberal arts did not prepare anyone for any 
particular job outside university, but the students gained 
general competences that could be used in many contexts.
The University of Paris flourished from the early 13th to 
the mid-14th century. Oxford rose to prominence a little 
later, about the middle of the 13th century. As time went 
on, more universities were founded, but they were not all 
elite research institutions, and while much good research 
was still being done in the 15th century, there were alarm-
ing signs of arteriosclerosis. Thus, several universities 
prescribed that their teachers stick to the theories of one 
particular earlier thinker or of a few such famous men, 
such as Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, 
or John Buridan.
By the late 14th century, universities had become so 
ubiquitous in Western Christendom that any self-respect-
ing prince felt that so ein Ding muss ich auch haben. One 
among those princes was king Christian I of Denmark 
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and Norway, who in 1474 travelled to Rome to obtain a 
papal bull authorizing the foundation of a university in 
Copenhagen. Unfortunately, he had no sense of money, and 
squandered so much on the way that on arrival in Rome 
he could not pay what it took to have a bull issued. The 
bull only materialized a year later when his sensible wife, 
queen Dorothea, undertook the long journey to Rome; she 
was a shrewd economist, who on more than one occasion 
had to help her prodigal husband out of a mess. After a 
couple of years spent on finding the means to run the new 
institution and hiring a team of teachers, the University 
of Copenhagen could start functioning in 1479.23
Universitas Studii Haffnensis was a very modest in-
stitution with maximally a dozen teachers. Virtually all 
documents from its early years have disappeared, if no 
later, then in a fire that consumed the university library 
in 1728; but we may assume, I believe, that the philosophy 
teaching was at a decent level, as it seems to have been at 
the similarly small university of Uppsala in Sweden, which 
was founded in 1477 and from whose early years several 
manuscripts produced by students have survived.24 As for 
research, however — forget about it!
If the intellectual level at the early university of 
Copenhagen was unimpressive, it sank to new depths when 
the institution was reorganized after the official adoption 
of Lutheranism by Denmark-Norway in 1536. The new 
statutes were the product of Johann Bugenhagen, whom 
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Philip Melanchthon had sent to Denmark as a substitute 
for himself after king Christian III had invited him to come 
and lay down rules for the reformed university. The one 
good thing one can say about the reformation university 
is that Greek was introduced as a subject, but that would 
have happened anyhow: in catholic Europe chairs in Greek 
were established at about the same time.
In spite of all sorts of privileges granted by Christian I 
and confirmed by later kings, the university in Copenhagen 
was now subjected to direct ministerial control. The king’s 
chancellor was in charge, and in the 16th and 17th centuries, 
he did not shy away from interfering in the affairs of the 
institution, including strictly academic matters. In his own 
name, or in the name of the king, he repeatedly ordered 
the university to hire named persons as professors or to 
confer a doctoral degree on named persons.25
In the minutes from a 1624 meeting of the university 
senate, one finds the following justification for nominating 
a young man to a vacant professorship:26
Master Hans Resen was unanimously nomi-
nated by the professors because of his father’s 
meritorious services to the university and the 
church, as well as his own progress in learning 
and singular modesty.
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Daddy was a professor of theology, bishop of Sealand (the 
island on which Copenhagen lies), primate of the church 
of Denmark and Norway — and very much in favour 
with the king. The senate must have received a not-so-
gentle ministerial nudge to unanimously settle on young 
Resen as the right man for the job. He did, in fact, take 
up the position after returning from a sojourn abroad, 
and at the end of his career he had managed to obtain 
the same prestigious titles as his father. Before he got that 
far he had, among other things, produced a dissertation 
on logic in which he unabashedly plagiarized one of his 
predecessors.27
In the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, the University of 
Copenhagen was a miserable institution, primarily produc-
ing pastors (and bishops) for the churches and teachers for 
the Latin schools of Denmark and Norway, a few doctors 
and still fewer jurists plus various minor officials. To obtain 
the licence to become a pastor, two or three years of studies 
sufficed, i.e. about half of the standard time required to take 
a degree in the liberal arts at the University of Paris in the 
13th century. Not much was left of the spirit from then, or 
of the spirit from Plato’s Academy, although the institution 
often called itself academia in accordance with humanist 
practice. Of course, there were honourable exceptions 
in the vast sea of mediocrity, but the few whose learning 
and innovative thinking shone in the darkness managed 
to do quality work in spite of rather than thanks to the 
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environment in the institution at which they were employed.
The situation was similar in many other European univer-
sities, for most of them had become dependent on secular 
or religious authorities or both. Bold new thoughts were 
most often thought in other settings. For, of course, there 
were still people with a burning wish to understand the 
world. The 17th and 18th centuries saw the rise of a new 
sort of institution: the learned society. Some of those 
societies called themselves academies, and they typically 
obtained state recognition like the British Royal Society 
(officially recognized 1663) and the Danish Det Kongelige 
Danske Videnskabernes Selskab (founded 1742; literally The 
Royal Danish Society of Sciences, but the official English 
translation is now The Royal Danish Academy of Sciences 
and Letters). However, since they all had ‘Royal’ in their 
names, the learned societies generally escaped serious 
intervention from the central administration and managed 
to provide the forum for research and discussion that the 
universities could no longer offer. On the other hand, the 
learned societies lacked direct contact to young students.
In the 19th century, the universities finally returned tri-
umphant, the youthful dreams of the 13th century were 
revived and to a considerable degree realized.
The name that shines out is Wilhelm von Humboldt, 
the father of the University of Berlin, which is now named 
after him. In 1810, when he held a position in the Prussian 
government that we may only slightly anachronistically 
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translate as “minister of education”, he wrote a memo-
randum in which he stresses that universities should be 
something different than just extra advanced schools.28 
They should be places where man’s natural urge to under-
stand can thrive within as free a framework as possible. 
The state must not, by any means, stifle this and should 
not meddle in the running of the institution.29 About the 
nature of scientific knowledge (Wissenschaft, including 
both humanities and natural sciences), he says:30
Regarding the internal organization of the 
higher scientific institution, everything de-
pends on respecting the principle of viewing 
scientific knowledge as something that still has 
not been completely found, and never will be 
completely found, while relentlessly searching 
for it as such.
About the relation of the school to the university, he says 
that the transition from school to university ought to mark31 
an incision in the life of the youth, to which the school, 
if it has fulfilled its mission, delivers over its alumnus in 
such a pure state that physically, morally and intellectually 
he can be left to freedom and independence.
Inspired by such ideas, people in the 19th century 
found a sensible compromise between a free general 
education and the state’s recognized need for expert 
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knowledge in ever more fields. In several countries, the 
result was university education of the sort that I myself 
have received. The final degree was called candidatus 
magisterii and the exam was called skoleembedseksamen, 
literally school office exam, meaning that anyone who 
had taken the degree was licenced to teach his subject in 
a high school. The requirements for obtaining the degree 
were meant to ensure that the graduate had at least the 
knowledge needed to hold such a post, but at the same 
time that the student enjoyed almost unlimited freedom 
from the time he entered university till he took his degree.
In many ways, I have devoted my life to the University 
of Copenhagen and I have much for which to thank the 
institution. In my youth, it provided me with great freedom 
to develop intellectually. In my mature age, I enjoyed con-
siderable free space to pursue my research as I wished and 
to teach subjects I liked to teach, and in the way I preferred 
to teach them. In my last years, I have been sufficiently 
invulnerable to allow myself the luxury of flouting most 
of the rules that now restrict academic freedom.
But I do pity my younger colleagues who are now 
tasked with continuing the business in unreasonable 
circumstances, and I particularly feel sad on behalf of the 
students, who have lost the freedom that used to make an 
academic study a real development of oneself.
The so-called “student revolt” of 1968 happened 
while I was a student; it was not as violent in Denmark 
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as in Paris, but there was quite a commotion. Some of the 
troublemakers later became well-esteemed professors, 
and with some I entertain friendly relations, but that is in 
spite of, not because of what they did then. Among their 
achievements was a change in study programmes to the 
effect that many branches of the humanities jettisoned 
their historical ballast, e.g. focussing on modern trivial 
literature rather than older world literature, and dropping 
requirements that students of English learn Anglo-Saxon 
or students of history learn Latin.
The “68ers”, as they are called in Denmark, claimed, 
among other things, that they were revolting against “the 
regime of the professors”. Now not only the professors, but 
all university teachers and students have been robbed of 
any influence at the University of Copenhagen (and all 
other Danish universities as well), save for a few who have 
been hired as “leaders” — a term that gives bad vibes to 
anyone acquainted with European history in the 1930s 
— and for hostage members of the university board. But, 
some people in parliament and the central administration 
seem to think that even that is too much freedom. Recently 
it was suggested that the university board should have 
politically appointed members.
We are worryingly close to being back to the heavy- 
handed ministerial rule of the 16th and 17th centuries, only 
nowadays we are also burdened with a gigantic bureaucra-
cy, which is sucking out all the oxygen from the system. 
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Study programmes are being organized along school lines, 
with little choice left to the students as to which courses 
to attend or when to sit for which exams. It is time the 
university reclaims its freedom and its soul!
So, dear students, now is the time to revolt! Revolt to 
recover and enjoy your freedom, while taking responsibility 
for your own lives! Freedom to structure your studies the 
way you want and freedom from petty gathering of ects 
points and a host of little exams with associated courses. 
Revolt for the right to work your butts off out of sheer 
enthusiasm and reach an understanding of your chosen 
area of study that will last you for a lifetime and not 
just ensure that you can deliver the right answers at the 
January examinations. You must find a way to resurrect 
the dying university in a form that suits your times. You 
cannot wait for three hundred years, as people did after 
the reformation!
You may have to make economic sacrifices on the 
altar of freedom. As long as the Danish state pays a 
monthly salary32 — however modest — to all students, 
politicians and civil servants are likely to feel obliged to 
rule the universities in a way that, in their opinion, will 
probably result in the money returning to the treasury. 
To achieve that aim, they want education to be short and 
to be tailored to the measure of occupations that they 
believe will generate money.
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But, as Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle and the creators of the 
first universities had realized, knowledge is a good in its 
own right. It is a good worth pursuing no matter whether 
one can expect an economic reward or not. Man shall 
not, and cannot, live by bread alone; knowledge is also 
needed. Some knowledge then turns out to be useful in 
the production of bread, some just enhances the quality 
of human life.
 
1  Nowadays, Danish students have the right to pursue only one 
degree, although in the humanities this will often involve two 
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2  Studiehåndbog for det filosofiske fakultet fra 1962.
 
3  Translated by the author. The same goes for all other translations 
in what follows. The Danish text ran: “Studiet er frit, og det af-
gørende er og bliver den stadige læsning af tekster, oversættelser 
og faglitteratur. De studerende rådes dog til, særlig i de første 
semestre, at følge den universitetsundervisning der er lagt til 
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before the final MA exam).    
 
4  “Jeg haaber, at det skal lykkes mig, idet vi i Forening søger  
Sandheden, at vinde og fortjene Deres Tillid. I dette Øjeblik, da  
vi endnu er fremmede for hinanden, er der kun een Ting, jeg har 
Ret til at fordre af Dem: at De har Tillid til Videnskaben, Tillid 
til Tanken, Tillid til Dem selv.” The words were taken down by  
one of the students. I quote from C.H. Koch, ‘Hans Brøchners  
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bidrag til Kierkegaard-receptionen i Danmark’, Scientia Danica,  
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6  Charmides in Taureas’ wrestling court (palaestra). Lysis in a 
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7  Little house: Aristophanes, Clouds 92. Thinkery: Clouds 94. Sports 
facility: at Clouds 179 a pupil relates how Socrates by means of an 
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(palaestra)”.  
 
8  Platon, Sophist 216c-d.
 
9     Aristophanes’ Socrates is a composite character borrowing traits 
from several of the intellectuals of the time (Protagoras, for 
instance), but I am inclined to think that his running a sort of 
school is a trait that was shared by the real-life Socrates.
 
10  Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers VI.24. In Greek, the 
pun is diatribē “school, institution” — katatribē “wearing out, 
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11  According to Aristotle, as reported by his pupil Aristoxenus 
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his thought. Most modern scholars believe this was Plato’s only 
attempt to address a general audience.
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own school.  
 
13  In a few places in his Metaphysics Aristotle uses a “we” that must 
mean “we Platonists”. On one of those occasions, I.9.991b3, he 
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usurp the authorship of Plato’s dialogue, so  the sense must be “As 
we say when discussing on the basis of Plato’s Phaedo.”
 
14  This paragraph summarizes Plato, Theaetetus 172c-173b and 
200d-201c.
 
15  Spørge Jørgen by Kamma Laurents.
 
16  This appears from the way both of them portray “sophists” as 
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17  Gellius, Attic Nights XX.5.
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19  See, for instance, R. Sorabji, ed., John Philoponus, (Duckworth, 
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22  Boethius Dacus, ‘De summo bono’, ed. N.J. Green-Pedersen, Corpus 
Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi VI.2, (DSL: Copenhagen), 
p. 371.
 
23  A scholarly description of the foundation of the first Danish uni-
versity may be found in J. Pinborg, Universitas Studii Haffnensis, 
(Copenhagen 1979).
 
24  See A. Piltz, Studium Upsalense, (Lund 1977).
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25  H.D. Rørdam, Kjøbenhavns Universitets Historie fra 1537 til 1621, 
vol.4, (Copenhagen 1877.) Documents 220-221 are letters addressed 
to the university by king Frederick II in 1580, in both of which he 
orders that named persons be promoted to doctors. In documents 
115, 116 and 148, the same king “recommends” certain persons to 
the university. In documents 265 and 286 (from 1590 and 1592, 
respectively), the royal chancellor, in his capacity of conservator 
of the university, instructs the institution about whom to appoint 
to vacant professorships.
 
26  Original text in H.D. Rørdam, Historiske Samlinger og Studier,  
Copenhagen1890-1902, vol. 4, p. 477: “Tandem de Professione va-
cante dubitatum est, quis in illam succederet. M. Johannes Resenius 
communi Dn. Professorum consensu nominatus est ob patris in 
Academiam et Ecclesiam merita et ob proprium ipsius in literis 
profectum et singularem modestiam. Magnifici tamen Cancellarii 
judicium prius per M. Rectorem exquirendum.” For more information 
about Resen, S. Ebbesen & C.H. Koch, Dansk filosofi i renæssancen, 
1537-1700, (Gyldendal: Copenhagen 2003), pp. 170-175. Resenius, 
Disputatio logico-metaphysica prima, Copenhagen 1634. The logical 
part was copied from a 1621 dissertation by P.N. Gelstrup.
 
28  W. von Humboldt, ‘Über die innere und äussere Organisation der 
höheren wissenschaftlichen Anstalten in Berlin’, in: Werke in fünf 
Bänden. Herausgegeben von A. Flitner u. K. Giel, (Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft: Darmstadt 1964), vol. IV, pp. 255-266.  
 
29  Op. cit., p. 257: “Er [i.e. der Staat] muss sich eben immer bewusst 
bleiben [...] dass er vielmehr immer hinderlich ist, sobald er sich 
hineinmischt, dass die Sache an sich ohne ihn unendlich besser 
gehen würde”.
 
30  Op. cit., p. 257: “Dies vorausgeschickt, sieht man leicht, dass bei der 
inneren Organisation der höheren wissenschaftlichen Anstalten 
Alles darauf beruht, das Prinzip zu erhalten, die Wissenschaft als 
etwas noch nicht ganz Gefundenes und nie ganz Aufzufindenes 
zu betrachten, und unabläßig sie als solche zu suchen.”
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31  Op. cit., pp. 260-261: “Auf der anderen Seite aber ist es hauptsäch-
lich Pflicht des Staates, seine Schulen so anzuordnen, dass sie 
den höheren wissenschaftlichen Anstalten gehörig in die Hände 
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32  At the moment, every student above the age of 20 who does not 
live with his parents is entitled to approximately DKK 6,000 a 
month, which at the moment (late November 2016) is roughly 
equivalent to € 800 or £ 690.
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What is education? This question demands that we 
not only describe the general nature of education, but 
also that we describe the qualities, problems and con-
flicts, which make up the present reality of education. 
The question is thus as philosophically pertinent as it is 
politically urgent - it demands reflection but not without 
imposing confrontation.  To pose it is a way of questioning 
the answers that define and govern what education is and 
can be said to be today.
The contributions to this volume are, each in their own way, 
results of this urgent question.
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